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The Life of Field-Marshal
Sir Frederick Paul Haines

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

THE LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF HUGH, FIRST VISCOUNT GOUGH,

FIELD MARSHAL

Illustrated with Maps and Portraits

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The Life of Field-Marshal Sir Frederick Paul Haines

BY

ROBERT S. RAIT

FELLOW OF NEW COLLEGE, OXFORD

AUTHOR OF "THE LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF HUGH, FIRST VISCOUNT GOUGH"

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

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PREFACE

On the death of Field-Marshal Sir Frederick Haines, his son, Lieutenant-Colonel Gregory Haines, asked me to undertake a biography. The invitation was in accordance with his father's expressed wish, for Sir Frederick had deliberately refrained from destroying his papers in order that such a work might be written, and he did me the great honour of indicating me as the writer.

My book is an attempt to narrate the life of a noble-minded soldier, who fought bravely in many battles, occupied great and responsible positions, and took part in many memorable discussions. The character of the man will appear sufficiently in the record of word and deed.

The name of Frederick Paul Haines appears in the Army List from 1839 to 1909; for some years before his death he was, as the senior Field-Marshal, the oldest soldier on the Active List. He fought his first battles against the Sikhs, serving as Lord Gough's Military Secretary both in the campaign on the Sutlej and in the conquest of the Punjab. His letters and diaries, written from the camp of the Commander-in-Chief, and with full knowledge of his plans, throw fresh light upon the fierce warfare of 1845–6 and 1848–9. In the following decade Haines was engaged in the Crimea. His letters describe the battles of the

Alma and Balaclava, and are specially important for Inkerman, where it fell to him, with a handful of men, to keep for six hours the threatened barrier which was an all-important point in the defence of the British camp. There were many heroes at Inkerman; the achievement of Frederick Haines was second to none in courage and endurance, or in its influence upon the fortunes of the day. Kinglake considered that the retention of the barrier "goes to the very pith of the business. It augments the glory of the day, and gives much more simplicity and consequently more grandeur to the battle than would otherwise belong to it." The story of this exploit is here told in detail for the first time. The chapter on Inkerman will also be found to throw light upon the successful surprise of the British force in the early morning and upon the final repulse of the Russians.

Haines saw no active service in the Indian Mutiny, and his biography is concerned only with the measures taken during the critical weeks (June 17 to August 13, 1857), when Sir Patrick Grant was acting Commander-in-Chief at Calcutta and Sir Frederick Haines his Military Secretary. The policy adopted at military headquarters, and the results achieved, between the death of General Anson and the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell have not yet been properly weighed by historians of the Mutiny, and in this chapter an attempt has been made to show what British rule in India owes to Sir Patrick Grant.

Haines returned to England in 1860, and after a short interval was appointed to command the Mysore Division of the Madras Army. In 1871 he became Commander-in-Chief at Madras, and in 1876 Com-

mander-in-Chief in India. His five years' tenure of that high office includes the period of the second Afghan war, the operations in which he directed, though he did not command in the field. Between the Viceroy, the first Earl of Lytton, and Sir Frederick Haines there were many differences of opinion, both as to the measures to be taken in the event of hostilities with Russia, and as to the force required for the invasion of Afghanistan. These and similar subjects have been treated from the point of view of the Commander-in-Chief, but, it is hoped, without unfairness to the Viceroy. Under Lord Lytton's successor, the late Marquis of Ripon, there occurred some military events of importance, including the British defeat at Maiwand and the relief of Kandahar. If Sir Frederick's advice had been taken, the battle of Maiwand would never have been fought; after the disaster, it was he who suggested Sir Frederick Roberts' march from Kabul to the relief of Kandahar.

Sir Frederick Haines' term of command came to an end in 1881. The last twenty-eight years of his life were spent for the most part in London. He represented the British Army at the Russian Manœuvres of 1882 and at the German Manœuvres of 1884. Some reminiscences of these experiences form a large portion of the concluding chapter.

There is, it is believed, a sufficient amount of hitherto unwritten history in this volume to be of interest to students of war; but the book makes its main appeal as a simple and straightforward story of the not unadventurous career of a nineteenth-century soldier.

I have to express my gratitude to Colonel Haines, Mr. Robert Blagden, Miss Grant, Sir Squire Bancroft,

and Mr. Kenneth Barnes for lending me papers or giving me information. I am also indebted for the loan of his Reminiscences (still, unfortunately, in MS.) to Sir John Blunt, who was Chief Interpreter to the Cavalry Division in the Crimea, and Secretary to Lord Lucan at Balaclava. My friend Mr. G. W. Forrest, the historian of the Indian Mutiny, has been so generous as to read my proof-sheets and to make many suggestions. General Sir Luther Vaughan has kindly permitted me to use the map prepared for his autobiography, *My Service in the Indian Army—and After*, and the Viscount Gough has been good enough to allow me to reproduce the portrait of Sir Frederick Haines which originally appeared in my biography of his illustrious grandfather, the conqueror of the Punjab.

ROBERT S. RAIT.

New College, Oxford,
21 *November* 1910.

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THE LIFE OF FIELD-MARSHAL SIR FREDERICK PAUL HAINES

INTRODUCTORY

FREDERICK PAUL HAINES was born on the 10th August, 1819, at the Parsonage Farm, Kirdford, Sussex. The family[1] to which he belonged has a continuous history in Sussex from the middle of the sixteenth century. One of its members is said, traditionally, to have taken part in an expedition under Drake, and it produced, in the seventeenth century, a man of considerable mark in the person of Richard Haines (1633–1685), the author of works on *The Prevention of Poverty* (1674), *Proposals for Building in Every County a Working Almshouse or Hospital* (1677), and *A Method of Government for Public Working Almshouses* (1679). His interest in economics was not confined to Poor Law reform: he published also *A Breviat of Proposals for Restoring the Woollen Manufacture*, the leading suggestion in which seems to have been the underselling of foreign competitors until they were ruined. He was the inventor of a spinning engine, and of a

[1] I am indebted for information about the Haines family and about Richard Haines to a privately printed work, *A Complete Memoir of Richard Haines* 1633–1685, *with a full account of his ancestry and posterity*, by Charles Reginald Haines, 1899.

new method for the manufacture of cider, and he took out, in 1672, a patent for an invention "for severing and cleansing the seed called Nonsuch Trefoyle or Hop Clover from the huske." This patent was the occasion of much controversy, for a leading member of the Baptist community, to which Richard Haines belonged, succeeded in bringing about his excommunication on the ground that patentees might properly be classed with idolaters and unclean persons. The same opponents, on other grounds, obtained a temporary delay in the confirmation of the patent; but, in the end, Haines won a complete victory, for the patent was confirmed, and the sentence of excommunication was reversed. He prospered in life, and, although he died a comparatively young man, he left a considerable fortune, which "raised his family above the rank of yeoman."

The second son of Richard Haines bore the family name of Gregory. He was a trader in South Carolina, and his name appears as a witness of the acceptance of the sovereignty of George II by the Cherokees in 1730. His son, John, a sailor, was present at Hawke's great victory off Brest, and "Lost his Right arme the 14 Oct^{br}, 1747, one bord of his magestys Shipe the Glosester, in Gaging the french fleet onder the Comand of Admirall Hawk." He succeeded to a small Sussex property, and lived on a farm called Sladeland in the parish of Kirdford, where he died in 1769. He was the great-grandfather of Sir Frederick Haines, through his eldest son "Gregory Haines of Sladeland, gentleman," 1753–1819. This Gregory Haines was the father of six sons and five daughters. The eldest of his large family was baptized Gregory at Kirdford

Church in July, 1778. The first thirty years of his life were spent at Kirdford, on the land possessed or leased by his father, and in 1804 he married Harriet, daughter of John Eldridge of Kirdford. On the outbreak of the Peninsular War he joined the Commissariat Department of the Army and ended his career as Commissary-General for Ireland. His services are summarized by himself in a letter written in 1846 to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, on behalf of his son Frederick—

> "I believe that with the exception of His Grace, your Lordship, and my friend Mr. Booth, and myself, few can say what I feel a pride in saying, that throughout the glorious campaign in Portugal, Spain and France, from the 24th May 1809 to the 24th May 1814, the Head Quarters of His Grace never made a march without me. After that period, I had the honour to be placed in charge of the Commissariat Department attached to the left column of cavalry on the march from Bordeaux to Calais, a peculiar service which I believe was accomplished without a single complaint, and at a much less expense than was expected, for which I received the thanks of His Grace. I rejoined the Army which assembled in Belgium the following year, and saw occasion to step a little out of my profession at the Battle of Waterloo, which Sir George Scovell can well explain if referred to. I continued to serve with that army until the occupation of France was given up, and in 1826 was sent to this country [Ireland], where I continued in charge of the Commissariat Duties seven years, when the Lords of the Treasury were pleased to promote me in as flattering a manner as an officer could possibly wish. I have drawn up this short statement of

> my services because I know sometimes those of the Father are thrown into the scale with the merits of the Son, to the benefit of the latter."

Commissary-General Haines was made a C.B. in 1826. His Peninsular Medal bears clasps for Toulouse, Orthes, Nive, Nivelle, Pyrenees, Vittoria, Salamanca, Fuentes d'Onor, Busaco, Talavera, and Corunna. He can be recognized in a sketch representing Wellington hunting near Torres Vedras, and there is a caricature of him by his friend, Commissary-General Ibbetson, in the act of pronouncing upon the points of a horse. He was not forgotten by those who were associated with him in the Peninsula, for when his son Frederick was on Lord Gough's staff in India, he tells in a home letter—

> "I was dining at the Governor-General's a few nights ago. Lord Hardinge came up to me and said: 'Well, Haines, how's your Father? do you ever hear from him?' I told him I heard regularly, and that you were quite well. He said, 'I'm glad of it; a good man, capital officer; I wish we had him out here.'"

The family of Gregory and Harriet Haines consisted of a daughter, Emma, born in 1805, and three sons, Gregory, born in 1809, Edward Eldridge, born in 1815, and Frederick Paul, born in 1819. Emma Haines married, in 1838, Benjamin Duff of Hatton, Aberdeenshire, then a Captain in the 92nd Highlanders. Gregory, whose marriage to a daughter of the first Lord Gough had an important influence on the career of his youngest brother, was for thirty-two years an officer of the Madras Army, but he was chiefly

employed in the Civil Service in Mysore. He died in 1874. Edward became Colonel of the 92nd Highlanders, and died in 1878. Mrs. Duff survived to 1897.

Of the early years of the subject of this memoir there is little to tell. The boy's home was in Sussex till 1826, when the family removed to a house in Belvedere Place, Dublin, which continued to be the family meeting ground until his mother's death in 1869. His letters, written from India between 1846 and 1849, contain a few references to the happy home life—

> "I don't believe there was a happier circle in the three kingdoms than ours in 1837, '38 and '39," he says.

Frederick was a high-spirited boy, given to practical jokes, with all a boy's hatred of "early to bed and early to rise." One of his boyish pranks he relates as a reminiscence for the amusement of his father—

> "Teddy insisted on keeping an owl in our bedroom in Belvedere Place. Thinking Teddy was asleep, I quietly got up and opened the window, to give free scope to the flight in which the creature was indulging. The thing must have flapped his wing in his master's face in one of its gyrations, for I was caught and thrashed in flagrante delicto."

He had evidently a reputation as a "pickle," for he writes in 1846—

> "I well know that I have been by far the most expensive to you of all your sons, and was usually looked upon as the *vau rien* of the family,

not by our own circle, for you and my mother always gave me credit for having some good in me, but many thought me fit only for the gallows."

Among the family friends were Mr. William Booth, a Peninsular friend of his father, afterwards of the Ordnance Department in Dublin, and the distinguished Irish lawyer Francis Blackburne, successively Attorney-General, Master of the Rolls, and Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench in Ireland, and for a few months Lord Chancellor of Ireland. Of the kindness and hospitality of both of these, Haines retained a most grateful recollection, and his early letters contain many references to them. Mr. Booth followed the career of his young friend with great interest and lived to congratulate him upon his appointment to the command in India. A grandson[1] of Lord Chancellor Blackburne fell fighting gallantly at Maiwand, and in the course of some correspondence in which the Commander-in-Chief informed the parents of the "highly distinguished conduct" of their son, he referred to his old associations with the family—

"Throughout a long and somewhat varied career I have never ceased to remember with much satisfaction and gratitude the intimacy to which the late Chief Justice Blackburne and his family were good enough to admit me in the days of my obscure boyhood. I have often thought with wonder upon the kindness and patience with which that wonderful mind of the Lord Chancellor's would put up with my boyish conversation, and even go so far as to seem interested in it. Indeed, I may say that those days at Roebuck

[1] Lieutenant Henn, R.E.

> have always formed one of my most pleasant memories. I have often [related] to my friends how that once he tried to turn aside my soldier proclivities in favour of the Bar, offering at the same time to assist my early steps. I told him I was an idle fellow who could do him no credit, and I thought I had better stick to the army."

Frederick Haines received his early education at Midhurst in Sussex. No incidents of his school-days survive; the one scrap of information is a note, in his handwriting, to Campbell's "Hohenlinden"—"Spouted by F. P. H. at Midhurst." His education at Midhurst was followed by two memorable years in Germany.

> "My father," he wrote in 1893, "had the forethought to give me a year in Brussels and a year in Dresden. This last was the most important part of my education. But then, as now, much of my thought was turned to Art. As opportunity offered, I always returned to Dresden. Leaving it in 1837, I re-visited it in 1850, after an absence of thirteen years, with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. This, in German eyes, was a miracle of promotion in those days."

As an old man he frequently re-visited Dresden: several times in company with Mr. Kenneth Barnes, to whom he related some early memories of his "Queen City." His father placed him, in 1837, under the care of a tutor, but the fact that he was an English boy studying for a profession did not prevent his making friends in the German society of the place. He was asked to parties, and it was at Dresden that he met Clara Wieck, afterwards Madame Schumann.

He stood at the piano while she played, and he had some conversation with her afterwards. "One day," says Mr. Barnes, "he took me to see a bust of the famous Singer, Madame Schröder-Devrient, and he told me he had had a great admiration for her and her art in his youth."

The impulse of that year in Dresden was never lost. The Drama, and, above all, Painting, continued to be, apart from his profession, the great interests of his life.

After a period of training at the Royal Military College, Frederick Paul Haines was, on the 21st June, 1839, gazetted an ensign in the 4th (the King's Own) Regiment, and he sailed, almost immediately, to join it in India, then six months distant from England, for the passage of those days was made in a sailing vessel and by the Cape of Good Hope.

CHAPTER I

THE CAMPAIGN ON THE SUTLEJ

THE India to which his long sea voyage brought young Haines was on the verge of the great events which were to render the Victorian era memorable in the annals of the East. The Afghan wars of 1839 and 1879 are separated by an interval of forty years —years which saw campaigns in Sind, Gwalior, the Punjab, and Burmah, the suppression of the Mutiny, the extinction of the great East India Company and the growth of the system and methods of administration with which we are familiar to-day. It could not be given to any one man to play his part in all these varied scenes of Indian history; but the ensign of 1839 was fated to take an active share alike in the council chamber and on the battle-field, to know the secrets and to face the perils of warfare on the banks of the Sutlej and in the Punjab, to help to bear the responsibilities of the darkest hour in the Sepoy revolt, and, finally, to be the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian army throughout the second invasion of Afghanistan. He served under the command of Gough and Colin Campbell and under the sway of Auckland, Ellenborough, Hardinge, Dalhousie, Canning, Elgin, Lawrence, Mayo, Northbrook, Lytton, and Ripon. He was not an officer of the Indian army; but, except for the glorious days when, with

his beloved and gallant regiment, he fought in the Crimea, his title to remembrance rests upon the honourable record of nearly thirty years of a soldier's life in India. His own memories of the years which followed the death of Runjit Singh, the Lion of the Punjab, seemed distant to those who listened to them in the reign of Edward VII. "We are all children compared to Sir Frederick," said an Indian veteran in introducing to him Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, then about to assume the command in India. But his associations with British rule in the East went back far beyond his personal recollections, for he was welcomed to India by General Sir Mark Cubbon, the great administrator of Mysore, who went out to India in 1800, the year after the capture of Seringapatam and the death of Tippoo. When the insurrection in Mysore, caused by the misgovernment of the Rajah, had been quelled by a Madras force, the administration was carried on by British officers till 1834. Cubbon was a member of this Commission, and from 1834 to 1861 he was sole Commissioner. The country grew tranquil and prosperous under his sway, and his name is remembered with affection and gratitude by the people. During his sixty-one years' service in India, Cubbon had never visited Europe, and he died at Suez in 1861 on his way to England. Sir Mark showed great kindness to Haines during more than one period of residence at Bangalore, and his memory was always regarded by him with affectionate gratitude.

More important for the future career of our hero was his recommendation to the attention of Sir Hugh Gough. His eldest brother, Gregory, Lieutenant-

Colonel of the 18th Native Infantry, had married, in 1839, Mona, third daughter of Sir Hugh, who was then in command at Bangalore, and this family connection proved an important factor in Frederick's life. In the Peninsular War, Hugh Gough, at the head of the 87th Regiment, the famous "Prince's Own," had gained a reputation which was not forgotten at the Horse Guards after a quarter of a century, during which his military career seemed to have passed its period of opportunity. At Talavera the 87th was in the thickest of the fight, and its Colonel and twenty-seven other officers were wounded. At Barrosa, in a hand-to-hand encounter on which the fortunes of the day depended, the 87th, with Gough at its head, charged the 8th French regiment and captured its Eagle, with the laurel wreath which was the gift of Napoleon himself. "Your regiment has covered itself with glory," wrote General Graham (Lord Lynedoch), who commanded at Barrosa, to the absent Colonel, Sir John Doyle. "Recommend it and its commander to their illustrious patron, the Prince Regent; too much cannot be done for it." The conduct of the "Aiglers" was not less distinguished at the siege of Tarifa, the most thrilling and the most romantic of the sieges of the Peninsular War, when Gough and the Prince of Wales's Irish regiment held the breach in the defences and saved the town. To the music of "Garryowen" and "St. Patrick's Day" the men, in the words of one of them, succeeded in their efforts "to tache the French what it is to attack the aiglers," and "to give them Garry Owen to glory again." "The conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Gough and the 87th, whose good fortune it was to defend the

breach, surpasses all praise," wrote the Commandant of Tarifa. Tarifa was saved in 1811, and, in the three remaining years of the war, the 87th, though the course of events gave them less opportunity of independent action, added at Vittoria a fresh distinction to their illustrious record. In another of those brave encounters in the sternest fighting of a well-fought field, they captured the bâton of Marshal Jourdain. It was presented by Wellington to the Prince Regent, who sent him in return the bâton of a field-marshal of the British Army. At the Nivelle, where Gough was wounded in the thigh, a courageous exploit of the regiment drew from General Colville the exclamation, "Royal 87th! glorious 87th!"

The wound received on this occasion prevented the hero of Barrosa and Tarifa from fighting at Waterloo, but for his services in the Peninsula he received the honour of knighthood. The second battalion of the 87th was disbanded two years later, and in 1819 Sir Hugh Gough was transferred to the 22nd, or Cheshire, Regiment, which under his command dealt successfully with a Whiteboy outbreak in Ireland. From 1826 to 1837 Gough was on the unemployed list, and the rank of Major-General, accompanied by a K.C.B., seemed likely to be his final distinctions. In 1834 he was unexpectedly passed over for the vacant colonelcy of the 87th, and had thoughts of retiring from the service; in 1837 he was, equally unexpectedly, offered the command of the Mysore division of the Madras army. He landed at Madras in October, and had been, with his wife and daughters, resident at Bangalore for three years, when, in November 1840, Lord Auckland appointed him to

command. an expeditionary force sent to conduct a series of operations along the coast of China.

There is no extant letter which describes the first meeting of Frederick Haines and Sir Hugh Gough, but the older man was early impressed by the ability of the younger, and when he was selecting his staff for the China War, Haines, still only an ensign, asked to be allowed to go with him. "How long have you been with your regiment?" inquired Sir Hugh.

"Nine months, sir."

"Go home and learn your drill."

Four years later their long and intimate association began. In the interval Sir Hugh Gough had shown in China that he possessed the qualities of a statesman as well as of a soldier. He conducted a large number of actions against a brave, though ignorant, enemy, and by his well-considered tactics and the avoidance of frontal attacks where it was possible to employ other methods, he fought with uniform success and with an expenditure of life so trifling that the character of the operations was not fully appreciated in England. He early perceived that his instructions to attack ports and shipping along the coast failed to meet the necessities of the case, and from the first he determined, in spite of the adverse opinion of the Duke of Wellington, upon an advance up the Yang-tse-kiang. When this policy received the sanction of Lord Ellenborough, a demonstration before Nanking immediately put an end to Chinese resistance. From the first, too, he held that the swiftest method of ending the China War consisted in the adoption of a policy of conciliation and not of severity towards the Chinese people, and he consistently urged upon H.M.

Plenipotentiary the folly, as well as the cruelty, of attempting to exert pressure upon the Chinese Government through the sufferings of the population. For his success as Commander-in-Chief in the first China War, Sir Hugh was created a baronet and appointed to the command at Madras. A few months later, and before Sir Hugh's return to India, Lord Tweeddale, who was a soldier, was made Governor of Madras, and it was deemed desirable to unite the military with the civil command. In a letter which, some years later, was read by Sir Robert Peel to the House of Commons as "one of the most creditable letters ever written by a military man," Gough accepted the decision of the Government. On his arrival in India, in the beginning of 1843, he received an intimation from the Duke of Wellington that, at the Duke's suggestion, the Government had sanctioned his appointment as Commander-in-Chief in the East Indies.

This high and responsible post Gough held for almost six years, in the course of which he found himself on three occasions at the head of an army in the field. With the first of these campaigns—the sharp and decisive struggle with the regents of Gwalior—our story is not directly concerned. The defeat of the Mahratta army at Maharajpore illustrates the policy adopted by the Commander-in-Chief in dealing with the Sikhs. Hard-fought battles, calculated to impress on Mahratta or Sikh the prowess of the British soldier; no prolongation of hostilities into unhealthy seasons; and no long pursuits over difficult ground—such were the principles on which Sir Hugh Gough fought in India. The Maharajpore campaign lasted a few days, and the actual fighting

was over in forty-eight hours. The double victory at Maharajpore and Punniar was purchased at considerable cost; Gough's tactics met with some criticism, and but for political considerations which deprived him of some of his artillery, the loss might have been smaller. But the Duke of Wellington wrote in no hesitating terms—

> "I sincerely congratulate you on the Battle of Maharajpore. I have perused the details thereof with the greatest satisfaction, they are highly creditable to the officers and troops engaged as well as to yourself."

A year after the battle of Maharajpore, Frederick Haines became A.D.C. to Sir Hugh Gough,[1] and he served as his Military Secretary through part of the first, and the whole of the second, Sikh war. The years in which he enjoyed the confidence of the illustrious soldier who added the Punjab to the British dominion in India were a great and a formative epoch in his career. It must be remembered that the influence of this period was not limited by military operations, or even by the preparations and negotiations which preceded them. The Commander-in-Chief had to face other problems besides those of Sikh and Mahratta warfare. The discontent in the native army which led, in the following decade, to the Sepoy mutiny, was already showing itself, and Sir Hugh Gough had to deal with some of its manifestations while, at the same time, he was trying to persuade the Government to improve the artillery, and to increase both the proportion of European regiments and

[1] He was appointed A.D.C. on the 20th November 1844.

the number of European officers in native regiments. In the first year of his command mutinies broke out at Ferozepore on the Sutlej frontier and in Sind. Gough showed determination and firmness. In a few cases he disbanded the regiments, and in all he announced his policy as "punishment for those that resist, reward for those that redeem their error by submission." He had remonstrated against the measures which were the occasion of the mutinies; when they occurred, he declined to consider any suggestion of concessions until discipline had been completely restored. Then—insisting that native soldiers "look upon us as their conquerors, and only serve us from interested motives; whilst we pay them better than our neighbours and treat them justly, they will serve us"—he persuaded Sir Henry Hardinge (who succeeded Lord Ellenborough as Governor-General in 1844) to increase the pay of the Sepoys and to restore to them some privileges of which they had been deprived. He advocated, in opposition to some other military authorities, the retention of native officers, that the Sepoy might have some reward for loyal service; and, at the same time, he approved the reintroduction of corporal punishment "to deter bad characters from entering the service." His measures and his personal influence carried the army safely through the temptations of the Sikh wars; but the dangers of mutiny and discontent were never absent from his mind throughout the period of his command. He was specially alarmed by the condition of the magazine at Delhi, and urged its removal upon Lord Ellenborough, telling him that "everything is to be apprehended from the insecure state of the magazine

in the event of any internal outbreak." When Sir Henry Hardinge arrived in India, Sir Hugh Gough drew his attention to the "fearful insecurity" of the magazine "against any assault which the population, under any cause of excitement, might be induced to make upon it," and begged for its removal to Umballa. And when Hardinge was succeeded by Lord Dalhousie, the old Chief returned to the charge and urged the same course. Ellenborough, Hardinge and Dalhousie alike failed to appreciate the wisdom of the advice, and in 1857 the capture of Delhi brought to the rebels a great effective power to add to the strength of the sentiment derived from the historic fame of the city.

Such were some of the problems ever present before the Commander-in-Chief and his personal staff, and occasional references in Haines's diaries and letters indicate that the younger soldiers about the Chief did not fail to discuss them in all their bearings. The most intimate friends of the new A.D.C. were the Hon. C. R. Sackville West, afterwards the sixth Earl Delawarr, Herbert Edwardes, and the Chief's son-in-law, Major (afterwards Field-Marshal Sir Patrick) Grant, who was Adjutant-General in India from 1846 to 1851. Haines was to find himself in close association with Sackville West in the Crimea as well as in India, and his services during the Mutiny were to be rendered in the capacity of Military Secretary to Sir Patrick Grant. His diaries speak of discussions on military topics with both of these; and, during two campaigns, his official position brought him into more or less close relations with such distinguished soldiers as Sir John Littler, who commanded a division at

Maharajpore and outwitted Tej Singh at Ferozepore; Sir Colin Campbell, who had yet to win his great reputation in the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny; Sir Walter Gilbert, to whom the Sikh army was to surrender; Sir Harry Smith, of Aliwal fame; and Major Robert Napier,[1] who, as Lord Napier of Magdala, long afterwards preceded Haines in the chief command in India. During the intervals of peace, Lord Gough's activities never flagged, and his Military Secretary was kept busy by the energy of the Chief, who was never happier than when "reviewing troops and inspecting hospitals and barracks and looking at new marching inventions." The experience thus gained was always regarded by Haines himself as invaluable for his future career, and, in other ways as well, he was being trained for the varied responsibilities of high office. Gough was hospitable even for hospitable India, and he and Lady Gough bore worthily the burden of hospitality which fell upon the great "War Lord." The household of the Commander-in-Chief was united and harmonious, and the letters of the period show Haines' affection for its members. His devotion and loyalty to the Chief continued in undiminished intensity after sixty years had passed, and his affection for Lady Gough, for

[1] Sir Frederick Haines, writing in 1874 as Commander-in-Chief at Madras, expresses his pleasure at a visit paid to the first Camp of Exercise at Bangalore by the Commander-in-Chief in India: "That it should be Lord Napier of Magdala makes it doubly gratifying, for we have reminiscences in common of great events which have long since become history. We were somewhat thrown together in the campaigns of the Punjab, and have witnessed together incidents which we now look back upon with identical feelings. I find also in His Lordship an appreciator of the merits of my first military patron, Lord Gough."

the Grants, and, above all, for his sister-in-law, Mrs. Gregory Haines, was evinced by many acts of kindness and self-sacrifice.

On this happy family party there fell, a year after Haines joined it, the anxiety of the Sikh invasion of British India. The land of the Five Rivers[1] is inhabited partly by the Sikhs and partly by a Mussulman population much greater numerically than the Sikhs. In the seventeenth century the Sikhs or "Disciples," an unorthodox Hindu sect, formed themselves into a religious and military commonwealth, called the Khalsa or "pure." The soldiers of the Khalsa were divided into twelve fraternities, known as Mesh or equals, and the head of the Mesh was a Sirdar. In the nineteenth century Runjit Singh subdued these Sirdars, made himself chief of the Khalsa army, and sealed his power by delivering the Punjab from Afghan domination. Thus he created a great state. Runjit Singh lived on good terms with the British, but, after his death in 1839, the government fell into weak hands. The Punjab was temporarily rescued from anarchy in 1840 by Shir Singh, a reputed son of the great Runjit, who maintained cordial relations with the British in spite of the first Afghan war and the annexation of Sind. On Shir Singh's murder in 1843, anarchy again supervened at Lahore, and, gradually, the Sikh rulers become so much alarmed

[1] The five rivers are the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Ravi, the Sutlej, and the Beas. The lands lying between them are known as Doabs, and consist of rich alluvial soil near the river-beds, with wastes of grass, thornbush and tamarisk in the interior. The scene of the first Sikh war is in the south-east of the Punjab, near the confluence of the Sutlej and the Beas; the second Sikh war was fought between the Chenab and the Jhelum.

at the power of the Khalsa that they were prepared to launch the army over which it had complete control against British India in the hope of a defeat. It was not until after the conclusion of the first Sikh war that such an attitude on the part of the authorities at Lahore came to be suspected—

> "It was not credible," wrote Sir Henry Lawrence, "that the Lahore Government would calmly sit down in the midst of its difficulties and make the horrible calculations which it did of its inability to stand another month against the army . . . and that the vengeance of a foreign army would be a lesser evil than the fury of its own—that, *therefore*, it was expedient to fling the soldiery upon British India, supplying them with every possible means of success, taking, if unsuccessful, the chance of clemency and forgiveness, and, if victorious, the merit and profit of repelling the English from Hindoostan. We repeat that this calculation was too monstrous to be altogether credible, though not too monstrous to be true." [1]

The year which elapsed between the arrival of Sir Henry Hardinge as Governor-General and the outbreak of hostilities was spent in a pathetic attempt to prevent the inevitable contest. The guiding line of Hardinge's policy was the belief that any increase of British strength on the Punjab frontier would precipitate the war which he desired to avoid, and on this subject he naturally became involved in a controversy with the Commander-in-Chief. The position most important strategically and most open to attack

[1] *Essays, Military and Political,* by Sir Henry Lawrence, pp. 262, 263.

was Ferozepore, where we had an open cantonment near a ferry over the Sutlej, which was the natural crossing-place for a Sikh army. Eighty miles to the east we held a small fort at Ludhiana. Both Ferozepore and Ludhiana were in Sikh districts under British protection, and the nearest support in British India was Umballa, a station about eighty miles from Ludhiana and more than a hundred and fifty from Ferozepore. Sir Hugh Gough had, in October 1843, proposed to Lord Ellenborough to reinforce Ferozepore, Ludhiana, and Umballa, and to place between the two former a Light Cavalry Brigade to maintain communications. The suggestions were sanctioned, but the immediate danger passed away and they were not fully carried out when Lord Ellenborough left India. In his first communications with Sir Henry Hardinge, the Commander-in-Chief pointed out the danger arising from the existence of the Sikh army, trained by European soldiers and possessing magnificent artillery, "on our frontier, the greater part within four marches of our own territory, and the navigation of the boundary river in their hands." He shared the Governor-General's anxiety to avoid alarming the Sikhs by military preparations, and he stated the smallest reinforcements consistent with the safety of British India. These included the stationing of a European infantry regiment at Ferozepore and the erection of suitable barracks. In the end of 1844 Sir Hugh Gough himself visited the frontier, made a careful survey of the ground, and again urged Hardinge to complete the barracks which had been commenced in 1842, and were, in fact, considerably advanced. The course of events at Lahore helped the argument

of the Commander-in-Chief, and in January 1845 orders were given for the completion of the barracks. In due course reinforcements were sent, including one regiment of European infantry. A pontoon train and a supply of boats followed.

During the year 1845 matters went from bad to worse at Lahore, and in the late autumn Major Broadfoot, the political agent in the Punjab, announced that a Sikh invasion was imminent. At this date the British force available for employment between Umballa and the frontier numbered over 30,000 men. There were 7,000 efficient troops at Ferozepore, 5,000 at Ludhiana, 10,000 at Umballa, Karsauli, and Subathu, and 9,000 at Meerut, a station a hundred and thirty miles from Umballa and nearly three hundred from Ferozepore. On the 20th November Broadfoot reported that at least 40,000 Sikhs would at once cross the frontier, and Gough, on his own responsibility, ordered H.M. 9th Lancers to move from Meerut to Umballa and other troops at Meerut to be in readiness. Three days later Broadfoot thought an invasion less likely; the Governor-General countermanded the orders, and the Lancers returned to Meerut. On the 2nd December Gough supported Sir John Littler, who was in command of Ferozepore, in a demand for an additional European regiment. The request reached Hardinge on the 3rd, but he did not order the movement until four days had elapsed. By that time he had left Umballa, and the regiment (H.M.'s 80th Foot) could not march till the 10th. The delay deprived Gough of its services in the first two battles of the war. On the 8th December Broadfoot informed the Governor-General that the Sikhs would

immediately cross the Sutlej, and about the 11th the invasion began.

Everything was in readiness for immediate action. The cavalry moved from Umballa on the 11th, and the Commander-in-Chief followed with the infantry, having ordered up the reserve from Meerut and sent instructions to Sir Charles Napier to co-operate by making a strong demonstration on the other side of the Sutlej. The distance from Umballa to Moodkee, about 140 miles, was covered in a seven days' march over sand and jungle and cultivated fields, amid clouds of dust and under the merciless rays of an Eastern sun. The little army numbered about 10,000 men in all; the movements of the main body were, wrote Sir Henry Hardinge, "so accurately combined with other posts on our line of operations that in our progress we brought within our ranks every available man." The Governor-General had hesitated about fighting at once, and, some days earlier, had suggested leaving Ferozepore and Ludhiana to defend themselves until a larger relief force was available. "With a force of 10,000 men," wrote Sir Hugh Gough, "I should indeed deserve censure were I to let Ferozepore and Ludhiana be hard pressed, and, please God, I will not."

The Sikhs, on crossing the Sutlej, threatened Ferozepore, and then took up an entrenched position at Ferozeshah, about half-way between Ferozepore and Moodkee. They detached a force of about 10,000 cavalry and 2,000 infantry with 22 guns to meet the relieving army, which, on the 18th December, was approaching Moodkee. The British patrols were in constant touch with feeling-parties of the enemy, but

Sir Hugh Gough did not intend to give battle, and when the van reached Moodkee about midday, orders were given to lay out the camp. When the Chief came up, he sent out Haines (who had just been appointed acting Military Secretary) to the right front to report on any movement of the enemy. He found a cavalry piquet under Captain Quin, who told him that he had, for some little time, been watching clouds of dust in the far distance. These dust clouds Haines himself could descry a long way off, and he agreed with Quin that they indicated movements of troops. He hastened back to inform the Chief, who was already aware of the Sikh advance, and had given orders for action. It was now three o'clock in the afternoon, the headquarters staff had not yet breakfasted, and the men were dead beat after their twenty miles' march. Some of the European troops had not come up. Political considerations had prevented the Chief from brigading his army elsewhere than on paper, and the brigadiers and their staffs were unknown to the men. But it was impossible to refuse battle, and the Chief issued his final orders.

The cavalry were immediately sent to the front—Brigadiers Michael White and J. B. Gough on the right, and Brigadier Mactier on the left. The Chief rode a couple of hundred yards or so with the cavalry to give some orders to General White, and then returned to form up the infantry under Sir Harry Smith, Major-General Gilbert, and Sir John M'Caskill. While the cavalry threatened the enemy's flank, the British artillery replied to their first fierce challenge, and with unexpectedly satisfactory results, for the enemy's guns were silenced for the time. The Sikh cavalry now

emerged from the protection of a jungle into which it was unsafe to advance the British artillery. The Chief at once instructed General White to dash upon them the 3rd Dragoons, who in a brilliant charge won for themselves the name of the *Moodkee wallahs* (Moodkee fellows). Their charge was not the only brilliant cavalry exploit of that darkling afternoon; left and right the British horse swept along the enemy's flanks. There was no time to continue the artillery duel: the Sikh guns must be taken and the enemy driven off the field before the last rays of daylight came and went. The horse artillery moved up to the jungle, and Sir Harry Smith, supported by Gilbert and M'Caskill, attacked "an overwhelming force of Sikh infantry."

> "In this advance[1] our loss was dreadful. The enemy stood to their guns most manfully and plied us incessantly with round and grape. They had also posted matchlock men in the trees, from which our officers were sadly picked off; but nothing they could do could stop our fine fellows, who just at nightfall found themselves in possession of the enemy's position and of 17 of their guns. We remained on the field till eleven o'clock, when the moon arose to light us back to the camp. I rode on this occasion my little grey, 'the King's Own,' and never was better carried, having been on his back nearly twelve hours."

From the moment when the sounds of the Sikh artillery were heard ("the first shot I ever saw fired in anger"[2]) until, in the dim starlight, amid clouds of dust from the sandy plain, the forms of the retreating

[1] F. P. Haines to his mother, 1st January 1846.
[2] *Ibid.*

foe could just be descried, Haines had been carrying message after message from the Chief. "The day being far spent," he says, "it was necessary to act sharply and decisively," and sharply and decisively the battle was fought. The total loss was 215 of all ranks killed, and 657 wounded. Among the dead were Sir John M'Caskill, Brigadier Bolton, and Sir Robert Sale, the stubborn defender of Jellallabad; among the wounded was Major Patrick Grant, who had just become Deputy Adjutant-General. The Sikhs had killed and mutilated wounded men, and there were cases in which the merciful victor had been murdered by the merciless vanquished.

There was another and a more alarming reason for the long death-roll. "Some of the loss," wrote Sir Hugh Gough, in confidence, to his son, "was caused by corps firing into one another." The confusion of what was almost a night attack by troops which were brought together for the first time will in part account for this. But the Sikhs had for two years been attempting to persuade the native army to join them in the effort to drive the British out of India; the mutiny at Ferozepore, to which reference has already been made, was one result of their efforts. Sir Hugh Gough knew that it was essential to draw blood at once, if he wished to secure the loyalty of the Sepoy, and this was one of the reasons why he dared not leave Ferozepore to its own resources and await the coming of the larger army which he had been forbidden to assemble in time. The cross-firing was, in all probability, not entirely accidental, and, if danger from this source was to be avoided, "sharply and decisively" must continue to be the watchword.

The Governor-General had been close to the frontier when the enemy crossed, and he had taken the important step of withdrawing part of the garrison from Ludhiana to reinforce the main body: an arrangement provisionally made by Gough and himself. He joined the army before Moodkee, placed his personal staff at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, and was himself in the thick of the fight. On the evening of the next day he offered his services as second in command, and the graceful offer was accepted. The same day H.M.'s 29th Foot, the 1st European Light Infantry, and two regiments of native infantry reached the camp, bringing with them two 8-inch howitzers; the last reinforcements which could arrive in time for the next conflict. The Chief now began to make his plans for a greater struggle than Moodkee. The enemy's forces were divided. One large body, under the Sikh general Tej Singh, was watching Ferozepore; another, under Lal Singh, a Sirdar who was the favourite paramour of the Queen-Mother, occupied the entrenchments at Ferozeshah and cut off Littler and the Ferozepore garrison from Sir Hugh Gough's army. They much preferred defensive to offensive tactics, and the experience of Moodkee had confirmed them in this preference. Ferozeshah was a strong position, with horseshoe entrenchments, defended by a large number of powerful guns. "The Sikh artillery," Sir Hugh had written in anticipation of the fighting, "are good; they are bringing into the field a much larger force than we are. . . . Our six-pounders are pop-guns, very well and efficient against infantry, but unequal to cope with the heavy metal of the Native States, when outnum-

bered as we shall be." The range of the British artillery was only 800 yards. It was on his infantry that the Commander-in-Chief depended:—"Our advantage will, and ever must, be," he said, "manœuvre and the irresistible rush of British soldiers. Cavalry and artillery are excellent arms in aid, but it is infantry alone can in India decide the fate of every battle."[1] The infantry weapon was the "Brown Bess" of the Peninsula and Waterloo: its range was only 300 yards, and its real value lay in the cold steel of the "never-failing bayonet."

The Sikhs must be attacked, and without delay. The tactics which Gough had employed so effectively in China were useless here. To out-manœuvre the Sikhs and drive their mobile force from one entrenchment to another was an impossible suggestion, even apart from the necessity of relieving Ferozepore. When "the bull is all horns" there is but one method of attack. The entrenchments must be stormed. Sir Hugh Gough determined that they should be stormed with the help of the Ferozepore garrison and before Lal Singh was joined by Tej Singh. The main army could not join Littler at Ferozepore without losing its communications and compelling a junction of the Sikh forces. The Commander-in-Chief therefore instructed Littler to elude the vigilance of Tej Singh and, leaving a small guard at Ferozepore, to arrive at Ferozeshah in time to reinforce the attacking army —a manœuvre which, with good reason, he trusted Littler to perform.

[1] "Our infantry must ever be our mainstay; if it is indifferent, the utmost efficiency in other branches will little avail."—Sir Henry Lawrence, *Essays*, p. 23.

Even if Littler should fail, the attack on Lal Singh at Ferozeshah must still be made, if the junction of the two Sikh armies was to be prevented. Accordingly, on the evening of the 20th December, Haines was instructed to summon a meeting of brigadiers and divisional officers. The Quarter-Master General and the Political Department had supplied the Chief with the necessary information, and he himself had made a survey of the ground in the previous year. He was therefore able to give the necessary instructions for the attack, which was to be delivered on the near side of the Sikh entrenchments at eleven o'clock on the morning of the 21st. Sir Henry Hardinge was not present at this meeting, but he was represented by his military secretary, Colonel Blucher Wood.

At four o'clock in the morning the army left Moodkee, and at half-past ten it halted to breakfast in full view of the Sikh position. The Chief now knew that Littler had succeeded in carrying out his difficult task; he was still some miles away, but staff officers had passed between the forces, and the Ferozepore garrison could be confidently counted upon as a reserve. Sir Hugh, after finally reconnoitring the Sikh position, saw his army so posted that the words "Right wheel into line" would have brought on an action. Riding up to the Governor-General, "I promise you a splendid victory," he said.

Sir Henry Hardinge was a brave and distinguished soldier, but he had seen no fighting since the battle of Waterloo, thirty years before. He had failed to understand the significance of the arrangements made on the previous night, and the reason of the halt now made in the face of the enemy. The Commander-in-

Chief, in place of giving the order which had almost fallen from his lips, found himself involved in a controversy with his second in command. They withdrew a short distance to discuss the situation. Hardinge was accompanied by his son, afterwards the second Viscount Hardinge, and Gough by his military secretary. "I acted as a table and held a map," Haines used to say, "but I could not help hearing the conversation." The memorable discussion on that winter morning, while the two armies faced each other in battle array, was not likely to be forgotten by the few who listened to it. Sir Henry insisted upon delaying the attack until Littler's arrival. Sir Hugh urged the necessity of utilizing the hours of daylight on the shortest day of the year. Even if Littler's movement had failed, it was essential to vanquish Lal Singh without delay. Littler had not failed, and it was so much the more advisable to attack at once. Several hours must elapse before the Ferozepore division could reach the position that the main body now occupied; by that time the daylight would almost have gone, and they would be in the same plight as at Moodkee. Hardinge was unconvinced, and more strongly than before he advocated delay, putting forward the new suggestion that the army should march on to meet Littler. The Commander-in-Chief imagined that the Governor-General could not realize all that this proposition meant. "What!" he exclaimed, "abandon my communications with India, and my wounded at Moodkee?" The protest was in vain; the second in command could not divest himself of his supreme powers or of his unique responsibility. Believing that he was saving the army from the rash-

ness of its Chief, the Governor-General overruled his settled plans on the eve of their being carried into operation.[1]

There was no choice but to obey. The camp at Moodkee was left to the protection of its guard of two regiments of native infantry, and the army marched on, "almost crossing the front of the enemy's position," as Wellington had done at Assaye, forty-two years before. At midday an advance party of the Ferozepore force, including General Littler himself, rode into the camp of the Commander-in-Chief; about half-past one the junction of the two armies was effected near the village of Misreewalla. The whole force now numbered about 18,000 men, and it was not until after three o'clock that the counter-marching and the formation of the army to suit the new front were completed. Sir Hugh declined to commence the battle until every man was in position. Very few in his army knew why the battle was delayed till almost dusk on a December day, or why, after eighteen hours on the march, they were facing the southern front of an entrenchment whose eastern side they were ready to attack an hour before noon. The few who were aware of the controversy kept their secret well, and half a century elapsed before the full story was given to the world. "It was late on this occasion before we got formed in order of battle before their position, so that a rush at the guns became again necessary," is all that Haines says in his home letter.

[1] The substance of this conversation was given to the present writer by Sir Frederick Haines during the preparation of *The Life of Lord Gough*. The account given in that work was approved by him, and it has been reproduced here almost verbatim.

The battle of Ferozeshah began with an artillery duel. "As on the former occasion (but in an infinitely greater degree)," the home letter proceeds, "our advance was exposed to their formidable artillery, on which our light field guns could make but little impression, while their breastwork afforded a complete cover to their infantry." The right wing of the attacking army was under the personal command of the Chief; the left was entrusted to Sir Henry Hardinge, with Sir John Littler and the Ferozepore force in support; Sir Harry Smith's division formed the reserve. The British artillery was completely outranged, and the Sikh shot, lopping off the branches of the trees as it fell, grew fiercer and fiercer. Brigadier Brooke, who commanded the artillery, at length approached the Chief. "Your Excellency," he said, "I must either advance or be blown to pieces." Almost at the same moment Sir Hugh's ear distinguished, amid the fury of the cannonade, the sound of musketry, as Littler's division made a premature advance. "Littler will be in the trenches unsupported," he exclaimed, and gave the order for a general advance.

Littler's division could not be saved from the danger into which its rashness had led it. His right brigade had already out-distanced the artillery; it was supported by his left (composed of native regiments alone), and in spite of the gallant conduct of H.M.'s 62nd Foot, it was compelled to retire. The troops for which the Governor-General had sacrificed the precious hours of daylight were completely repulsed at the very beginning of the battle. A stern conflict was before the main army. Its right wing, directed by the Chief himself, charged the entrenchments in

front of them, capturing the enemy's guns at the point of the bayonet, and breaking up their infantry. Their courage was put to a cruel test by the explosion of a Sikh powder magazine, but the brigade undauntedly pressed onwards to their goal. Sir Henry Hardinge and the left wing were equally successful, though with almost equal loss, for one of his brigades mistook the locality of the enemy's guns, and exposed themselves with terrible results. The reserve, under Sir Harry Smith, captured the village of Ferozeshah, the centre of the Sikh position, which they defended against heavy odds. It was now dark. The Sikhs had been driven out of most of their entrenchments, and, had the daylight lasted, they would have been beaten off the field. The ammunition which they had abandoned began to explode, and the Chief considered it necessary to withdraw the troops from the burning camp. They spent the night some 300 yards outside the entrenchments, harassed, after the moon rose at midnight, by an occasional volley from the enemy's artillery. In the terror of that awful night some brave men urged the Chief to retreat upon Ferozepore. Sir Henry Hardinge sent away his surgeon with Napoleon's sword, which Wellington had given him in 1816, and gave orders to destroy all State papers at Moodkee, in the event of the annihilation of the army at Ferozeshah. A message purporting to come from the Governor-General was conveyed to the Chief. It recommended withdrawal. "My determination is taken," said Sir Hugh, "rather to leave my bones to bleach honourably at Ferozeshah, than that they should rot dishonourably at Ferozepore."

Dawn showed that the Sikhs had partially re-occupied their entrenchments, from which they were soon expelled by a general onslaught along the whole line, and the army "halted, as if on a day of manœuvre, receiving its two leaders, as they rode along its front, with a gratifying cheer, and displaying the captured standard of the Khalsa army. We had taken upwards of seventy-three pieces of cannon, and were masters of the whole field."[1] The day wore on, and Tej Singh's fresh army from Ferozepore with heavy columns of cavalry, infantry and guns began to menace the wearied little force which had already suffered many things. Accidental explosions had exhausted the ammunition of the artillerymen; but the army responded to the confidence of its chief, and the Sikh onslaughts failed. Disheartened by their failure, and never at their best as an attacking force, the enemy saw in the distance a large body of our artillery and cavalry on its way to Ferozepore. This movement was, in reality, no more than a hideous blunder caused by the mental derangement of a staff officer, whose order was obeyed in spite of his appearing in pyjamas and explaining that his overalls had been so riddled with bullets that they had fallen off. Tej Singh knew nothing of the condition of the enemy beyond the fact that they had beaten Lal Singh's forces, and were holding his carefully entrenched position. The advance to Ferozepore was interpreted by him as part of some tactical movement designed to cut off his retreat, and he at once withdrew his forces. Sir Hugh Gough was left in undisturbed possession of the field.

[1] Sir Hugh Gough's dispatch.

Among the wounded at Ferozeshah was Frederick Haines—

> "I advanced with the right echelon, viz. H.M.'s 29th and 80th, having lost the Chief, after delivering an order to the artillery, but the front is always the place to find him, so there I went. . . . When we got to within 20 yards of the enemy's works, their discharges of grape and musketry became hot in the extreme, and one of the former coming my way hit me on the thigh a prodigious crack; some of its comrades broke my poor 'King's Own's' near fore leg in two places and gave him a wound in the chest also.

In later years he used to tell the story in greater detail than a wounded soldier could write. The prodigious crack of which he speaks rendered him for a few seconds unconscious, and he saw the features of father and mother, the scenes of his Sussex school-days, and the beloved Dresden Gallery. Then came a voice, dimly heard—

"Get off, your horse is wounded."

"I can't get off: I'm wounded myself."

The friend who spoke lifted him off and placed him on his own horse, which was immediately shot through the nose, but was safely led to the rear.

> "The only accommodation I could get was on the limber of one of the guns. One of the officers dressed my wound as well as he could. I *slept* (never closed my eyes)—I passed all night on the limber, and certainly never in my life spent so wretched a night. The pain of the wound, the piercing cold, notwithstanding the kind attempts of the artillerymen to keep me warm with their horses' clothing, cloaks, &c., together with the

incessant roar of the Sikh artillery, kept up from the portion of their position not yet carried, the uncertainty regarding the fate of our dear old Chief (I had heard some one say in passing he was wounded. This, thank God, proved untrue) all combined to make me most uncomfortable, bodily and mentally. Every night has its end, and that dreadful one passed at last, and in the morning, after enduring the agony of a gallop on the gun, I was fortunate enough to procure a dhooly, in which I arrived at Ferozepore on the night of the 22nd. The next morning my wound was dressed; two days after the ball was extracted (a large iron grape-shot)."[1]

There is an incident of this story which formed part of the reminiscence as it used to be told by its hero, and which cannot be omitted from his biography. Cricket was Haines's game, and in the beginning of December, while playing at Umballa, he had made the highest score of his life—ninety-nine runs—and hoped to complete his century. As the ball left the hand of the bowler, the midday gun went off behind the batter, and he was bowled out. During the night of pain at Ferozeshah, the limber on which he was lying had sunk into the sand, and there was some little difficulty in raising it. Every movement caused exquisite agony to the sufferer. At last it was accomplished, and the horses were put to. The driver looked at the wounded man. "Hope it won't spoil your cricket, sir," he said. It was the artilleryman who had bowled him out at Umballa, and his words brought

[1] Beaten, not cast: its jagged edges cut its way with fearful destruction in its passage towards the urethra. It was preserved by its victim and is now in the possession of his son.

the cheer of a great hope that he might live to play cricket again.

Despite the serious character of the wound, the young soldier's recovery was rapid. The home letter from which we have already quoted was written on the 1st January in excellent spirits—

> "A Merry Christmas and a happy new year to you, beloved Mother, and to all the dear ones at home. I can't say much for the jollity of my Christmas this time, but, my God! how much better than that of many of my comrades.... Poor Sir Robert Sale died of his wound, a broken thigh, 4 or 5 days after the fight [Moodkee], as did my most excellent friend Dashwood of the Horse Artillery. Poor fellow, he fell a victim to a mistaken attempt to save his foot, which should have been amputated. . . . I have been doing most admirably. When the Governor-General's camp came in here, I was moved up to it, and now occupy a tent with Abbott, wounded in the shoulder, and [Herbert] Edwardes, A.D.C., wounded in the thigh. We are a most merry set, I assure you, and begin already to laugh at our wounds. The Sikhs have retreated across the Sutlej, leaving 98 guns in our hands; their loss in men has also been severe, but I doubt if it equals ours, which in the two actions amounts to 3,970. This is horribly severe. Broadfoot, one of our most valuable men, is killed; poor [Arthur] Somerset gone also, shot through the lungs. Now that I have told you of my misfortunes, what think you of my luck, my plaister for my wound? It is not a Lieutenant of the King's Own who addresses you, but a Captain of the 80th, for to a company in that corps has Sir Hugh Gough gazetted me since the action. I hope it may be confirmed from home: how anxiously you will be all looking out

for the next Gazettes. I think my Father will be glad to hear of this. We will get the brevet majority for Lahore yet, please God. Had my poor little horse been spared, I should have been quite happy. On the morning of the 21st I would not have take Rs.2000 for him, and now John Company puts me off with his dirty 800. I lost a new saddle, bridle, and a pair of pistols to boot. I have not a horse fit to ride now, but I shall probably not want one for a month or so. I don't expect to be about before that. I was on the back of the little horse from 3 a.m. to 5 p.m., when he was killed, until which moment he was quite fresh. Oh! he is a sad loss. Now, dearest Mother, you won't be frightened at seeing my name among the severely wounded, for I really am going on as well as possible; the length of this letter will prove that I am not suffering much, for it is written at a stretch. I am a little tired now."

The letter is endorsed by a loving hand: "From Captain Haines on the Staff of Sir Hugh Gough"; but the news which he gives—probably received from the Chief himself, who visited him on the day before he wrote—was premature. In view of the serious losses of British officers at Moodkee and Ferozeshah, Sir Hugh Gough had taken upon himself the responsibility of filling their places, and actually conferred commissions upon five N.C. officers. This step was resented at the Horse Guards, where it was described as an encroachment on the royal prerogative. The appointment to the 80th Foot was not confirmed; but, on the 16th May, 1846, Haines was gazetted, without purchase, Captain of the 10th Foot, whence, in June 1847, he exchanged into the 21st Foot, with which

his name was long and honourably associated. Being on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, he never served with the 10th, and in a letter of 1848 he speaks of "making the acquaintance of my old corps, the 10th Foot."

His wound prevented Haines from sharing in the final defeat of the Sikhs. Moodkee and Ferozeshah had destroyed all danger from the invasion of British India; but it remained to crush the Khalsa army. Some weeks must elapse before the army was again ready for action, and it was essential to obtain European reinforcements. Ferozeshah had confirmed the suspicions aroused by Moodkee, and Sir Hugh Gough wrote privately to his son—

> "The Native Army participated in the general feeling throughout India of a desire that we should not overthrow the only remaining powerful Native Hindu Government. . . . They decidedly did not wish to see the Lahore Government annihilated. These causes made it necessary for the European portion of the army, especially the European officers of the Native Corps, to be foremost in the fight, and to expose themselves in a manner most creditable to them, but in many instances fatal. These are facts, but facts that cannot be brought before the world. . . . I am ready to bear taunts rather than throw a shade over the bright laurels the Indian army have won."

The aim of the Commander-in-Chief was, in the first place, to protect the extended line of frontier while he awaited the arrival of a siege train and reinforcements from India. In order to secure the safety of Ludhiana, it became necessary to detach a portion of the army under a separate command. Sir

Harry Smith was selected for this purpose, and on the 28th January he won the battle of Aliwal, which expelled the enemy from the left bank of the Sutlej and secured the communications. Meanwhile the Sikhs, to the delight of the Chief, had been re-crossing the river in the neighbourhood of the main army. "Whenever we meet the Sikh army," he wrote to the Governor-General, "we shall find them in an entrenched position. Here, the enemy has placed himself in a very strong, still, in a false, position, with a river in his rear." There could be no doubt, he said, that "to dismember this democratic army, and to lower its confidence, so as to enable the Sikh Government to submit . . . another action must be fought." Efforts to tempt the enemy to attack were unavailing, and on the 10th February, at the battle of Sobraon, Gough stormed the position with frightful slaughter,[1] and captured the guns. The Sikh resistance came to an end with this battle, and Gough's march to Lahore was unopposed. There was no siege and no guerilla warfare; the great military power of the Sikhs had been humbled within sixty winter days. The British losses in killed and wounded were less than eight per cent. of the whole force employed at Moodkee, and less than fifteen per cent. at Ferozeshah and Sobraon. Marlborough at Blenheim lost twenty-

[1] A private soldier who was present at Sobraon told the present writer, sixty years after the battle, that on wet days, when he was unable to go out, he loved to sit in his chair and "think how we druv them into the river. Oh, we did druv them into the river." Another Sobraon veteran related as the most gruesome incident of the battle that "we gave them cold steel, the blood spouted out, and the sole of my shoe came off." Haines was at Ferozepore while Sobraon was being fought, and he had a vivid recollection of the throbbing of his wound as the great guns were fired.

three per cent.; Wellington at Assaye thirty-one per cent.

The Treaty of Lahore, subsequently modified by an agreement known as the Treaty of Bhyrowal, placed the Punjab under British protection, and the Governor-General (upon whom and the Commander-in-Chief peerages were conferred in 1846) was confident that "it would not be necessary to fire a gun in India for seven years to come." In this belief he reduced the strength of the Native Army before leaving India in January 1848. His successor, the Earl of Dalhousie, had not been four months in office when a second Sikh war became inevitable.

Haines recovered sufficiently from his wound to resume his duties as Acting Military Secretary on the 9th April 1846; he was confirmed in the appointment on the 23rd May, and held it until the expiry of Lord Gough's tenure of office. When the cold weather approached, he was ready for cricket again—

> "We had two capital matches at cricket," he writes from Umballa, in October, "the officers against the men, in both of which we were victorious. In the second match I made 44 runs and a great number of wickets to my bowling. . . . I renewed my acquaintance with some of the men who were so kind to me at Ferozeshah. . . . My guns have been idle all this season. I have had no fancy for the long day's work after Bruin, not but what I think my leg could bear it well enough, but I have avoided the trial, thinking discretion the better part of valour. It stands a good match at cricket well enough."

By the following summer he had, to all appearance, completely recovered—

> "I never lose an opportunity of playing [cricket]. About six weeks back I rode 25 miles before breakfast to play in a match at Subathu; Visitors at Simla against the Officers of the two Bengal European regiments. We beat them in one innings with 80 runs to spare. We go again some day this month to play the return match. We intend insisting on their taking the best of their men to make up an eleven worth playing against. We have by far the strongest side I have seen in India."

The letters of the period naturally abound in references to criticisms upon the conduct of the Sutlej campaign. Haines considered an article in the *Calcutta Review* of September 1846 to "beat everything that has appeared as yet," and on internal evidence attributed it (correctly) to Herbert Edwardes.

> "The article is not only a good history of the campaign, but abounds, after the manner of all the Brahminee Bull's writing, in witty anecdote and quaint remark. He is making his way in the world famously, and I'm glad of it, for a worthier fellow than Herbert Edwardes does not exist.... I do not think it [the *Calcutta Review* article] does justice to our good old Chief, but gives too much to Lord Hardinge."

Gleig's article in the *Quarterly* roused Hardinge to great indignation, and received a reply (in the *Calcutta Review*) from Sir Henry Lawrence. "The Chief is wiser. He lets people write as they like, and takes no notice of them, leaving his acts to speak for themselves";[1] but Lawrence's article drew some inter-

[1] Here and elsewhere throughout the book, passages in inverted commas for which no reference is given are taken from Haines's letters, diaries, or memoranda of the period.

esting remarks from Haines himself in a private letter to his father—

"It is quite disgusting to see how all the writers who touch on the campaign on the Sutlej grasp all the credit for Lord Hardinge, and shuffle the responsibility on to Lord Gough's shoulders when they would find fault. Ferozeshah, as represented in this review, is a notable instance of this. The whole account is quite inaccurate; the writer evidently was not an eye-witness of the scene he would portray. . . . I should much like to know if the article has found a circulation at home, and what is thought of it. In India the truth is too well known to require a rejoinder, but at home the public ought to be set right. The Indian Army knows right well that it was Lord Gough's earnest wish to fight the battle at 11 o'clock in the morning, but was overruled by the Governor-General (*not* the second in command), who insisted upon waiting for Littler. His assistance was purchased at the frightful expenditure of 4 hours of daylight and a vast expenditure of strength, energy, &c., on the part of our men. In connection with Littler, the action could not have been commenced earlier than it was, but why throw the onus of delay, at the price of which his assistance was purchased, on the Chief's shoulders, he who would so gladly have fought the battle without him? Time, the freshness and vigour of his men were infinitely of more value in the C. in C.'s eyes than Sir John Littler's 5,500 men and 20 guns. Were we to decide the case on the merits of the amount of assistance rendered by them when they did come, there could not be two opinions on the subject. I have been reading everything that bears upon this subject, and am perfectly convinced that had the battle been fought as the

Chief wished, it would have been a most decisive victory, gained with comparatively small loss. I should like to see my letter written after the battle just to compare my ideas of to-day [April 1848] with those of the time when these events were passing."

CHAPTER II

THE CONQUEST OF THE PUNJAB

THE Multan tragedy of the 20th April 1848 was immediately recognized by the Commander-in-Chief and his staff as the prelude to a second Sikh war—

"*Simla, 7th May* 1848.

"MY DEAREST FATHER,

"Thanks for yours and the dear Mother's packet up to the 22nd March. I ought by rights to have answered it to the Mother, but as the subject on which I have to write is War and War only, I think it more appropriate for the Paternal ear. So listen to the tale. My letter to Emma [his sister, Mrs. Duff] will lead you at once to guess that the scene is laid in Moultan. Dewan Moolraj, the governor of that district, hearing British officers were to be appointed to act as magistrates and superintendents of affairs, applied to be relieved from his charge. To this the Lahore Durbar assented, appointing Sirdar Khan Sing governor, who, with Messrs. Agnew and Anderson, appointed by the [British] Resident [at Lahore] to assist him, reached Moultan on the 18th. They were accompanied by an escort of 300 Infantry (Hill Pathans), 70 or 80 horsemen, and 6 light Field pieces. It is said a much larger force was to have accompanied them, but Agnew, impatient to be off, would not wait for them, but started with those I have de-

tailed. Dewan Moolraj received them with every mark of respect and consideration. On the 19th, the Politicals, accompanied by the Dewan and the new Governor, proceeded to take over the fort, its stores, &c., &c. They had done this, Anderson had left the fort with Moolraj and his escort, and Agnew was on the point of mounting his horse to follow him, when two Sowars rushed upon him and cut him down, when Sing, who was with him, immediately jumped off his horse, hastened to his assistance, and drove off the assassins, wounding one of them. He procured an elephant, placed Agnew on it (wounded in two places) and went off towards their encampment. They had not gone far when they came upon Anderson lying on the roadside frightfully wounded in four places. Moolraj's men had attacked him. I fancy he must have been quite disabled, for he is never again mentioned as an active agent. They all proceeded to a mosque in which they had taken up their quarters. This was situated in a garden, enclosed by a wall of sufficient extent to contain the whole of the escort. It is within long range of the guns of the Fort of Moultan. From this, fire was opened upon the Mosque and garden on the morning of the 20th, and continued throughout the day, doing but little damage; eight or nine horses and a child were killed or wounded.

"Agnew on the night of the 18th wrote off a report of what had passed to Sir Frederick Currie, resident at Lahore, and sent a message to the Bhawulpore man[1] to send him relief in men and provisions. He thought he could hold out for two days. On the night of the 20th, Moolraj's troops came out and surrounded the Mosque and enclosure. Khan Sing and Agnew prepared for

[1] Bhawal Khan, the loyal chief of Bhawalpore.

a stout resistance, but to their horror the escort to a man sided with the enemy and went over. Their apartement was soon entered, Agnew and Khan Sing fired their pistols but were soon overpowered, the former killed and the latter wounded and made prisoner. He appears to have behaved admirably. The remains of Agnew and Anderson were exposed on the walls of the Fort. On the 24th orders were issued for a body of Sikh troops accompanied by the most influential Sirdars to move on Moultan, to be supported by a movable column of British from Lahore and Ferozepore . . . to be commanded by Brigadier [Colin] Campbell. This movement was however countermanded on further consideration, it being doubtful if the force could invest the place with any hope of success, especially at this season of the year, when the heat is most intense, and the country around Moultan inundated by the overflow of the Ravee. Lord Hardinge's reductions in the army and other measures of retrenchment must now be judged. Such expensive measures of economy were never before entered into. The carriage for the Troops on the Frontier has all been discharged, this has to be brought together again at an enormous expense. 15,000 or 16,000 men were lately discharged from the Native army, these must be re-enlisted or they will flock to Moolraj's standard of Revolt—to this all the disaffected of the Punjab are now flocking. The disbanded Khalsa finds a home in Moultan. The wild Belooch and Afghan tribes will furnish their quota. We who have so often been told by Lord Hardinge and Co. that tranquillity reigns in the Punjab, who will have the same monstrous fiction repeated to us by the next mail in the report of the Directors' dinner to the little Viscount, we shall have hot work cut

out for us in the cold weather. His acts will make it hotter than it would have been . . . those Leadenhall speeches will be subjects of intense derision in India.

"With the uncertainly disposed Sikh army on our rear and flank, it will be necessary to have an army of between 15,000 and 20,000 men for the reduction of Moultan. Agnew in his last report to Currie represents it as the strongest fort he had seen in India. Keep what I now and may hereafter write on these matters en famille as far as my opinions are concerned. You will have very full accounts by the papers. Should any Club orators assert that immediate operations should have been undertaken, you might ask them what the moral effect on the native mind would be of a failure or even delay before a place the investment of which the nature of the country and climate renders impracticable at this season of the year?

"A curious thing has happened to the apothecary attached to Agnew's party. For some reason or other he was three marches behind them. On arriving at a village not far from Moultan, the villagers told him there had been a row, and recommended his staying with them until they could find out how matters stood. The Moultanees on the other hand heard of this man, and, thinking their work of butchery incomplete, sallied out to put an end to him. This however the villagers prevented by sallying out sword in hand and putting the ruffians to flight. They have escorted the man safe back to Lahore. I hope Sir F. Currie has taken measures for the efficient protection of that loyal village. The Moultanees will most likely attempt to revenge their failure on it.

"It has become a matter of immense import-

ance that the Chief should not be relieved this cold weather. Fancy turning our backs on events such as those about to take place at Moultan. . . . You will be glad to hear that between Moultan and other matters I have business enough on hand to keep me quite out of mischief during this season. I am inclined to think that the Chief has timed it with a view to that. God bless him, who would not work their hearts out for him, season or no season?

"Poor Agnew, the victim of Moolraj's treachery, is the man who was so exceedingly kind to me when the Governor-General's camp crossed the Sutlej in February 1846, leaving me at Ferozepore. Agnew, poor fellow, gave me up his house, telling me to take in as many of the wounded officers as it would accommodate. He it was who, with Captain Robinson, repelled the first marauding party that passed the Sutlej at the beginning of the last campaign. He with a few of Bhawul Khan's sowars charged the marauders and cut up 50 of them with their leader. This brought him into notice and procured his advancement to the position in which he died. A more active, excellent officer John Company has not in his service. He was a civilian."

It was too late to save Agnew and Anderson, and Lord Gough, convinced that the whole Sikh army was ready to revolt, urged upon the Governor-General the wisdom of postponing the conflict till the cold weather. A brief spring campaign was out of the question, because the reductions in the army establishment had left the force at Lord Gough's disposal quite inadequate for the task before it. The danger of a hot weather campaign is indicated by the losses of the few European regiments which actually took the field in

an exceptionally healthy summer.[1] Lord Dalhousie accepted the recommendation of the Chief, which, later on, was cordially approved by the Duke of Wellington and the Home Government, who, in view of the outbreak of war, indefinitely extended Lord Gough's command of the army. Meanwhile, Herbert Edwardes had won his two brilliant victories of Kineyree (18th June) and Suddoosam (1st July). The effect of these victories was to compel Mulraj to remain in or near Multan, and to limit the area of the rebellion to the scene of its outbreak. In July Edwardes was outside Multan. Imagining that he had accomplished the investment of the fort, he miscalculated its strength and resources and told Sir Frederick Currie that a small force would suffice to reduce it. The Resident at Lahore, who placed undue reliance upon the loyalty of the Sikh Government and soldiery, sent a British force from Ferozepore and Lahore in July. Lord Gough could not interfere with Currie's use of the discretionary powers which were entrusted to the Resident, but he insisted upon largely increasing the force dispatched to Multan. It failed to capture the rebel fort, to which large reinforcements of Sikhs were crowding; but, owing to the foresight of the Chief, it was sufficient to prevent a grave disaster.

All through the summer the Commander-in-Chief

[1] *E.g.* on the march from Ferozepore to Lahore two sergeants and fourteen privates of the 14th Light Dragoons died of apoplexy, and eighty men had to be taken into hospital. Haines, who studied Indian history, recalled, in a home letter, the fact that "Lord Lake, in a May campaign, lost 17 or 18 men per diem from coup de soleil and apoplexy. This obliged him to take refuge in Cawnpore, not from the enemy, but from the furious heat of the sun."

attempted to persuade the Governor-General to sanction adequate preparations for the coming struggle. Lord Dalhousie, with six months' experience of India, informed him that "the force proposed by His Excellency is larger than will be necessary," and declined to consent to anything which involved serious expenditure. At last, on the 5th October, he sanctioned the proposals which the Chief had placed before him on the 11th of May. All this, of course, occupied the attention of Haines during the summer months—

> "The Mooltan expedition is one which has been undertaken in entire opposition to the Chief's views and wishes. All he insisted upon was that all the troops there available should go, if any, instead of the paltry force demanded by Sir F. Currie for that service. He has never had any confidence in our allies [the Sikh army under Shere Singh], nor in the reports of our enemy's weakness. The event has proved how right he was. General Whish's fine force [before Multan] ought to be perfectly safe from the efforts of any 20,000 Sikhs that ever lived. They will never attack our men in position supported by 30 pieces of Heavy Artillery. The worst of it is we are not prepared to reinforce them to such an amount as will enable them to undertake the siege of the place. I do not think this can be done before the end of December. It will be a slashing business when it does come off, and will, I hope, be considered worthy of the presence of the gallant Chief. Had his counsel been listened to in the first instance, 24,000 men with 50 siege guns would have been assembled at Ferozepore by the 1st of November. Economy prevented this. We cannot calculate the lavish expenditure of blood and treasure this parsimony will entail upon

us. As yet the Chief is responsible for nothing that has occurred, he has the satisfaction of knowing that he prevented Sir F. Currie from putting an insufficient British force into the hands of the enemy. But the absurdity of Government in investing Sir F. Currie with military authority superior in the Punjab to that of the Commander-in-Chief, prevented him from stopping the mischief entirely. For this premature move on Mooltan, Sir F. Currie is alone responsible to the world, and Edwardes to him. You, of course, get later intelligence direct from their camp than we can give you from this, indeed their doings are not very interesting. [The letter is dated October 1.]

"They are most anxious Lord Gough should take down the reinforcements himself. Col. Markham declares he would rather see him than 10,000 men."

The Commander-in-Chief was, however, not fated to see Multan. The movements of Shere Singh with his large army, now openly hostile, from Multan towards the Chenab rendered the siege an operation of secondary importance, and Lord Gough moved up towards Ferozepore with as large a force as it was possible to get together. There were two large Sikh armies in the field—one under Shere Singh, operating near the Chenab, and the other under his father, Chutter Singh, in the Hazara—and there were rebel forces at Bunnoo, and in the Peshawar district, where Lieutenant Herbert was holding the fort of Attok. The attitude of the Afghans was becoming more and more suspicious, and it was necessary to send a detachment across the Beas to secure the loyalty of Gholab Singh, whom Lord Hardinge had made Maharajah of

Kashmir. The Commander-in-Chief, who had wished to send an army to the Chenab in September, was now, in the middle of October, unable to do more than send an advance force, under Cureton and Colin Campbell, across the Sutlej, while he himself awaited the long delayed formation of the Army of the Punjab.

On the 6th November the headquarters of the army reached Ferozepore, where the French soldier who had trained the Sikh army called upon Lord Gough—

> "The Chief gave an audience to General Ventura, one of Runjeet Singh's French officers. He is now most anxious to place his services at the disposal of Lord Gough, as an extra A.D.C. This the Chief could not accept. He talked very freely of his former companions in arms, and predicted an easy victory if we can only catch them, but he says they will give much trouble if they take to guerilla warfare in the difficult country beyond the Hazara. They are immense marchers, thinking nothing of 40 miles per diem for a week together. I acted as Interpreter on the occasion. My French is rather rusty for want of use. . . .[1] General Ventura is below the common size, of an active figure, a countenance expressive of great cunning and intelligence. His whiskers grey, moustache black. He can understand English but not speak it. French, Persian and Hindoostani are his languages."[2]

Lord Gough had instructed Cureton and Colin Campbell not to attack the Sikhs, a party of whom had occupied some ground at Ramnuggur on our side of the Chenab. He hoped to entice the whole force of the enemy across the river and to deal with them

[1] Letter of 15th November 1848.
[2] Diary of 7th November.

as he had done at Sobraon. If they should decline to give this opportunity, it would be necessary to drive them out of the rich cultivated land near the Chenab, which the Chief described as the "finest portion of the Punjab." By the date of Lord Gough's arrival at Lahore (13th November) it was evident that the enemy, as a whole, had no intention of crossing the Chenab, and the Chief therefore gave Campbell permission to dislodge the Sikh detachment at Ramnuggur, and instructed him to report on all the available fords on the Chenab.

When Lord Gough reached Ramnuggur with the main army, the Sikh outposts had not yet been driven from the left bank of the river. This operation was undertaken by General Colin Campbell on the 22nd November, Lord Gough coming up in time to witness it. The artillerymen, in their over-eagerness to be at the enemy, precipitated a gun into the sand of the river bed on the British right flank under the enemy's fire. Campbell, who personally attempted to extricate it, found it impossible to do so, and ordered it to be spiked and abandoned. The object of the operation had now been accomplished by the expulsion of the Sikh outposts; but the left flank of the British was threatened by some Sikh light cavalry who had re-crossed the river, and the 14th Light Dragoons under Colonel Havelock were instructed to clear the ground. "Losing sight of the direction of the body of Gorchurras, which General Cureton had sanctioned his attacking, Havelock charged across an arm of the river, under the bank of which numbers of Infantry and Cavalry were concealed."[1] Cureton saw his

[1] Lord Gough to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, 26th Nov. 1848.

danger, and exclaiming, "My God! this isn't the way to use cavalry," rode off with a small escort to warn Havelock. He was immediately shot through the heart. Meanwhile Havelock, with his Dragoons, had charged into the river bed; and when his leaderless regiment made its way back, it had twenty-six men killed or missing and fifty-nine wounded. It was an unfortunate opening to the campaign, and the loss of Cureton (by general consent the best cavalry officer in the army) and of Havelock was felt later on.

The Commander-in-Chief now prepared for the immediate crossing of the Chenab, in order to cut off the Sikhs from the right bank "and to place at the disposal of the British commissariat a very rich portion of cultivated land." This movement was always regarded by Haines as the critical point in the campaign. It enabled Lord Gough to cover Lahore, and to prevent Shere Singh from joining his father in the difficult country across the Jhelum; it forced the Sikhs into the inhospitable territory of the Jetch Doab and ultimately compelled them (owing to lack of supplies) to give the British the chance of meeting them in the open at Gujerat.

The crossing of the Chenab was accomplished with very trifling loss—

> "The design was this.[1] Sir Joseph Thackwell with a strong force of cavalry, infantry and Horse Artillery, accompanied by two 18-pounders and a pontoon train, was to proceed up the Chenab to a ford about 11 miles from this, said to be an easy one, not much used and ill-guarded by the enemy. Having effected the passage, he was to

[1] Haines to his mother from Ramnuggur, 13th Dec. 1848.

move down upon Shere Singh's position in flank and rear and attack him. However, on reaching the ford, it was found impracticable,[1] and the movement had to be extended to Wuzzeerabad. On the night of the 30th, we erected batteries for our heavy guns and mortars. These were to be opened the moment we heard of Sir Joseph having crossed the river. Two officers had been attached to his force to bring back word of this. On the evening of the 1st Dec. Lieut. Mayne brought in word of the failure of his first intention, and that the force had proceeded to Wuzzeerabad. Our batteries were therefore silent until Captain Gabbett, A.D.C., returned on the road with the welcome intelligence that the passage had been effected at Wuzzeerabad. We opened fire upon their position on the opposite bank; the practice was good, but I don't think it did much damage. The Sikhs are such capital hands at burying themselves, they burrow like moles and sit in their holes in perfect safety. Their fire was perfectly harmless to us.

"On the 3rd a Brigade was sent to reinforce

[1] For the reason of its impracticability, cf. pp. 59–60. Colonel Wylly, in his *Military Memoirs of Sir Joseph Thackwell*, argues that the ford by which Thackwell was intended to cross was at Ali-sher-ke-chuk, not Runniki (Ranni-ki-Patten), as stated in the present writer's *Life of Lord Gough*. In the letter quoted on p. 59 Haines calls it Kanokee, which is certainly a form of Runniki, for no ford of Kanokee is to be found on any map, and Runniki-ki-Patten is spelled by Sir Joseph Thackeray himself "Runnee-Khan-ki-Puttun." Lord Gough also uses the word "Kanokee" for the ford by which Thackwell was intended to cross. In his dispatch Sir Joseph says that he proceeded in the first place "to the vicinity of the ford on the Chenab at Runnee-Khan-ke-Puttun," and gives his reasons for not attempting it. Lord Gough considered that Thackwell could have crossed by it if the boatmen who had agreed to act as guides had been employed for the purpose. The reader will find in Colonel Wylly's book what may be said in defence of Thackwell.

Sir Joseph by a ford about 6 miles above this, which Brigade, however, never joined him throughout the day, the passage of the river proving so difficult. The Cavalry portion could not get across, and returned to camp. The Infantry got over too late to share in the events of the 3rd. General Thackwell considering the time, at which he reached a point about 4 miles from the Sikh position, as too late to admit of his making his attack that morning, halted. The Sikhs on this moved out towards him and opened a distant cannonade, to which our guns made no answer, our Pickets merely retiring. This gave them courage, they advanced boldly, threatening both our flanks with cavalry and horse artillery. This was met and repulsed by a similar movement on our part, the artillery opened upon them with tremendous effect. The enemy's fire was soon silenced by it, say in an hour and a half, and their guns were virtually ours, but, unfortunately, Sir Joseph did not think so. Instead of advancing upon them and consummating his victory, he was content with having repelled their attack, expecting they would await him in the morning. But morning dawned upon an evacuated position, guns,[1] enemy and all had vanished, save and except some 250 or 300 of the enemy slain. There can hardly be a doubt but that a glorious opportunity was lost. Our position during the fight was a curious one. Our guns were playing upon the few left to hold the position in our front, replied to by 4 or 5 guns only, our Infantry ready to force the passage if absolutely necessary. The Commander-in-Chief and Staff galloped off about a mile and a half down the bank of the river towards the scene of

[1] Two guns had been thrown into the river and six elsewhere concealed.—Lord Gough to Lord Dalhousie, 12th Dec. 1848.

action to watch the progress of the fray. Some Sirdars from the enemy did the same on the opposite side. We could with our glasses clearly distinguish the enemy's position in rear. We saw the smoke of every gun they fired, heard that their firing came from a greater distance, and could not understand it, not knowing that they were making the attack, and towards 4 o'clock could clearly trace the line of their retreat, but we listened in vain for the rattle of the musketry, the signal of a closer combat, and precursor of our own weapon, the bayonet. Had it been freely used on this occasion, the battle of Sadoola or Sunez would have been one of the most complete victories ever recorded; as it is, it is a mere combat of artillery. The Sikhs have retired from Ramnuggur (for on the morning of the 4th they blew up their magazines and quitted their position) with an outmanœuvred not a beaten army. The 9th Lancers and 14th Dragoons were pushed forward in pursuit in hopes of picking up some of their guns, but did not succeed.

"Our loss is about 20 killed and 50 wounded, no officers among the first and only 4 wounded. The Seiks suffered by all accounts very severely. A glance at the defences on the opposite bank makes one rejoice over the success of the movement, had we attacked them in front a fearful sacrifice of life must have resulted. There was cover for every man in their army, the trenches and breastworks for infantry being in some places 6 or 7 feet deep, especially in that part which commanded the ford. Every man who could not find a place for himself in the trenches appears to have immediately burrowed on his own account, making a hole in which he would sit in almost perfect security under the hottest cannonade. We find too that they had batteries on this side

of the river, far to our left, perfectly swept by a 12-gun battery from the opposite bank, but these, I fancy, they abandoned early, as they were quite clear of our position, which threatened their left more than their right. The enemy are said to have retreated by three lines, one to Jhelum town, another to Jellalabad, and the third to Pindadur Khan. The regulars have all, in my opinion, held together and taken the Jellalpore road; of the others we shall hear no further. The Jellalpore column has pulled up at a place called Mong about 15 miles in front of General Thackwell's present position at Hazlah. There they were joined by a reinforcement from the Peshawur force, with 12 guns, and there they declare they will fight us. Their position is a very strong one, which they are strengthening with entrenchments as usual. It is surrounded by jungle so dense as to render Cavalry and Artillery useless, and it appears it goes so close up to their position as to bring any force attempting to debouch from it under the fire of their batteries. I fancy we shall not attempt to disturb them there, at all events until the fall of Mooltan. Our operations for the present will be restricted to the immediate vicinity of the Chenab."

In a later letter (16th March 1849) Haines recurs to the question of Thackwell's conduct at Sadulapore—

"The ford business is easily explained. The boatmen and fishermen of the place assured the Chief of the practicability of the ford of Kanokee. They were to receive a thousand rupees if it proved so, but in case of failure to be hanged. Thackwell was accordingly ordered to cross by it, but in the event of its being impracticable to extend his movement to Wuzzeerabad. The force reached the ford, but the men who were to

> show the passage were not to be found. They had been sent off by goodness knows who to cut jungle for the fascines which might be required! How could men totally unacquainted with the river find an intricate ford over three streams, and that, too, in face of a picket of the enemy? The Quarter-Master General's department did their best, the engineers ditto, but the ford remained a mystery to them, and the force moved on. . . . Thackwell was warned not to make a night business of it if he could avoid it, advised to begin his battle as early in the day as possible, and in this arose the mistake. Who could have supposed it possible an observation of this sort would have been construed into an order not to fight or not to press a battle successfully commenced to a triumphant conclusion when to all appearances such was in his hands."[1]

The main intention of the Commander-in-Chief was to cross the river, and this difficult and delicate problem had been accomplished in the face of a powerful enemy, strongly posted. The enemy had not been beaten, but they had been compelled to retreat. An immediate pursuit was impracticable, owing to the want of provisions. Lord Dalhousie had declined to comply with Lord Gough's demand in the summer and early autumn, and the resources of the Commissariat were inadequate to keep pace with the swift march of the army. The Governor-General now forbade a forward movement and a battle until the fall

[1] In Lord Gough's dispatch he shielded Thackwell, but he regarded it as a grave error. In a private letter he wrote: "I placed the ball at Thackwell's feet, and he would not kick it." Lord Gough, in another private letter, mentions that Thackwell never found the real ford, and that the boatmen had been sent on some other errand.

of Multan,[1] and the Commander-in-Chief prepared to take up a position with his base at Wazirabad (Wuzzeerabad) and an advance at Gujerat, thus holding the richest portion of two doabs, while also covering Lahore, and preventing any communication with Kashmir. Rejecting Lord Dalhousie's suggestion of sending expeditions to attack isolated Sikh forts, he maintained his principle of "no small wars," and he informed the Governor-General that, if a reconnaissance on the 10th December had proved satisfactory, he would have taken the responsibility of attacking in spite of the wishes of the Government. The effect of the reconnaissance was to lead him to pitch his camp in the end of December at Janukee, to the left of the position between Wazirabad and Gujerat which he had intended to take up. Thence, on the 9th January, he moved towards Dinghi. On the same day he received a communication from the Governor-General. Lord Dalhousie announced the approaching fall of Multan, and added—

> "It would give me no less pleasure to announce a similar blow struck by you on the Jhelum. . . . I shall be heartily glad to hear of your having felt yourself in a condition to attack Shere Singh with success."

[1] Lord Dalhousie afterwards denied this prohibition: "I did not prohibit Lord Gough from 'fighting a battle until the Mooltan force came up.' I never interfered with Lord G.'s movements, but once, viz. when from 27th November to 17th December, I prohibited his pursuing operations across the Doab, beyond the Chenab" (*Private Letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie*, p. 79). But on the 8th December 1848, Lord Dalhousie wrote to Lord Gough: "I cannot, as at present advised, consent to your advancing from the line of the position I mentioned, in order to attack them, until the fall of Mooltan. The cursed delay which has been permitted renders it uncertain when this event may come to pass."—*Life of Lord Gough*, II, p. 205.

This entire change of front on the part of the Governor-General was more than a permission to attack without waiting for the Multan force, and Lord Gough determined to fight a battle before Chutter Singh should join his son. Attok, which had hitherto occupied the attention of Chutter Singh, had fallen, and a day's delay might be too long. On the 12th Gough encamped at Dinghi. On the 13th he fought the battle of Chillianwalla.

The letter in which Haines describes this battle is disappointingly brief as compared with the account of the crossing of the Chenab, and the narrative quoted below is mainly derived from his diary—

> "We moved towards the Sikh position to attack or reconnoitre as the case might be, formed in two divisions of Infantry, Gilbert's on the right, Campbell's on the left, each [with] its proportion of cavalry and Artillery, Heavy guns in the centre. At 11 a.m. we came on a Picket of the enemy's horse and foot posted on a mound: these were easily dislodged by a few rounds from the heavy guns, and we advanced to Chillianwalla. Here we got a good view of the enemy's line drawn out in thick jungle some way to our front. As the day was pretty far advanced before we had made a good reconnaissance, the Chief determined on attacking in the morning, and the Quarter-Master General was in the act of taking up the ground [for encampment], when the enemy advanced some of their Horse Artillery guns and opened upon us. They had come out and taken post in the jungle, formed in line reaching from Futteh Shah ke Chuck on their right, to Russool on their left, outflanking our line both ways. We replied with our heavy fellows, which drew the fire of their whole line, showing their position

clearly. Our heavy guns shook them a good deal, and as, on the commencement of their fire, the line had been prepared either for attack or defence, the Chief determined to take advantage of it, and ordered Campbell to attack with his left division, accompanied by cavalry and artillery, and shortly after General Gilbert was ordered to do the same on the right. The division of Cavalry (9th Lancers, 14th Dragoons, 1st and 6th Light Cavalry) were left to take care of our right flank and rear.

"We were watching the infantry attacks when news came that the Gurchurras [light cavalry] were on our right flank, and were overpowering our cavalry and horse artillery (3 troops). Such a scene occurred as I hope never to witness again. It was frightful. The 14th Light Dragoons allowed themselves to be thrown into a complete panic, upset our artillery in their headlong course, creating infinite confusion. The consequence was the Artillery on the right was entirely paralyzed, carried off the field in fact, and the Gorrchurras captured the guns that had been upset. Some of these men continued their flight until they rode over our Field Hospital and were rallied by our Chaplain![1] Two guns got into action, and the Gorrchurras scuttled like sheep at the first discharge. I cannot imagine how it happened.[2]

"Immediately after this we received news of the 24th Foot (Campbell's right brigade) being repulsed in the centre with terrific loss. Consequently things about that time (say half-past

[1] The Rev. W. Whiting. Lord Gough is said to have offered to make him "a brevet bishop on the spot." Other fugitives were rallied by Haines himself.

[2] The panic was caused by a shout of "Threes About," probably raised by some traitors in the ranks of the native cavalry. Such unreasoning panics are not unknown even in manœuvres.

three) looked unpleasant. We were however regaled by the sound of the never-failing British cheer. This proceeded from the 29th Foot, 2nd Europeans, and 61st Foot, with native Corps (Gilbert's Division and Campbell's left Brigade), who were capturing position after position from the enemy in first-rate style. We drove the enemy before dark out of their very strong position, capturing some 14 or 15 guns. More were spiked but carried off, as in many instances the Sikhs managed to get back after they were carried, as our troops worked from the enemy's right to their left, leaving the guns behind them. They retain 4 of our guns, taken from under the noses of a strong Brigade of Cavalry. Better luck next time.

"Our loss is very, very heavy; it will not fall short of the battles of the Sutlej, while I fear the result will not be so great, for the rain has come down upon us in such style we are perfectly unable to move to follow up the advantage we have gained. . . . We remained out until late, and returned to where the Baggage was massed by about half-past nine o'clock, pitch dark. We got a tent up for the Chief, and as many as could pigged in with him."

The casualties at Chillianwalla amounted to about 17 per cent. of the whole force engaged: 5 per cent. killed and 12 per cent. wounded. The roll of wounded included a large number of slight injuries: of 624 wounded Europeans, 156 returned to active duty within a fortnight, and of the total wounded (1,500, European and native) only 72 were permanently disabled. The impression of a wholesale slaughter was made by the disaster to Campbell's right brigade, where some 520 officers and men were in the

course of a few minutes rendered *hors de combat.* The responsibility for this disaster must be divided between the ill-fated Brigadier, Pennycuick, who met a soldier's death in the action, and the General commanding the division, Colin Campbell. The divisional commander made no attempt to keep his brigades in touch, he led his left brigade in person, with brilliant results, but allowed his right to outdistance the artillery and make an unprotected attack on the most difficult part of the Sikh position. He even appears to have given them the fatal order to advance without firing.[1] Haines had a very vivid recollection of hearing the Chief, after the conclusion of the battle, expressing to Campbell his opinion of his conduct in leaving one of his brigades to its fate. The Brigadier, Pennycuick, had instructions from the Commander-in-Chief to advance in line with the artillery and to capture the guns by the aid of musketry and bayonet; he advanced without cover of the artillery, and his British regiment never fired a shot. The task entrusted to Campbell's division was performed, without undue loss, by his left brigade alone, after the repulse of his right. To the unnecessary loss in Campbell's brigade must be added the casualties caused by the cavalry panic on the right, which exposed Gilbert's wisely led and gallant division to the fire of the enemy. Had Lord Gough's orders been carried out, Haines used to say, the Sikhs would have been forced to abandon their guns and retire helpless to the Jhelum. When the next battle was fought, on a similar plan, and with due regard to

[1] Not without *loading*, a charge which Campbell denied without referring to firing. The question is discussed in the chapter on Chilliahwalla in the present writer's *Life of Lord Gough.*

the Chief's instructions, the victory was complete. The British army at Gujerat found that the Sikhs had not forgotten the infantry charges at Chillianwalla, and did not dare to meet them again. "To the completeness of the business," Haines wrote three months after Gujerat, "the battle of the 13th January contributed not a little. Had we not fought a Chillianwalla we should never have fought a Goojrat."

After their defeat at Chillianwalla the Sikhs retreated to a strong position at Russool, which Haines, writing on the 30th January, describes as "on the edge of a raviney range of hills, naturally a strong position. They are strengthening it daily. We can distinctly see them at work at their batteries and entrenchments." It was the hope of the enemy that Lord Gough would be induced to attack at Russool, and it was now that the wisdom of occupying the rich district across the Chenab early in December became apparent. The Sikh force had not sufficient supplies to hold Russool for long, and the British commander, on his part, had no intention of playing into their hands by attacking them in their fortress. His strategy had all along been to force them to meet him in the open, and he was more than content to wait, for Multan surrendered on the 22nd January, and he could hope, for the only time in all his conflicts with the Sikhs, to meet their artillery on equal terms. The Multan column could not arrive until after the middle of February, and Lord Gough determined to wait, as he had waited before Sobraon, until the movements of the enemy and the increase in his own resources should enable him to deal a final blow.

For a month the army rested at Chillianwalla.

> "The enemy[1] generally leave us pretty quiet; sometimes their cavalry patrols come a little too close, but have only once caused us to fire on them. A round shot from a nine-pounder made them keep a respectful distance. They talk of attacking us, but it is not in their system. . . . Our great amusement consists in watching our enemies through telescopes. The heavy gun battery is the usual lounge, the Mall in fact of the camp. We all have our private look-outs, that is a mound of earth thrown up to about 12 foot in almost every street of the camp."

There was some communication between the opposing forces.

> "Two Lancers, men of the 9th, had strayed beyond our pickets, and were taken by some Sikh horsemen. They were unarmed, but one showed some fight with his fists, à l'Anglaise, for which he received a cut across the arm. They were then taken to Shere Singh. They were questioned as to whether they were officers or belonged to the artillery, and on answering in the negative were sent to a tent and well treated. The next day they were taken before Shere Singh, who showed them his camp, and told them he had another of 20,000 men on the other side of the Jhelum and then sent them back with a letter"—

"giving them a champagne breakfast," adds the Diary for January the 18th.

More trustworthy information was obtained on the 15th, when "Elahee Buksh, their general of artillery, came over to us with two of his sons (artillery officers), a colonel of infantry, and some 15 artillery men." About the 25th Chutter Singh joined his son, bringing

[1] Haines to his mother, 30th January 1848.

with him, as prisoners, Herbert, the brave defender of Attok, and George Lawrence, who with Lieutenant Bowie had held the Residency at Peshawar. Bowie was allowed to visit the British camp on parole for twenty-four hours.

> "He dined with the Chief. He says he is extremely well treated, but not so Herbert, the defender of Attock. With him they were at first very severe, but latterly they have relaxed a little on the remonstrances of Bowie. He says the Sings have some grounds of complaint against us. They are anxious to come to terms, but will fight for what they conceive to be their rights. . . . Poor Bowie left us to return to durance vile within the 24 hours. He would take no books, as the Sings would make him translate them. They played him that trick with a newspaper, on one occasion, checking his translation by a reference to a rascally moonshee who understood English."

Meanwhile the Sikhs and the Governor-General were watching with equal impatience the inactivity of the Commander-in-Chief. When the enemy, having in vain attempted to draw him out, began to move from Russool, the impatience of both increased. Lord Dalhousie imagined that the Sikhs were outwitting the blind and obstinate old general: the Sikhs knew that he had out-manœuvred them. Both were unable to take any remedial step. The Sikhs could only offer battle in vain, and Lord Dalhousie had no resource beyond communicating his nervousness to his friends and the home government.[1] Haines used to relate an incident of these days. Major Mackeson, Lord Dal-

[1] The letters are preserved in the Broughton MSS. in the British Museum.

housie's political agent in the camp of the Commander-in-Chief, had been urging a policy of immediate action, and when the Sikhs first began to move from Russool, he took the opportunity of again pressing his view upon the Chief.

"The Sikhs are moving," said Mackeson.

"Oh, well, let them move," was the reply, given in a soft Irish brogue.

"But they may go to Dhingi."

"And why shouldn't they go to Dhingi?" said the Chief.

"But they will go to Gujerat," persisted the political agent.

"That is exactly where I hope to find them."

It was at Gujerat that he did find them. "The enemy moved from Koree," is the entry in Haines' diary for the 14th February, "it is supposed to Gujerat, which ought to make short work of the business in our favour."[1] In a letter dated the following day, he

[1] How far Lord Dalhousie was from understanding Lord Gough's strategy may be seen in his letter of 19th February 1849 (*Private Letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie*, p. 53): "One fine morning the Sikhs, quitting Russool, and passing at the back of the hills, prepared to pass a body of troops through the Poorun [*sic*] Pass into the plain. C. in C. was shown this would give the enemy possession of the whole northern plain and its supplies. He would not move. Accordingly, next day the force with 40 guns was at Khoree, on his right flank, and plundering to Dingee in his rear. Still he would not move. The enemy were round him everywhere. He went from excess of rashness to excess of timidity. . . . At last the rest of the Sikhs came out of their fortified camp at Russool and joined the other force at Khoree. No attempt whatever was made to molest either force during the movement. . . . Finally, when they got up on 14th, lo! the whole Sikh army had gone slick away. Still the C. in C. did not move a peg that day." Even after the victory he failed to realize how it had been brought about, and could only find in it a special intervention of Providence. "If

tells of the incidents which preceded and followed the move—

> "We have this day got free from our prison at Chillianwalla; but why are you moving to the rear, you will naturally ask, for this place [Lussorie] is 12 miles on the road to Lahore. . . . On the 31st January, we observed considerable commotion in the Sing camp. Our spies told us they were coming out by a pass in the hills a little to our right which we will call the Koria Pass. On the 1st February, their camp was considerably diminished and altered, their lines being entirely abandoned on their right and Russool now formed that flank, strongly fortified. . . . On the morning of the 5th, out came the main body, say 40,000 pleasant fellows on our right rear. They took up a very strong position in jungle at the foot of the hills, covered by a nullah [river-bed] along their front. They had about 40 guns. Our patrols were obliged to give up their post of observation, a mound about a mile in front of their camp, which they occupied by day. On the 6th, they drew out and offered us battle, despatching cavalry and horse artillery to Dinghee. We patrolled in force to Dinghee also. Their party retired before ours, which came in at nightfall. The enemy, finding we would not go into their jungle to attack them, went back to camp towards the afternoon. The Russool force paraded also, ready to act upon us if we attacked the others. The next morning they repeated the manœuvre. I was watching their camp through an excellent telescope from a mound, as they commenced their

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they had been attacked when they moved from Russool—as, humanly speaking, they ought to have been—they would never have got into the plain . . . and we might have been hunting them in the hills still."—*Ibid.*, p. 69. 7th May 1849.

move, and had an admirable view of them getting into position. They remained for the same time, and retired as on the previous day, horribly disgusted with us for not accommodating them to a fight on their own dunghill. Pas si bête. On the 8th we strengthened the face of our camp towards the Koria pass, as the rascals were loud in their threats of attack. This kept them quiet, for when they heard we had struck our tents for this move, they thought we were coming to attack them. . . . On the 11th the fellows moved out early, extended their cavalry well to their left, and advanced it much closer than they had before done. Four squadrons of our cavalry, however, felt them with their skirmishers and held them at bay with their carbine fire. This proves the fellows had no serious intention of fighting on the ground they then occupied, but wanted to draw us into their jungle. We got on the house-tops of the highest village in our position, had a good view of their antics, and when they went back to their camp, we also quitted our post of observation. Our calm reception of all their taunts has irritated them very much. . . . Yesterday the whole moved from Koria, but we could not determine in what direction in time to enable us to make a move. This morning, however, we made one which would be good whatever their intentions were. They moved to Gujerat. . . . You cannot imagine with what light hearts we set out upon the race, after our month's sojourn at Chillianwalla. The health of the troops has been wonderful, the wounded have recovered without a check, so we ought not to abuse even Chillianwalla."

The narrative is continued in a letter of the 1st March, ten days after the decisive victory of Gujerat—

"On the evening of the 16th Major [George] Lawrence came in from the Seik camp on a week's leave to Lahore. He brought in with him the post-bag Shere-Sing had plundered, most of the letters had been opened. Lawrence gave a great account of their pluck and determination to fight, also saying it was their intention to move on Lahore, but they found us too close upon them and the fords of the Chenab too well watched for this move, so were fain to await us on the lovely plain of Goojerat, on which we flatter ourselves we have given a very tolerable account of them.

"From the 16th to the 20th we answered them with very short marches, always in their direction, but not coming within reach. This enabled the Bombay and Mooltan troops to join us, and on the evening of the 20th we stood complete, as pretty a force as ever paraded. The parole of the day was 'Sobraon,' what could more appropriately apply to the day on which Goojerat was to be fought? At ½ past seven on the 21st, the camp being previously struck and, with the baggage, made snug at Shadiwal, the men paraded. . . . A deep nullah intersected our centre, running between the heavy guns and Campbell's division,[1] leading straight upon the enemy's centre until it came within two miles of Goojerat, where it strikes off to our left and covers the westward face of the town at an interval of about 1½ miles. This affords good cover to their right. Another nulla with water ran nearly parallel with this, about three miles distant.

"Between these two we made our principal attack with the heavy guns, Gilbert's and Whish's

[1] On the British left to the west of the town of Gujerat. Gilbert commanded on the right. The heavy guns were in the centre.

Divisions, Hearsey's and Lockwood's Brigades of cavalry with light artillery distributed along the line. Campbell, Dundas, and Thackwell were on the left of the nulla. We had not advanced far when the enemy fired his signal gun and got into the position in which he meant to fight us. This was about a mile and a half in front of the town. He had the turn of the nulla and a line of strong villages of which he made some use, but not so much as he might.

"On our reaching the village of Hurreanwala he opened with his artillery, just giving us a good view of his position and that of his guns without doing us the slightest mischief. From the roof of a house[1] in this village the Chief gave his orders for the attack, commenced by the Horse Artillery, covered by skirmishers, under cover of which the Heavies were brought into position. The Infantry was deployed. After about half an hour's cannonade from this position an advanced one was taken up by the guns, to which the line conformed, and from it the cannonade was terrific. How the enemy stood it as long as they did is wonderful. It seemed impossible to knock their artillery away from their guns. In some instances I saw guns served by two men for many rounds. Their Infantry supports had slight entrenchments in rear of their guns, and keeping close, did not suffer much.

"The action commenced a little after nine; at about eleven General Gilbert was ordered to attack a village in his front (Chota Kalra), while General Campbell was ordered to occupy one in his front, the infantry making a corresponding

[1] This is probably the origin of the absurd "windmill" fiction to which both Sir Frederick Haines and Sir Patrick Grant gave an absolute and unqualified contradiction.—Cf. the *Life of Lord Gough*, Vol. II, p. 275.

forward movement. Campbell's village was unoccupied by the enemy, but Gilbert's was hotly contested. It was held by a strong body of their Bunnoo troops, but the second Europeans put them out of that, with great slaughter. They also suffered some loss in the operation.[1] General Whish also made his advance at the time the village was attacked, and drove those opposed to him back on the centre. There they were massed in great confusion in front of our heavy guns which plied them with shrapnel, &c. The troops of Horse Artillery and Light Field batteries galloped up and gave them grape. Already broken, they could do no more, but hurried from the field in the utmost state of confusion and disorganisation.

"I have given you the part of the action which came under my own observation: and as the day was beautifully clear, without dust to any extent, the view of an individual was more extended than usual. The enemy made many attempts with cavalry on our flanks, which were well met and foiled by our cavalry and artillery. On the left, the Afghans, supported by Sing horse, with a demonstration of infantry even on the centre of the Bombay column, appeared bent on mischief; but the Scinde horse, supported by the squadrons of the 9th Lancers, charged and routed the Afghans in splendid style, killing a chief of consequence. The attack on the Bombay column being met by the direct fire of Dundas's Artillery and flanked by that of Campbell was turned into a retreat, in which they lost very considerably from our fire.

"By one o'clock we were in possession of the enemy's camp, many guns, heaps of ammunition

[1] Gilbert, in his report, mentions that he did not realize the village was occupied, and so ordered a party of infantry to take possession of it.

and baggage. They moved off so rapidly that our infantry could not catch them. With the exception of the attack on the village by Gilbert and part of Whish's division, the line hardly fired a shot through the day. It was essentially an artillery fight. The Cavalry were put upon the pursuit and followed them up till dusk assisted by horse artillery until their teams were done up. The only troop that kept up to the last was Blood's Bombay troop; the blood of his Arab horses told and enabled him to see the pursuit to the end. They lost many guns in the course of it, and I hear the slaughter for twelve miles is terrific. The next morning Sir Walter Gilbert, with his division under Mountain, and Dundas' Bombay column, were pushed towards the Jhelum. They reached Narungabad on the banks of that river, via our old friend the Koria pass, in three days. From that he has moved on to Loochainpore, and by the last accounts had crossed a considerable portion of his force, and hoped to get the rest over in the course of yesterday without opposition. The moment he appeared on this side they packed up their traps and were off on the other. . . . There is strong ground behind, they may dispute the Bukruala pass, a celebrated position in their former wars, but my belief is, as they did not oppose the passage of the Jhelum (Sir Walter had not above half a dozen boats to effect it with) they will fight no more. They are utterly broken and disorganized as an army. We thought the same after Sobraon, I remember, and they have given us tough work since. They have asked for terms, but unconditional surrender will alone satisfy our Governor-General.

"Now, Mother dearest, you may send the Governor to the Club with the first sheet of this,

and I'll have a little chat with you, but you may tell him before he goes that we have 53 guns in park, many of them of large calibre, two of our own lost ones are amongst them. Our loss amounts to 807 killed and wounded in all, 5 officers killed.[1] It is impossible to calculate the loss of the enemy. Is it not a glorious affair, Mother dearest? We look upon it as the grandest of all our Sèik battles. It is probably the last in which the dear old Chief will be engaged, they cannot say he did not take a warm farewell of them. The campaign now becomes an affair for a Major General. That splendid specimen of his class, Sir Walter Gilbert, is to have the finishing of it, right well he will do it, I have no doubt. The Chief is in wonderful spirits and, thank God, in the very best of health, long may he remain so, the glorious old gentleman. . . . I have missed in all the accounts of the battle a grand picturesque point, which was the beautiful snowy range of the Cashmere hills [2] which backed the enemy's position. I never saw them look more beautiful and clear than they were on that occasion. . . . I rode Charley on the day of the fight, he behaved right well, but it was an easy day for the horses, the easiest for the Staff of any battle I have seen."

As soon as the infantry halted after the flight of the Sikhs, Haines seized the opportunity of "writing a scrap" to relieve the mind of his sister-in-law, Mrs. Gregory Haines, who was at Bangalore, and very anxious about her father, Lord Gough, from whom

[1] The figures are 96 of all ranks killed and about 700 wounded.

[2] Sir Henry Durand's article in the *Calcutta Review* soon gave immortality to the presence of the hills, which have not failed to appear in almost every subsequent account of the battle.

she had parted when he set out on his last campaign. While he was writing, an incident happened which he does not mention in the home letter. Some British privates were near him, and their shouts and laughter disturbed the letter-writer. He was on the point of telling them to be silent, when it occurred to him that (as he used to say) it was rather hard luck to be silenced in the first raptures of a great victory; and he therefore moved some distance away. A few minutes later he was startled by a loud explosion, and, looking round, saw the charred remains of some of the men whose rejoicings had disturbed him. They were sitting on Sikh powder-bags, and, in lighting their pipes, had set fire to the ammunition.

A later letter (March 16) describes the Sikh surrender—

> "Sir Walter Gilbert's advance has been unchecked from the Jhelum. The Sings evacuated one position after another until they reached Rawalpindee, where it appears the men told the Sirdars they would go no further, not liking the idea of trusting themselves among the Afghans trans Indus. They had no objection to fight there, if the Sirdars wished. This, however, they did not think it prudent to do, so by way of opening negotiations with us Shere Sing came in with Bowie and Mrs. Lawrence, saying the others were to follow immediately. After a little diplomacy it was arranged that the guns were to be given up, the men and Sirdars to lay down their arms, we ensuring life, food, clothing, and guarantee against imprisonment or transportation to the Sirdars and allowing the men to go to their homes unmolested. They have performed their part of the pact, giving up 41 guns (our own stray

ones among them). 21,000 Infantry have given up their arms and a good number of the cavalry, the old soldiers of the Khalsa saying as they threw their arms on the heap: 'This day Runjeet Sing has indeed died.' Their excuse for not standing longer at Goojerat is not a bad one. They say, 'We stood in Hell for three hours, and then we saw 12 miles of Infantry coming down upon us.' They are now flocking through our camp in thousands. Their disarming has been complete, neither sword nor musket is to be seen among them. Their road runs past their own guns, which are paraded on an island across the bridge, no man can pass without a good view of them. They take their licking very good-humouredly and answer questions freely. . . . We expect the Sirdars here in a few days under charge of their former prisoner Lawrence. Mrs. Lawrence and Bowie passed through this en route to Lahore a few days ago. She was looking uncommonly well, she speaks most highly of Chutter Singh. Their good treatment of our prisoners will tell well in their favour."

The victorious army remained in camp till April—

"We could not induce the Chief to move from the Chenab until he heard of Peshawur being in General Gilbert's possession. He occupied it on the 21st March, exactly one month after Goojrat. It would have been good marching, putting the enemy out of the question, but when you consider he had to take over 43 guns, receive the submission and disarm 17,000 or 18,000 men, to say nothing of sweeping before him the Afghan chaff, it becomes quite an achievement. On the 27th, all our business being finished, we commenced our march back via Goojranwalla, the birthplace of Runjeet Sing. . . . On the 29th we

heard of the annexation of the Punjab having been proclaimed at Lahore. . . . We reached Lahore on the 1st April, from which date the Army of the Punjab was officially dissolved. . . . We went to see the famous Koh-i-noor and other curiosities. The grand diamond is set in an armlet between two smaller stones . . . it is badly set and badly polished, but, when European science is applied to it, I doubt if there will be so fine a jewel in H.M. Crown. The three are joined together by silk by which they are tied round the arm.[1] There is a very large flat diamond called the Devra-i-noor or Sea of light, it looks more like a piece of looking-glass than a precious stone. Perhaps the most beautiful of all the jewels are the pearls, one string in particular cost Runjeet, who collected them, 89,000 rupees. The pearls are graduated from the size of a good-sized marrow fat pea at either end to that of a white-heart cherry in the cenre. A coat of Shere Sing's (not our friend, but one of the maharajahs who followed Runjeet in such quick succession) is profusely ornamented with jewels of all sorts, the epaulettes are pearls innumerable. Three bridles of Runjeet's are set in diamonds, one in emeralds, and one in rubies, with heaps of other things it is impossible to do justice to in writing.

"Moolraj is confined close to where the jewels are. Many went to see him. I did not, feeling that were I in his place the idea of being stared at like a Bengal tiger in his cage would be most insupportable."

[1] Sir Frederick Haines used to tell of an anxious moment when the Koh-i-noor could not be found. It had got concealed under some of the other jewels, and was, of course, soon discovered. But the consternation of the onlookers can be easily imagined.

The English mails now brought the ignoble outcry which led to the supersession of the Chief whose army was rejoicing over his "mighty struggle, splendidly ended"[1]—

> "I thought Chillianwalla,[2] or the battle of the Jhelum, as you prettily but erroneously call it at home, would be too much for the patience of the people of England, and that a furious outcry would be raised against the affair, but I hardly thought that the Court of Directors would have exhibited such an unequivocal symptom of funk as to allow their insulter and reviler to be forced upon them, dictating his own conditions in accepting the appointment. For my part, I think Sir Charles [Napier] is likely to make a most valuable Commander-in-Chief. There are certainly many things which cry aloud for reform, the last campaign has brought them out in a strong light. The Baggage is one great evil, to this he [Lord Gough] has already turned his attention. Reform by the fresh comer will be more a propos than if introduced by the old incumbent. There is one question, however, which I should like to be answered. On what does this tremendous military reputation rest? Hardly on Meanee, I should think. . . . If he attempts to fight the Sikhs as he did the Beloochees at Meanee, woe betide him. How very amusing it is to read of the herculean task he has before him, of the miracles he has to perform if he would come up to the expectations of the people of England! The task is performed, his miracles accomplished —anticipated in all by the man the English press

[1] *Diana of the Crossways*, chap ii. Lord Gough is the original of Mr. Meredith's Lord Larrian.

[2] Haines to his father, 16th April 1848.

delights in abusing.[1] Sir Charles assumes the reins at a time when a prospect of unexampled prosperity and peace is opening on the scene of his command, the empire consolidated as well as increased by the late conquest. You may take your passage for Jhelum from London to-morrow, if you like, water carriage all the way. Our steamers are now plying in the Five Waters. The '*Conqueror*' reached Jhelum in seven days from Multan without obstruction of any sort save from the want of fuel. Arrangements had not been made beforehand and wood is scarce on the banks. Coal has been found which the Captain of the steamer says is admirable. This is certainly a noble opening to our commerce. The Punjab will become the granary of Britain, you may eat bread of Goojrat flour.[2] Will the country condescend to thank the man who gained the prize for her? How the Duke, Lord Ellenborough, &c., &c., must chuckle over this triumph over the Court of Directors, and they poor brutes must think but poorly of themselves. Their faithful servants in India have no very exalted opinion of them just at present."

When the news of Gujerat reached England, the Government did its best to atone for the slight which had been put upon Lord Gough, and when he returned home he was received with enthusiasm throughout the

[1] Sir Charles Napier was very indignant at the abuse of Lord Gough.

[2] Twenty-seven years later Haines wrote, on returning from a tour: "I have come down the whole length of the Indus, after its junction with the five rivers of the Punjab, a magnificent stream it is, bearing great wealth on its bosom. Everywhere the landing-stages are encumbered with wheat, cotton, seeds of all sorts, &c.—the cotton from Scinde being short in staple is unfit for the English market and goes to China. But the wheat is all for England."

three kingdoms. But meanwhile, the arrival of Sir Charles Napier placed the old Chief in the difficult position of having to remain in the country through the hot weather as a deposed monarch, and it, of course, put an end to the appointment of Haines as Military Secretary. The wound received in the first Sikh war was now causing great trouble owing to the appearance of a tumour, and Haines decided to return to England at once, breaking up his establishment and selling Mango, the horse which had taken the place of the beloved "King's Own," and of which he used to speak with affection to the end of his life—

> "I have an immense inclination to bring home Mango. It would be an unpardonable bit of extravagance in a poor man like me. . . . In parting with Mango I feel as if I had committed an abominable meanness."

It was a trial to bid farewell to the Chief, but a well-earned promotion to a Brevet-Majority gave no less satisfaction to Lord Gough than to himself. With an amount of savings, which he describes as "not bad for the scamp of the family," he left India in October in high spirits. "Barring the leg," he wrote, "I am the luckiest fellow that ever came to India."

The view of the operations in the Sikh campaigns which is expressed in his Punjab letters was held very strongly by their writer to the end of his life. "The truth," he says in a letter of 1891, on this topic, "is what we all desire to arrive at. The 'hot-headed Commander-in-Chief's' reputation can only be increased by it. But it must be the whole truth." He was much interested in Sir Charles Gough's work on *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*, and he read, both in

MS. and in proof, every line of the *Life of Lord Gough*. In spite of his hatred of controversy, and especially of public controversy, he permitted his name to be used as authority for important statements, and when the book appeared he promised to give his support in any question that might be raised. Subsequent experience of military operations only increased his belief in Lord Gough's great qualities both as a strategist and in the handling of troops; if he had been in command at the Alma, he used to say, "we should have taken every Russian gun." His affection for the Chief was warmly reciprocated, and Lord Gough more than once urged his claims upon the authorities, insisting upon the exceptional value of the services rendered by his Military Secretary. After Gough's return to Europe, they met not infrequently in Ireland, where Haines was a welcome guest at St. Helen's, Lord Gough's Dublin home. In his last years Gujerat was an anniversary more honoured than his own great day of Inkerman, and the portrait of his Chief was the most conspicuous decoration on the walls of his bedroom. The picture represented some of the happiest memories of his life.

CHAPTER III

THE INVASION OF THE CRIMEA

THE pleasure of home-coming was chastened for Frederick Haines by the necessity of a serious operation on the wound received at Ferozeshah. His original recovery had been rapid, but his general health had not been so good as usual in the last two years, and the fatigues of the campaign in the Punjab brought on violent attacks of inflammation in the vicinity of the tumour which he mentions in his home letters. In the winter of 1849–50 he underwent a successful operation in London, and in the summer was able to enjoy a Continental tour, made the more pleasant by the distinction of a Brevet Lieutenant-Colonelcy conferred upon him in August 1850, as an additional recognition of his services in India.[1] This second brevet within fourteen months made him feel himself "the luckiest fellow in the British army." His substantive rank was that of a Captain, and as a Captain he joined the 21st Foot, then stationed at Glasgow. Of the Royal Scots Fusiliers Haines was always a loyal member. He made many friends in the regiment: he was proud of its traditions, and though he

[1] His claims were pressed upon the military authorities not only by Lord Gough, but also by Lord Hardinge, who happened to meet him in London, and telling him that "he knew the ropes at the Horse Guards," exercised his great influence on Haines' behalf.

never commanded it, the accidents of warfare gave the regiment the opportunity, under his guidance, of adding fresh laurels to its wreath.

The services and achievements of the regiment were already varied and important.[1] The North British Fusiliers had been raised as far back as 1678 for the inglorious purpose of hunting down brave and ignorant Scottish peasants. As the Earl of Mar's Regiment of Foot, it took part in the battle of Bothwell Bridge, in which the Duke of Monmouth defeated the Covenanting army. Six years later it was given the more honourable duty of suppressing the rebellion raised by Argyle against King James II, to whom its Colonel, Thomas Buchan, remained loyal in 1689. William of Orange replaced him by Colonel Fergus O'Farrell, who commanded the regiment (now called the Scots Fusiliers) in the war against Louis XIV. On the outbreak of the war of the Spanish Succession, the regiment was sent to Flanders to join the Allied Armies, and it gained distinction at Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenarde, and Malplaquet. The attempt made after the Treaty of Union to replace the names England and Scotland by South and North Britain, led to a change in the description of the regiment, and as the Royal North British Fusiliers it fought under Argyle at Sheriffmuir during the first Jacobite rising. Its next exploit was at Dettingen, where George II commanded the British army in person—the last appearance of a sovereign of this country on the battlefield. The traditions of the regiment tell how it was charged

[1] For the facts here stated I am indebted to the *Historical Record and Regimental Memoir of the Royal Scots Fusiliers*, by James Clark (1885).

by a body of French cuirassiers, how its Colonel, Sir Andrew Agnew, succeeded in subjecting them to a cross fire, and how the incident was witnessed by the king himself. His remark, "I saw the Cuirassiers get in among your men this morning, Colonel," was quickly answered: "Ou ay, yer majestee; but they didna get oot again."

The Fusiliers displayed the same gallantry in the less fortunate action of Fontenoy, whence they were summoned to take part in the scattering of the clans on Culloden Moor. In the Seven Years' War they were stationed for a considerable time at Gibraltar, and their only opportunity occurred in connection with the capture of the French island celebrated in the familiar couplet—

"At the siege of Belle Isle
We were there a long while."

The regiment formed part of the force in America when disaster closed the revolutionary war, but for those disasters the British soldier was in no way responsible. In the great French war the 21st was engaged in the West Indies, in the Mediterranean, and in Italy. In 1814 it was sent to America, where it gained fresh distinctions at Bladensburg, returning to England just too late to share in the glories of Waterloo. It was in India when the first Sikh war broke out, but, after a continuous march of thirty-four days, reached Agra when Gough was winning the battle of Sobraon. When Haines joined in 1850 the Fusiliers had been for two years engaged in garrison duty in Scotland.

The next few years were spent in the routine of

regimental work at Glasgow and in the North of England.

In 1851 Haines visited the Great Exhibition in company with his father, and they met there the Duke of Wellington walking with the Duke of Richmond. Wellington stopped to speak to his old Commissary-General, and his companion entered into conversation with his son. The courtesy of the Duke of Richmond thus unintentionally intervened to prevent the elder Haines from introducing his son to his old Chief, and Haines always regretted that he had missed the opportunity of talking to the Iron Duke. At the Exhibition he saw the Koh-i-noor and other treasures, which he had inspected more closely a year before; but the "Greek Slave" of Hiram Powers, the American sculptor, interested him more than anything else: "Powers shall produce a duplicate for me when I come into my fortune." After acting for some time as commandant of the troops in garrison at Newcastle, Haines was sent, in the summer of 1851, to take charge of a detachment at Sunderland. In June 1853 he accompanied the regiment to Dublin, and was present at the death of his father, which occurred in August. The relations between father and son had been unusually intimate, and he felt keenly the great break in the family life. He was engaged in arranging affairs for his mother when there came a fresh call to danger and a new opportunity of distinction.

In the middle of the eighteenth century the greatest of Jacobite exiles, Field-Marshal James Keith, then the trusted adviser of Frederick the Great, gave some advice about the future of Russia to the Empress

Elizabeth, whose armies he had commanded in the field against Turkey. He pointed out that Constantinople must be the final goal of Russia, but he warned the Empress against precipitate efforts to reach it. "Progressive boundaries, not rapid conquests," he gave as an invariable rule for the government of Russia. A hundred years later the Emperor Nicholas decided that the time had come when the slow progress of boundaries should give place to the rapid extension of a great conquest. "We have on our hands a sick man, a very sick man," he said to the British Ambassador early in 1853, "the sick man is dying," and he proposed to divide the spoil. Constantinople for Russia, and Egypt for Great Britain was the suggested division. The Government of Queen Victoria was not prepared to admit the Czar's contention that Turkey retained "no elements of existence," and the Russian prophecy of the approaching dissolution of the Turk suggested more than innocent foreknowledge. The wolf had no difficulty in picking a quarrel with the lamb. When the Sultan consented to the Czar's demand to control the holy places, the Russian answer was a claim to be the protector of the Christian subjects of the Porte. If the Sultan had yielded, Greece might have suffered the fate of Poland; he declined, and Russian troops crossed the frontier in 1853.

It seemed as if Europe were to witness a campaign on the Danube; but the course of events was changed by the attempt of France, Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia to arrest a war. It failed, and in October war was declared between Turkey and Russia. Lord Aberdeen, the British Premier, was a lover of peace,

but he held the general opinion that Great Britain was bound to maintain the independence of Turkey. In December 1851 Louis Napoleon, President of the French Republic, had become Napoleon III, "by the grace of God and by the will of the people, Emperor of the French." He was eager to strengthen his hold on the throne by a revival of the military glory of the first Empire; he and his people had resented the refusal of the Czar to greet him as "mon frère"; and he had many reasons for wishing to remain on cordial terms with Great Britain. The French and British Governments alike were anxious to keep the peace, but on the outbreak of war their fleets were sent to Constantinople "for the security of British and French interests, and, if necessary, for the protection of the Sultan." The Russian Government was therefore warned, in the end of October, that the Allies contemplated taking part in the war; a month later, Admiral Nakimoff destroyed a Turkish squadron at Sinope, almost in sight of the ships of Great Britain and France. After three months' further delay, the allies sent an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of Russia from the Turkish principalities which she had occupied since the preceding summer. It received no reply, and, on the 30th April 1854, Great Britain and France declared war upon Russia.

The Russian plan of a campaign upon the Danube and a march on Constantinople by the Balkans was rendered impracticable by the action of Austria in insisting upon the evacuation of the principalities and in sending a large army to check the Russian advance. The Czar was compelled to yield to Austria what he had denied to the Allies, and the Russian troops with-

drew to their own territory, having given the Turks opportunities of convincing the Czar that they retained in military prowess some of the "elements of existence." Here, then, the war might have ended, and the allied troops, under Lord Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud, which in June had encamped at Varna, might have returned home without firing a shot. But a craving for military glory had been awakened in France and in England alike, and there was a feeling that Turkey was not safe while the Russians held the great fortress of Sebastopol, on the south-west coast of the Crimea, which they had been strengthening against Turkey in the Bosphorus. "The grand political and military objects of the war could not be attained so long as Sebastopol and the Russian fleet were in existence," said *The Times*[1] in the famous leader which gave point to Kinglake's satire in the second volume of his *Invasion of the Crimea*, and it argued "that, if that central position of the Russian power in the south of the Empire were annihilated, the whole fabric, which it had cost the Czars of Russia centuries to raise, must fall to the ground." The inference was easy: "A peace which should leave Russia in possession of the same means of aggression would only enable her to recommence the war at her pleasure." The existence of Sebastopol was a menace to peace; the sacred cause of peace demanded a war for its destruction. This belief had become widespread before the withdrawal of the Russians from the Danube in August 1854, and it was before that event, but in anticipation of it, that the Government of Lord Aberdeen decided upon an invasion of the Crimea.

[1] 15th June 1854.

In the middle of July, Lord Raglan received his instructions—

> "The Cabinet is unanimously of opinion that, unless you and Marshal St. Arnaud feel that you are not sufficiently prepared, you should lay siege to Sebastopol, as we are more than ever convinced that, without the reduction of this fortress and the capture of the Russian fleet, it will be impossible to conclude an honourable and safe peace. The Emperor of the French has expressed his entire concurrence in this opinion, and, I believe, has written privately to the Marshal to that effect."[1]

The two Generals could not feel that they were "sufficiently prepared," for they expressly stated that neither of them had any information as to the forces they were likely to meet in an invasion of the Crimea; but Lord Raglan interpreted the instructions of his Government as a command, and, not without hesitation, accepted the responsibility placed upon him. Weakened by pestilence, the allied armies embarked in the end of August, and by the middle of September the British, French, and Turkish fleets were off the coast of the Crimea.

The 21st Regiment was to form part of the Fourth Division of the British Army in the Crimea, and, on the 15th August, Haines sailed from Queenstown in the transport *Golden Fleece*. The tedium of the journey was lightened by the perusal of Dickens' *Hard Times*, then appearing in parts, and Haines in his Diary criticizes the picture of the Gradgrind children: "One child's mind totally thrown on the com-

[1] The Duke of Newcastle to Lord Raglan, 28th June 1854: quoted in Kinglake, Vol. II, chap. v.

pany of Tom Gradgrind's nature might lie fallow in all that relates to the imagination, but that same mind with a brother to rub against, as Loo Gradgrind had, must infallibly have been stimulated to somewhat of the ideal." There were the usual incidents of life on a troopship; the little tragedies of "an early parade for punishment—25 well laid in will give a salutary lesson to the young thieves we recruited in Dublin"; and the little comedies, as when a young officer "awoke with a feeling that the ship was on fire, and immediately proceeded to inflate his life-preserver which hangs in his berth. Unfortunately, however, his India rubber leggings hung there also, and of these, in his hurry, he caught hold and made most frantic efforts to inflate. Having blown himself fairly out in this fruitless effort, he became sufficiently wide awake to become conscious of his mistake, and also that there might also be some mistake about the ship being on fire at all. We bully him greatly for allowing Tinley, with whom he is doubled up, to sleep through all this imaginary danger, his only excuse for this gross neglect of the duties of friendship being, 'I meant to awake him when I was all ready.'" The real interest of the journey was the scenery, and the Diary describes a brilliant sunset behind Mount Athos and the moon sinking beyond the Dardanelles.

On the 1st September the *Golden Fleece* anchored off Scutari—

> "It appears that we have arrived just in time to join the expedition to the Crimea. This is now forming at Varna. After all our delays, we arrive just at the very nick of time in full health and energy. The troops here long before us have,

I fear, suffered greatly from sickness. The sunset behind Constantinople is something to be remembered through a lifetime. . . . The sail from Constantinople to the Black Sea would baffle all attempts at description; it far exceeded in beauty my expectations. For many miles it is lined with houses of most brilliant colours, the heights above them richly clothed with dark cypress and a variety of trees beautifully green. Grand palaces frequently rise up from amongst their humbler neighbours. The windings of the Bosphorus afford a great variety of views. The changes of these it is most beautiful to watch, as point after point shuts out what had been the background of the picture, taking its place for the time, and shut out in its turn by a more prominent neighbour. Lake after lake is thus formed in quick succession. Towards the mouth of the Black Sea the banks become more wild. Ruins frown from the heights, batteries sweep the surface of the water and line its edge. This part we passed by moonlight, bright clouds scudding before a north-easterly breeze adding to the beauty of the scenery."

On the 3rd September they reached Varna, and found the embarkation still in active progress. There were many

"absurd reports of what was to be done at Sebastopol and of the supposed state of the Russian defences. There seems to be very little general knowledge on this subject, but it is to be hoped that the big wigs know all about it. There has been a good deal of croaking, but the feeling of the army is one of satisfaction at getting away from Varna, where they have suffered so much from sickness and lost so many officers and men."

At Varna, Haines made the acquaintance of General Sir George Cathcart, who was to command the Fourth Division, and his Staff: "all very friendly and no humbug." On the 5th the *Golden Fleece* left Varna, and on the evening of the 12th was "brought up in Eupatoria Bay (about forty miles north of Sebastopol). The line of battleships and the effect of the setting sun on their sails was most magnificent. They looked like frosted silver standing out in bold relief against the darkling East, the West still glowing with the gold and purple of a most gorgeous sunset." In a letter of the 3rd October, Haines describes the unpleasant experiences of the landing—

> "On the 14th September we landed at Kalamita Bay, on a strip of beach between the sea and a putrid lake, without baggage, merely what we could carry on our backs, and with three days' provisions. We landed all the infantry that day without opposition. That night was a terrific one. A gale of wind sprang up with the heaviest rain I was ever exposed to. The British Army in the Crimea was indeed a wretched force that night. I managed to keep my kit dry, but got thoroughly drenched myself. A bright day following put us all right again. A great deal of damage was done to the boats and platforms by the storm, and a heavy surf rendered it impossible to proceed with the disembarkation until evening. We remained on the beach until the 19th, a most unhealthy place it turned out. Our men sickened fast, and we lost many from cholera."

The task before the allied armies was the reduction of the fortress of Sebastopol. The Russian commander, Prince Menschikoff, had made no attempt to oppose their disembarkation, but it was not to be

expected that he would permit them to march unmolested over some twenty-five miles to sit down before Sebastopol. The ground was broken by small ranges of hills and intersected by five rivers separated from each other by distances of from four to seven miles. The British Commander-in-Chief, General Lord Raglan (he was made Field-Marshal in the same year) had, as Lord Fitzroy Somerset, distinguished himself in the Peninsula, and was Wellington's Military Secretary through the later part of the Peninsular War and at Waterloo, where he lost an arm. He had seen no active service since 1815, but from 1827 to 1852 was Military Secretary at the Horse Guards, and in this capacity had been in constant communication with commanders in the field in our Indian wars. There was obviously considerable risk in placing at the head of the Crimean army an officer of sixty-six who had not seen a shot fired for forty years, and had never commanded a brigade or even a regiment. But, as Kinglake so frequently points out, the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's forces had to possess not merely the qualities of a soldier, but also those of a diplomat. There is good evidence that Napoleon III was, and intended to be, loyal to the British alliance, but the position of two generals in command of allied forces must always be a delicate one, and the character of Raglan's first French colleague, Marshal St. Arnaud, increased rather than diminished the inevitable difficulties. On the merits of Lord Raglan as a commander the opinion of military critics has not been unanimous; but no words of praise are too strong for the tact and wisdom with which he maintained friendly relations with his colleagues of the French army, for

his calm and noble bearing in good fortune and evil, or for the loyalty and considerate kindness he invariably displayed towards his officers and the troops whom he led to dear-bought victory.

The army under Lord Raglan consisted of five divisions of infantry and two cavalry brigades, with field and siege artillery. The First Division was under H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge; one brigade, composed of battalions of the Grenadiers, the Scots Guards, and the Coldstream Guards, was commanded by General Bentinck, and the other brigade by Sir Colin Campbell, who commanded the 42nd, 79th, and 93rd Highlanders. The Second Division was led by a Peninsular veteran, Sir de Lacy Evans, and the brigadiers were Pennefather and Adams, with the 30th, 55th, and 95th Foot, and the 41st, 47th, and 49th Foot respectively. Sir Richard England was in command of the Third Division, consisting of Sir John Campbell's brigade (1st, 28th, and 38th Foot), and Eyre's Brigade (44th, 50th, 68th Foot). The Fourth Division, to which Haines belonged, was under Sir George Cathcart, who had fought at Waterloo, and it consisted at first of the 20th, 21st, and 63rd Foot, and the 1st Battalion of the Rifle Brigade, the 46th and 57th joining later. The Light Infantry Division was commanded by another Peninsular veteran, Sir George Brown, and its brigades consisted of the 7th, 23rd, and 33rd Foot, under Codrington, and the 19th, 77th, and 88th Foot under Buller. It included also the second battalion of the Rifle Brigade. The Light Brigade of Cavalry (4th and 13th Light Dragoons, 8th and 11th Hussars, and 17th Lancers) was under Lord Cardigan; the Heavy Brigade (4th and 5th

Dragoon Guards, and the 1st, 2nd, and 6th Dragoons, *i. e.* Royals, Scots Greys, and Inniskillings), under General Scarlett, joined after the battle of the Alma. Lord Lucan was in command of the whole Division of Cavalry.

The disembarkation of the troops completed, the allied armies at once began the march towards Sebastopol, traversing undulating ground, "covered with a dry slippery grass, extremely fatiguing to march over." The men suffered greatly from lack of water and from the heat of the sun, some dying on the road. "Many strange wild flowers are to be observed—one, a lilac crocus without green of any sort, is curious. The general character of the vegetation is like that of England and other temperate climates." Early in the morning of the 19th September, the day on which the march began, Haines was roused to find his company entrusted with the unromantic duty of a cattle guard. Like the men, the cattle suffered from thirst on the march. "It was ridiculous enough to see the cattle break from the chain of men when they smelt the water [of the Bulganak, the first stream on the line of march]. Nothing could hold them." On the banks of the Bulganak there was a slight skirmish between Lord Cardigan's cavalry and the Cossacks, in which a few men of the 11th Hussars were wounded. It was known that the Russian army was prepared to defend the next river-valley, that of the Alma, a small stream flowing under some heights running from east to west. The French and British armies were approaching from the north, and the Russians occupied the southern bank of the river. "From the centre of the enemy to their right, the heights are of a more

gentle slope than those which extend from the centre to the left. This part of the position was left to its natural strength, while the other was considerably strengthened by batteries and entrenchments." On the morning of the 20th September the allied armies moved to attack the enemy. The Russians had never met British troops in battle, and looked upon Great Britain as a purely naval power: their estimate of the French was affected by memories of the Moscow campaign. Thus they were inclined to despise the enemy. There had been no European war since 1815, and the British and French knew nothing of the Russians beyond that they had not always proved themselves superior to the Turks. The first battle had, therefore, all the interest of the unknown—

> "The 20th was a grand day [1] for the expedition. The battle of Alma will be a thing to speak of in days to come. The march of the day before was a sad preparation for it, but luckily the Division engaged had not been exposed to it, and our Division was quite in reserve. We, however, had a beautiful view of all that occurred, taking in the enemy's movements of defence as well as our own of attack. Suppose yourself at Petworth, facing Dunstan Hill; take away its pleasant hedgerows and well cultivated fields, substituting some grassy plain on which you have shot Florikin in India, from which the sea must be visible at about three miles' distance on your right. People Dunstan Hill and the summit of the neighbouring downs with Russians. Batteries, too, must frown from their quiet heights, and there you have the position of the belligerents on that eventful

[1] This account is partly derived from the Diary of the 20th September, and partly from a letter of the 3rd October.

day. The French attacked first in heavy columns on the right. Their portion of the position was very precipitous, and considered by the Russians so strong by nature that they neglected to strengthen it much themselves.

"It was intended to have turned the position by this flank, but finding the work much more difficult than was expected, repeated messages were despatched to Lord Raglan to hasten his attack in front. On the third application this attack was commenced, and I have no doubt but that the severe loss we suffered will be attributed to this, and Lord Raglan's generalship questioned by those who are not aware of the pressure under which he acted. Our Division was manœuvred about a great deal throughout the line of march without any definite object. Our whole force moved in too contracted a space, the infantry (3 divisions) being massed together. It was also evident that we were crowding too much to the right on the French. . . . The French commenced the attack at about 1.20 by an advance of heavy columns from the right. As they moved, it became apparent that we were too crowded in our position, and ground had to be taken to the left, particularly by our division, kept in reserve on the extreme left. The French attack advanced but slowly, it was, however, evident that it was advancing. Our line advanced after about half-an-hour's delay, covered by light troops. Those covering the extreme left soon showed themselves on the opposite side of the stream, threatened by heavy columns of the enemy, whose bright barrels had a very pretty effect as they advanced against our men. These were soon supported by the line, which advanced cheerily on the batteries which had played heavily on them throughout their advance. On the right of our attack I fancied I

could perceive one regiment checked, but this was soon repaired by the advance of fresh troops under Sir Colin Campbell. In this part of the line the 23rd suffered greatly. They had advanced hurriedly across the river and broken ground. They were re-forming in rear of the 33rd, also engaged in the same manner, when Colonel Chester, previous to the formation being completed, gave the word to pass to the front by fours from the right by companies. Passing through the 33rd and becoming in some measure mixed up with them, they never again regained their formation, and suffered accordingly. It is also said that after having repulsed the Russians in their front, they received the word to cease firing, thinking they were firing on the French. The enemy rallied, and poured in a murderous fire. Colonel Chester, Sir Wm. Young, Captain Wynn, and many other officers fell, all save six being either killed or wounded. The enemy did not fight their guns in a very determined manner, but they saved them, sacrificing their infantry to that purpose. The whole position was in our possession in two hours after the first shot was fired. The Seiks would have held it longer, but they would have lost their guns. As it was we only got three—very fine ones."

"I certainly have seen no battle fought in which so little use was made of Artillery. The infantry did it all, and most manfully it was done. They swarmed up the heights, covered by clouds of skirmishers. Nothing could resist them. Battery after battery was carried, and had the cavalry been a little more forward, not a gun would have been carried off. It is a miracle to me how they got them off as it was, as for miles the road strewn with all sorts of military equipment gave evidence of a complete rout.

"We remained on the field for two days, and here again our men sickened. The ground had been a standing camp of the Russians, with the debris of the battle it became intolerable. We were all glad to leave it for the beautiful valley of the Katscha. . . . The next day we marched to Belbec, Prince Menschikoff's country seat. He will find it hardly fit for occupation on his next visit. The French gutted it, and I daresay our fellows helped. This valley is much like that of the Alma and Katscha. The Katscha would have been a stronger position than that of the Alma, the river being much more impracticable for artillery, but the enemy had such confidence in the strength of the other that they neglected it entirely. We hear that many Russian ladies went to the Alma to witness the destruction of the invaders. They say we showed no generalship, but great courage of the bull dog order. They thought to have stopped us for three weeks, but were turned out in two hours."

The reader of Kinglake will recognize in this brief description some of the leading features of the fascinating series of battle pieces which occupies the greater portion of his second volume. A question at once arises as to why the allied armies made a frontal attack on a position chosen by Menschikoff. Their numbers were considerably larger than his, for the British force engaged included 23,000 infantry, besides the Light Brigade of cavalry and 60 guns, and there were some 28,000 French infantry, with 68 guns. A small Turkish contingent numbered 7,000 infantry. The Russians had 33,000 infantry, 3,400 cavalry, and 120 guns.[1] With so large an available force, it is

[1] These numbers are taken from Sir E. Hamley's *War in the Crimea*.

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clear that the French and the British might have, by extending their left flank into the interior, turned the right flank of the Russian army, and compelled them to fight in a less advantageous position. It was argued at the time that it would have been dangerous to abandon our communications with the sea; but we are probably right in following Sir Edward Hamley, a distinguished student of the science of strategy and tactics, in his view that, as the plateau near the sea was commanded by the guns of the fleet, there was no real danger of this kind, and that "all considerations point to this suggested movement of the allied army away from the sea as the right one."

The battle, as actually fought, was scarcely more than a frontal attack, but a mere frontal attack was not the original intention. The French claimed the post of honour on the right; it also happened to be the post of safety because it was next to the sea: and for this very reason it was desirable that it should be taken by the French, who had as yet no cavalry to protect their flank. Marshal St. Arnaud undertook to attack the enemy's left, getting between them and the sea, and he informed the French authorities that Lord Raglan promised to turn their right but was prevented from doing so. It is, however, clear that Lord Raglan never assented to any proposal of this kind, and in his refusal he is supported by modern criticism. In point of fact, the Turks and a large body of French under Bosquet, who crossed the Alma at its mouth, found themselves so far to the enemy's left that there was nothing for them to turn, and the remainder of the French army, though gallantly surmounting physical obstacles under a heavy fire, did not push their attack

with sufficient energy to be of much real service. "The chief result achieved by St. Arnaud," says Sir Edward Hamley, "was that he gained a position threatening Menschikoff's left flank at the moment when his front was assailed by the English," and there can be no doubt that the French army showed to greater advantage in the later conflicts of the campaign.

While the French advance was taking place, skirmishers belonging to the Rifle Brigade drove across the stream the Russian outposts on the British front, who, in their retreat, set fire to a small village (Bourliouk), the burning of which narrowed the space available for the British line. It was now that the overcrowding of our position, to which Haines refers, began to be felt. Sir George Brown's Light Division and the Second Division under Sir de Lacy Evans formed the van of the attacking force, and their extended line, two feet deep, was formed by twelve regiments. The re-formation of the 23rd and 33rd Foot (both belonging to Sir William Codrington's Brigade of the Light Division) is described by Haines in his letter; the marching and countermarching were, of course, not confined to these regiments,[1] and it took place under a heavy fire from a Russian battery. The re-formation was not complete when St. Arnaud sent his third urgent request for a general advance; Lord Raglan told Kinglake on the evening of the battle-day that "he could no longer endure to see our

[1] Kinglake mentions that the 7th Fusiliers (part of Codrington's Brigade of Brown's Division) marched through the 95th Foot (part of Pennefather's Brigade of Evans' Division), as the 23rd did through the 33rd. Kinglake assigns to Sir George Brown the responsibility for not taking ground enough.

soldiery lying down without resistance under the enemy's fire," and he gave the order to attack. With this order the Commander-in-Chief disappears for some time from the history of the battle; he rode by the burning village to the river bank, crossed, and took up, with his staff, a position quite close to the Russian sharp-shooters; but, as Kinglake puts it, "happily neglected" by the Russian commander. Lord Raglan's reason for "entering without his battalions into the midst of the enemy's dominions"[1] seems to have been something very near akin to the spirit of adventure in which he had galloped alone to the drawbridge at Badajos, and in which the horse he rode at the Alma had carried him on "great days in the Gloucestershire country."[1] His wild ride ended, the same spirit of adventure had little difficulty in persuading him of "the fatal perturbation which would be inflicted upon the enemy by the mere appearance of our Headquarters Staff on this part of the field,"[1] and he remained there.

Meanwhile Sir George Brown and Sir de Lacy Evans pushed their forces over the Alma, the Light Division in front. Both divisions suffered severely from the Russian batteries. They were soon joined by the First Division under the Duke of Cambridge, including Sir Colin Campbell's Highlanders and Bentinck's Guards' Brigade. The 23rd, 33rd, and 7th Foot, under Codrington, had already lost many men, but they made a gallant rush upon the heavy battery whose fire had told so disastrously upon the British advance. The Russians, whose great error in not sufficiently guarding their position might have been

[1] Kinglake, Vol. II, chap. xvi.

redeemed by a fierce struggle to retain it, withdrew their battery when its services were most required. They had been told that the Czar would pardon no loss of guns. Codrington's brigade had outdistanced the rest of the army, and it found itself unable to meet the assault of Russian infantry and cavalry.[1] Scarcely had it fallen back, when an advance of the Guards drew exclamations of surprise and admiration from the French, and the whole army moved up in support, including the artillery, which had now crossed the river. Two heavy guns which Lord Raglan had summoned to the knoll on which he stood (now with the 41st and 48th Regiments near him) enfiladed some of the Russian batteries, and, in Kinglake's opinion, played no small part in the discomfiture of the enemy. In the last moments of the battle the Guards and the Highland regiments poured a heavy fire into the Russian columns, and the enemy evacuated their position, retiring in good order and saving their guns. Marshal St. Arnaud declined Lord Raglan's suggestion of sending fresh troops in pursuit, and the Russian retreat never became a rout.

The initial mistake of crowding the troops into an insufficient space of ground had told all through the battle, and had prevented proper co-operation, not only among divisions, but also between brigades of the same division and between regiments of the same brigade. The absence of Lord Raglan when it became apparent that the Russians intended to devote

[1] It was at this point that there occurred the call to cease firing (to which Haines refers in his letter). Codrington's men withheld their fire for some time, believing an approaching Russian column to be French: Kinglake, Vol. II, chap. xvi.

themselves entirely to defence against a frontal attack deprived him at critical moments of the opportunity of sending in support troops kept in reserve to defend the left flank, and of directing the movements of the artillery as the battle progressed. The action on the banks of the Alma showed that the courage which had been so often displayed in the Spanish Peninsula and on Indian battle-fields was still an asset on which British generals might rely, and that the soldiers of the Queen were still prepared to do and to suffer. The casualties were 353 of all ranks killed and 1,630 wounded. The 19th, 23rd, 33rd, 7th, and 95th Regiments suffered most severely; "five officers of the 23rd buried in one grave near the spot on which they fell" is the entry in Haines' Diary on the day after the battle.

If the defeat on the banks of the Alma could have been followed up without a moment's delay, an attack upon Sebastopol, from the north side, in combination with the fleets, might have been successful, and Sebastopol, in the words of Sir Edward Hamley, "might have fallen in a storm of battle as tremendous as the world has ever witnessed." But the battle was fought on the 20th, and, on the evening of the 22nd, while the British and the French were still on the banks of the Alma, Menschikoff took the important step of blocking the harbour of Sebastopol by sinking seven men-of-war at its entrance. The remainder of the Russian fleet, safe beyond range of the ships of the allies, was now free to take part in the defence of the north side of the fort. Further, the defeated Russian army had not locked itself up within the stronghold of Sebastopol, but remained at large in the

Crimean Peninsula, maintaining communications with Russia, and ready to harass the besiegers as opportunity offered.

On the 23rd September the allies moved to the banks of the Katscha. "The artillery ought not to have escaped us in such ground," remarks Haines in the Diary of their march over country strewn with broken arms and pouches, indicating the disorganization of the Russian column which had borne the brunt of the fighting. The route was made still more interesting by fine grapes, apples, pears, and melons. "No fear of cholera can stop our men, and no wonder." Next day, when they reached the Belbec, they found that the Russians had not troubled to destroy the bridge or to "cut up a good but steep road." They were now close to Sebastopol, but it was clear that no immediate attack from the north could then be made with any prospect of success, and the two commanders decided that the armies should march upon the harbour of Balaclava in the south of the peninsula. This was the last conference between Lord Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud, whose appearance, as they discussed this movement in the afternoon of the 24th September, gave Lord Raglan the impression that he was talking to a dying man. Next day St. Arnaud was seriously ill, and, relinquishing his command to General Canrobert, who had led the French centre at the Alma, he took ship for France, which he did not live to reach.

On the 25th the allied armies found themselves unexpectedly in touch with the Russians, for Menschikoff moved out from Sebastopol towards Bakshisarai, crossing the British march at right angles, as ignorant of their proximity as they were of his. Some of his

baggage was captured, but neither army was desirous of bringing on an action. The near presence of the enemy caused some anxiety, especially in the Fourth Division, which formed the rear-guard and was a day behind the rest of the army. "We were kept on the alert at night, a body of the enemy being in movement, we were told to expect them. I was on the outlying picket, with Kirkland, and passed rather an anxious night." The march of the 26th September was rich in incident—

> "Fell in early and marched without giving the men time to fill up their water kegs. Our road lay through a thick oak bush and was very narrow. It ran south for some time, taking an easterly turn just short of Sebastopol, which place we could see from the high ground at the change of direction. We turned south again at a distance of about six miles from camp, and reached Mackenzie's Farm at about 1 p.m., the men dreadfully knocked up from the want of water (the wells bad and the aqueduct destroyed). A great error that of not filling the men's kegs previous to marching. Our men marched well nevertheless and we got them on. Grog was served to them here, which enabled them to proceed at about 2½ p.m.
>
> "Shortly after leaving Mackenzie's Farm, we opened on an extraordinary tract of country. The high tableland on which we had been travelling suddenly breaks off, and standing on the edge of a chalky cliff you survey beneath you a deep valley and a broken mountainous country beyond. Our road wound down the face of this cliff, below it is the black river [Tchernaya], and at Tchernaia on its banks our camp was taken up that night. Here we had a ridiculous alarm

of Cossacks. Captain Kirkland and I had bathed in the stream. Bob Steward was just commencing his ablutions when the French foragers came in helter-skelter crying out 'Les Cossaques, les Cossaques.' K. and I immediately gathered up our possessions and bolted with the rest, but poor Bob S.:

"'What's the matter, Haines?'

"'Cossacks, Bob.'

"Shall I ever forget his face when in *puris naturalibus* he received this announcement? Kirkland and I proceeded a few yards laughing ready to kill ourselves, but coming on a great heap of apples, thrown away by a bolting forager, we halted and appropriated the spoil. This was good luck as the orchards were at some distance. The alarm was a false one, but it had caused the troops to turn out, for when we reached camp we found them under arms and Staff Officers galloping about in a frantic state of excitement."

The march of the 27th brought them near Balaclava. It was

"characterized by more than the usual dilatoriness and want of arrangement which has marked all our movements. Constant halts have kept the men under arms on many occasions throughout the day when the march might have been accomplished in a fourth of the time."

About two o'clock the Fourth Division reached the troops encamped in the neighbourhood of Balaclava, and "advanced to a height that looked to me uncommonly close to Sebastopol[1] and to the mud works in course of construction upon its southern side." The main body of the army was now on the Chersonese

[1] The distance from Balaclava to Sebastopol is only about ten miles.

plain, which historians of the Crimean War have agreed to call the Upland, and the Third and Fourth Divisions were posted on the right of a great ravine running towards the town. The "mud-works" of which Haines speaks turned out to be no less formidable defences than the Malakoff and the Redan and other works with which the genius of Todleben was strengthening Sebastopol. There was an impression in the army that the Russians were inactive because they made small effort to disturb the besieging force; the slender foundation on which it was based was soon demonstrated.

The first half of October was spent in the monotonous occupation of bringing up siege guns from Balaclava, digging trenches, and making other preparations for the assault. On the 17th October a vigorous effort was made upon the outworks of Sebastopol. The British artillery made a great impression on the Russian defences, silencing both the Malakoff Tower and the Redan, and preparing an avenue for an infantry attack. But the French guns were outranged, and failed in their attempt on the Russian field works, which were particularly strong in front of the French position, from which point alone it would have been possible to reach them by regular approaches.

> "We opened our fire," says Haines, in a letter of the 27th October, "at half past six on the morning of the 17th, the French opening at the same time. The weight of fire with which we were answered rather astonished me, I must confess. We soon silenced some guns in a round tower to our right, and these have remained silent ever since, but a large field work which surrounds this round tower remains in full force. The

French met with a disaster shortly after opening, from the explosion of a magazine. This is said to have dismounted 14 guns and to have done great damage to their battery. They tried to open fire after it, but, finding they could not do anything with effect, wisely shut up and proceeded to repair damages. The fleets came in at about noon, but did not get in sufficiently close action. The *Agamemnon* and the *Sanspareil* alone getting within 800 yards of Fort Constantine. These managed to shake it considerably, but also suffered a good deal themselves. The fact is we cannot flatter ourselves they made any great impression on the place. All hauled off at dark, leaving the Russians some reason to say they had repulsed the combined Fleets. In this respect we shall have better luck next time."

There was an impression among the land forces that the commander of the British fleet, Admiral Dundas, was not prepared to co-operate zealously enough with the army; but it is probable that if the naval leaders had attempted to do more, they would have run a very great risk with a comparatively slight chance of influencing the course of the siege. The assault of the land forces soon slackened; on the 18th October the French found it impossible to continue the bombardment. The Russians, under cover of night, had, with the guidance of Todleben's engineering skill, repaired the breaches and furnished their batteries with fresh guns, and the British artillery had to do its work over again—

"The second day I had charge of a very particular post on the main road to Sebastopol, at the point at which our two batteries would intersect it if carried across the ravine; as it is, the ravine

through which the road passes divides them. We had a very hot day of it, being under the line of the enemy's fire on both batteries and came in for a large proportion of the shot intended for either battery and getting a great deal of special shelling for ourselves. We kept close through the day, and only lost two men killed and three wounded out of three hundred men. These were of the 63rd and were under Gustavus Harrison, a contemporary of Teddy's and mine at Midhurst. Strange that we should meet on a post of great importance within 800 yards of Sebastopol. I was sent there, for poor Harrison had not pleased the Brigadier-General with his dispositions[1] for defending the post. The great labour of these commands begins at night, the drowsiness of the soldier being the element to be contended with—poor fellows, they seldom, or ever, get a clear night in bed, and nothing can persuade them that any reason exists why more than the Sentries should be awake even in the immediate presence of the enemy. It is hard work at times keeping oneself awake. At one time, on this very post, I sat down on the road thinking I was safe there, but the discomfort of the seat was nothing, I was asleep in a few minutes."

The progress of the siege was slow and methodical. The weather continued fine, and Haines enjoyed the excitement of those autumn days, the little gossip at the Battery before breakfast, the afternoon ride to see his friends in camp, with always the inevitable discussion of the progress of the siege and the effect of

[1] Sir Frederick Haines used to talk of this as an instance of pure bad luck in a soldier's career. He himself regarded Harrison's dispositions as satisfactory, and had only changed them slightly when the Brigadier again came up and commended them.

the fire. On the 25th October the routine of operations was interrupted by a forward movement of the Russians which led to the most memorable incident of the war. When, on the 20th September, the allied armies made their march past Sebastopol, they found the harbour of Balaclava an insufficient base for the conjoint force. The new French commander, General Canrobert, offered to yield the right of the line to the British in order that they might hold the harbour. Lord Raglan, on the advice of Admiral Lyons, who strongly maintained the necessity of keeping Balaclava, accepted the graceful offer. Balaclava had been easily occupied on the 26th September, and Lord Raglan was unable to leave a larger force than 1,000 marines with a few batteries to defend it. The distance between Balaclava and Sebastopol is so small that the detachment was never out of touch with the main army or with the French; and the 93rd regiment occupied ground just north of Balaclava. There was an exterior line of redoubts, defended by battalions of Turks, to whom some British guns had been entrusted.[1]

Meanwhile Prince Menschikoff, whose communica-

[1] "Lord Raglan ordered a series of redoubts to be made on the range of hillocks that divided the plain of Balaklava into two almost equal parts. These works, six in number, were of a very superficial type, and were hastily constructed by Turkish troops under the personal direction of English engineers. I went into most of them shortly after they were made, and among other defects I observed that their ditches and parapets were so low that a horse could have easily leaped over some of them. Only three of these redoubts were armed, one, by far the highest of the range, with three guns, and the two succeeding ones with two guns each—all ship's iron twelve-pounders. Rustem Pasha [the Turkish commander] told me after the battle that some of the ammunition supplied to these redoubts did not fit the bores of the guns."—Sir John Blunt's Reminiscences.

tions were open, and who could therefore draw almost unlimited reinforcements from Russia, was watching a chance of inflicting a severe blow upon the invaders. The right flank of the position at Balaclava offered just the opening for which he was waiting, and, early on the morning of the 25th October, General Liprandi, with a large Russian force, made a surprise attack upon the four Turkish redoubts, drove out the Turks after a stout resistance, and captured the British guns. He then, with cavalry and artillery, menaced the position so strongly that the First and Fourth Divisions were detached from the besieging force to repel the assault. While they were on the march the Heavy Brigade of Cavalry, which had not arrived in time for the battle of the Alma, distinguished itself by a brilliant achievement. Surprised by a large body of Russian cavalry, and hampered by obstacles on the ground, the Brigade advanced steadily and stood firm in a shock which left an indelible impression on the onlookers—

> "There was a clash and fusion, as of wave meeting wave, when the head of the column encountered the leading squadrons of our brigade, all those engaged being resolved into a crowd of individual horsemen, whose swords rose, and fell, and glanced; so for a minute or two they fought, the impetus of the enemy's column carrying it on, and pressing our combatants back for a short space, till the 4th Dragoon Guards . . . charged the Russian flank, while the remaining regiments of our brigade went in in support of those which had first attacked."[1]

The fire of three guns was brought to bear on the Russian cavalry; the artillery of the enemy replied,

[1] Sir E. Hamley's *War in the Crimea*, p. 114.

but failed to find its range. The Russians wavered and fled; the Scots Greys charged them as they went across the plain; "this they did going through them and back again." Haines, who was advancing with the Fourth Division, was not in time to witness the exploit of the Heavy Brigade or the success with which the 93rd Foot repulsed an attempt on the road to the harbour of Balaclava; his regiment as they came up "met wounded horses and Dragoons as well as many saddles emptied altogether." The affair seemed to be, and ought to have been, over; but the troops had arrived just in time to witness the tragedy of an error so nobly redeemed as to win from posterity the forgiveness which the men who witnessed it found hard to extend.

The Light Brigade of Cavalry had made no attempt to render assistance when the Russians had dashed past it to make their attack. Its leader, Lord Cardigan, understood that he was forbidden to take the offensive. The Earl of Lucan, who was in command of the Cavalry Division, now received instructions that the cavalry, supported by infantry, was to take the opportunity of recovering the redoubts and guns in the heights which had been abandoned by the Turks. While he waited for such an opportunity Captain Nolan, an A.D.C. to Lord Raglan and the author of a work on the use of cavalry, rode up to him, and delivered a written order—

> "Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front, follow the enemy, and try to prevent them carrying away the guns. Troop of horse artillery may accompany. French cavalry on your left. Immediate."

The Russian cavalry had not retreated on the abandoned guns but on its own, and Lord Lucan did not understand in which direction he was to follow an enemy who were not moving. Left, right, and in front of the valley in which stood our Cavalry Division were Russian forces, protected by guns, with riflemen and Lancers ready to issue from all sides. The conversation which followed the receipt of the message from Lord Raglan may best be given in Lord Lucan's own words [1]—

> "After carefully reading this order, I hesitated, and urged the uselessness of such an attack, and the dangers attending it. The aide-de-camp in a most authoritative tone, stated that they were Lord Raglan's orders, that the cavalry should attack immediately. I asked 'Where, and what to do?' neither enemy nor guns being in sight. He replied in a most disrespectful manner, pointing to the further end of the valley. 'There, my Lord, is your enemy; there are your guns.' So distinct, in my opinion, was your written instruction, and so positive and urgent were the orders delivered by the aide-de-camp, that I felt it was imperative on me to obey, and I informed Lord Cardigan that he was to advance, and to the objections he made, and in which I entirely agreed, I replied that the order was from your lordship. Having decided, against my conviction to make the movement, I did all in my power to render it as little perilous as possible."

The Light Brigade advanced, not upon the abandoned guns, but upon the Russian cavalry at the end

[1] From a letter to Lord Raglan dated 30th December 1854, quoted in Adye's *Review of the Crimean War*, p. 106.

of the valley. Captain Nolan rode in its van and was at once killed by a fragment of a shell. Lord Cardigan and his six hundred rode down the valley, suffering frightfully as they moved. As they came within range of the great Russian battery in front of the cavalry they meant to attack, the carnage increased; the Brigade never wavered, and, cutting their way through guns and gunners, they dashed themselves on the Russian horse, did some execution and retired. The Heavy Brigade, which had advanced in support, was recalled by Lord Lucan to avoid a second scene of butchery; but some French cavalry (a regiment of the Chasseurs d'Afrique) came nobly to the rescue and put out of action the guns on the left which were pouring a deadly fire upon the Brigade as it retreated. It had been broken, but was far from helpless. The Russians, determined to lose none of the advantage given them by the hideous blunder which brought about the charge, attempted to intercept its return, but a compact body of the 8th Hussars and the 17th Lancers broke through their cavalry, and Lord George Paget, with a similar body of the 4th Light Dragoons and the 11th Hussars, was strong enough to attack three squadrons of Russian lancers on the homeward path. The Brigade had lost 247 men killed and wounded: of one regiment, the 13th Light Dragoons, only two mounted men returned to camp.[1] Two of the lost guns, which had been in Lord Raglan's thoughts when he sent the message to Lord Lucan, were afterwards recovered by Sir George Cathcart and the Fourth Division; but the charge of the Light Brigade had achieved nothing beyond a brilliant example of stead-

[1] The loss in horses was 475 killed and 42 wounded.

fast obedience and high courage; an awful and noble deed of chivalry.

The impression which the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava made on the British army in the Crimea may be judged from the letter of the 27th October, in which Haines describes it. Camp gossip is far from accurate, and the letter is not quite correct in detail, representing Lord Cardigan as receiving Captain Nolan's order. The actual facts were, of course, not known to the army or to the public until some time had elapsed—

> "Nolan was sent with orders to the Light Brigade of Cavalry. To these he gave a significance they were not intended to bear; instead of, as was intended by the Commander-in-Chief, giving general instructions to Lord Cardigan, leaving the details to be carried out by him, with reference to position, &c., &c., he gave positive orders to his Lordship to charge, so positive and conveyed in such a manner that they could not be disobeyed. Lord Cardigan (not generally suspected of being over prudent himself) made him repeat his orders before he would carry them out. Nolan, however, repeated, 'Your orders are to charge, there's the enemy. Follow me,' riding out himself in front. In this position he was struck by a cannon shot and fell dead. The charge as ordered by him was carried out, but of 600 men who commenced it something under 200 returned. They became exposed to a cross fire from heights beset with minie men and, after passing through the first line with guns, came on cavalry in close formation, themselves broken and their horses blown. It is a sad, sad day. Although I myself was on the field, I don't know who are gone or who were spared. Many friends

> I have already made out as dead, but as yet there is much uncertainty on the loss. Ramnugger, made sad by the loss of Cureton and Havelock, comes back to my remembrance, but it affords no parallel to this. Havelock's mistake is as nothing compared with Nolan's culpable error. . . . I remain firm in the conviction that dashing cavalry officers are gross mistakes, and that those who move at a jog trot are the men who will do their work satisfactorily."

With the charge of the Light Brigade the battle of Balaclava came to an end. Lord Raglan suggested an advance against the Russian army, but General Canrobert, holding that nothing must be permitted to interfere with the siege operations, would not assent to the proposal. The Russians were therefore left in possession of the heights which they had carried, and the defences of Balaclava were confined to the inner line. It was not easy to secure even these, and, if the commissariat arrangements had permitted, it would have been of great advantage to the allied armies to abandon Balaclava altogether, employing only the French naval base in Kamisch Bay, in the north of the Upland and close to Sebastopol. The numbers of the allied armies were insufficient to prosecute the siege and, at the same time, to defend their own extended line of communications against the large Russian forces outside Sebastopol.

On the evening of the 25th October the divisions which had been sent to reinforce the guard at Balaclava returned to their posts. Possibly it was in ignorance of this that the garrison, on the 26th, made a sortie, directed against the position of the Second

Division. Of this sortie Haines gives an account in the letter from which we have just quoted—

> "Yesterday we had a very pretty little affair in our own lines, with infantry and artillery. The Russians in broad daylight took it into their heads to assault our right, as we stand in front of Sebastopol, with heavy columns of Infantry. My attention was first drawn to the fact by hearing some musketry at our pickets. I got my glasses on them, and found they were attacked by a cloud of Russian skirmishers supported by heavy masses of Infantry. To their pressure the pickets gave way in good order, retiring on the line in skirmishing order. The Russian columns advanced quickly with some guns. They passed the post occupied by the picket and then the heads of their advance came within view of our artillery, who plied them with shrapnel with good effect. However they continued their advance until within range of a 9 lb. battery which poured in grape. This I hear broke them entirely and they bolted, leaving many dead and wounded, and hotly pursued by our skirmishers. We had turned out in support of Sir de Lacy Evans' Division, the one attacked. The French too turned out smartly and supported us with a Division. The advance of this in three columns across the land gave the whole thing something the appearance of a Field day. I can hardly believe the report I have just heard that 700 Russians have been buried this morning. Grape, shrapnel, and minies make fearful holes in columns, but I cannot think they would create so great a loss in so short a time. The minie is a most wonderful weapon. At Balaclava the other day, half a dozen Riflemen silenced two twenty-four pounders which the enemy had brought to bear on us. They crept

up to the crest of a hill and fairly drove the gunners from their guns.

"I don't attempt to make things look brighter than they are, so I tell you of our mishaps as well as of our good luck. I do not for one moment doubt the result. The troops are in better heart now than ever, always anxious for a brush, and thoroughly inured to fatigue. We may expect anything from them. The climate is the most delicious in the world. There is some diarrhœa in camp, but it is wearing out."

Thus the siege went on, the French gradually recovering from their initial misfortunes and pushing up their approaches to the great work opposite them. Haines records on the 30th October a clever device of Bosquet—

"At night a great deal of firing on our right rear, supposed to be two Russian columns firing on each other. It is said that General Bosquet advanced a few of the Corps d'Afrique between these two, fired both ways, and then suddenly retiring left them to fight it out between themselves."

On the 2nd November Haines was sent to an advanced battery—

"On our road to this post the enemy opened a heavy fire on us as we were on a narrow ravine. A large shell, looking like a brilliant firework, came ricochetting along down the right bank, it passed in rear of the head of the column, but struck in for about the 12th rank of fours. Fortunately it stopped just as it came upon the line of march, the men threw themselves down, and got out of the way in the best manner they could, and the thing burst without injuring a soul. A

> rifleman's calabash was smashed to atoms by this shell, and the strap which suspended it cut in two places, but the man escaped unhurt. Captain Smith and I both felt the wind of the explosion, but thank God the splinters flew harmlessly past. There was a very heavy fire on this battery throughout the day. Their gunnery seemed to me to be very scientific. The French brought Rocket tubes and fired from them a good deal. One burnt in the tube, and as it did no harm we were enabled to enjoy the ludicrous scene which accompanied it. When it became evident that the thing was determined to stay and burst chez nous, instead of travelling to the good town of Sebastopol previous to doing so, the French cannoniers and the rifles who were looking on at the firing all rushed in upon [name illegible] and me, who occupied a snug cave, and fairly buried us. Then we heard the rocket roaring like a monster in the tube, the French accompanying this with many oaths, calling the recusant rocket all the nasty names they could think of. At last it did explode, doing no further damage than the destruction of the tube."

The siege was obviously destined to be long-continued. It was now also evident that the Russian force under Menschikoff must ere long attempt to raise the siege, and, in anticipation of a general action, the Diary for the last days of October and the first days of November tells of walking and riding excursions to reconnoitre. Among his companions in these little expeditions was his old friend Sackville West, now Lord West, a senior captain in the 21st. The mastery of the ground thus attained proved of great value to both of them in the battle of Inkerman.

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE BATTLE OF INKERMAN, SHOWING THE POSITION OF THE BARRIER

CHAPTER IV

THE BATTLE OF INKERMAN[1]

UP to this point in the narrative of the life of Sir Frederick Haines, the biographical interest has lain rather in his descriptions of the performances of others than in any great part which he himself played in guiding the fortunes of war. We have therefore tried to avoid, as far as possible, insisting upon details more relevant to the history of a campaign than to the biography of a staff or regimental officer. It is now necessary to enter into fuller explanation of one memorable conflict. Inkerman was the day of our hero's life; he used to express his readiness to exchange all the other hours of his many years for those six in which he and his men defended the barrier and controlled the tide of the conflict, as it surged and fell on that November day. "It was worth living to have been at Inkerman," he said one "Gujerat Day," suddenly interrupting his memories of the Punjab.

The battle of Inkerman was a surprise attack upon the British position outside Sebastopol. The geography is not easy without frequent reference to the map; in describing the locality we shall deal only

[1] The MS. material left by Sir Frederick Haines and used in this chapter consists of (*a*) Diary, 5th November 1854; (*b*) letter of 26th November 1854; (*c*) memorandum lent to Mr. Kinglake in 1869; (*d*) pencil notes in Vol. V of Kinglake's *Crimea;* (*e*) memorandum given to the present writer in 1904, but written about 1870.

with points essential to our story. The British line stretched south-east from the town of Sebastopol to the harbour of Balaclava, following the rough outline of the Chersonese Upland. The Upland ends abruptly on the eastern side, and in the valley below flows the Tchernaya. The Russians held the rising ground on the other side of the valley. This is the real Mount Inkerman, on which stands the masonry known as the Ruins of Inkerman. But the name was applied by our troops to the ground on the western side of the Tchernaya, between the river and the height of Shell Hill, the scene of the sortie of the 26th October, which the historian of the Crimean War has called the battle of the lesser Inkerman. It is this piece of ground, which probably had itself no distinctive name, that has given to the battle of the 5th November the name of Inkerman. South-west from the river runs the spur known as the Inkerman Tusk, and between this Tusk and Shell Hill is the Quarry Ravine.

The Quarry Ravine played an important part in the battle. Through it runs the Post Road, across which our men had thrown "a mere breast work of stone unfit to resist the discharge of six-pounders." This was the famous Barrier which became the critical point in the later portion of the battle. Beyond the Barrier, and just outside the ravine, was a small trench or cutting made across the road by the British. Below the Barrier the road crossed the Home Ridge, close to the camp of the Second Division. On the east of the Barrier, running north and south, was the Fore Ridge, the extreme eastern edge of which was called the Kitspur. On the Kitspur stood the Sandbag Battery, soon to be described as the "abattoir" by the French soldiers

who witnessed or shared in the long series of combats for its possession. The Sandbag Battery was an earthwork which had been constructed some time before to silence a Russian gun near the ruins of Inkerman. It had achieved its purpose and had "long been given up as a useless work for defence, and disarmed." Some distance to the south of the Second Division camp, the road passed a windmill, close to which was the Guards' camp, and a mile and a half to the rear was the camp of the Fourth Division. On the heights to the east of the road a French Division under General Bosquet was posted.

North-west from the Windmill up to the defences of Sebastopol was the Careenage or Careening Bay ravine; the heights on its southern side running from the Malakoff Tower to the Windmill, and those on its northern side from Careenage Bay (in the harbour of Sebastopol) to Shell Hill and the Barrier.

The Russians had now received large reinforcements, and could bring an overwhelming force to bear on the Allies. The resistance offered by Sebastopol to all attacks, and the capture of guns and heights at Balaclava, had given the Russians fresh confidence. The plan by which, on that November Sunday, they hoped to render untenable the position of the besiegers was threefold. From the garrison of Sebastopol a force of 19,000 infantry with 38 guns, under General Soimonoff, was to march on the heights above the Careenage ravine and take Shell Hill. They were to be joined by 16,000 infantry and 96 guns under General Pauloff, moving from the other side of the Tchernaya. General Dannenberg was then to take command of the united army and make an attack in

force upon the enemy, being ultimately assisted by the troops which had attacked at Balaclava, and which now held the valley below the south-eastern corner of the Upland. Prince Gortschakoff, who had succeeded Liprandi in the command of this force, was instructed to hold Bosquet's French troops by feigning an attack, and then to make his way up the heights to join the main army.

The conception of a surprise attack on this scale was masterly in design, and its possibility had not entered into the calculation of the British commanders. Haines remarks that Sir de Lacy Evans, whose Division (the Second) was to bear the brunt of the first onslaught, had not succeeded in strengthening his exposed camp by outworks and entrenchments, and had "allowed the brushwood to remain thick up to the very tents of the Division . . . a cover to the enemy and a sad impediment to our advance." Sir de Lacy Evans was, on the 5th of November, on board ship at Balaclava, suffering from the effects of an accident, and General Pennefather took command of the Division, which Soimonoff was successful in surprising—

> "We must admit that we were fairly surprised. It is difficult to get at the real facts, but my belief is that the Picket on our right front was not pushed forward to its proper night position, which was close to the crest of a hill [Shell Hill] about 800 yards in front of our camp. This position being untenable by day on account of being within range of shells from the [Russian] shipping, was held merely by night. 'My reason for thinking this, is, that after the battle was over, I came upon the blankets of the Picket somewhat

to the rear of what should have been its post, ranged very regularly, evidently in the spot the men had abandoned them. In this I cannot be mistaken, as a man who had been on picket in the morning expressed great delight at finding his blanket, which he had given up for lost. The Russians who worked a good deal over that part of the ground during the day must have been too fully occupied to think of removing them. This post had been neglected for some nights previous, as there is no doubt from the accounts of prisoners that the attack had been prepared for some days, guns advanced and even bodies of men secreted in the neighbourhood by our posts. The sound of wheels had been heard at night, but it was supposed it proceeded from the opposite side of the harbour. This even failed to elicit common? extra watchfulness."[1]

The Russians, successful in surprising their enemy, had, however, committed one great error which seriously affected the course of the battle. Soimonoff, after moving out of Sebastopol, had taken the northern side of the Careenage ravine. He had thus secured Shell Hill, but he had also occupied the ground towards which Pauloff was marching. The combined Russian force was thus compelled to act on too narrow a front and in an unduly restricted area; a circumstance which prevented them from making proper use of their great numerical superiority. Dannenberg controlled 35,000 men with 134 guns; the British infantry,

[1] These sentences, from Haines's letter of the 26th November, throw fresh light on the nature of the surprise at Inkerman. No details are given by Adye, or Hamley, or in Malleson's *Ambushes and Surprises*. Kinglake, in his attempt to show that there was no surprise, quotes a remark of Pennefather which bears out what is here said about the pickets (Vol. V, p. 464).

which, at various periods of the day, but never all together, were present on Mount Inkerman, numbered 7,464; the French infantry 8,219. There were also available 200 British and 700 French cavalry; the British brought into action 24 pieces of field artillery and two 18-pounders; the French 24 guns. The disparity of numbers suggests a tale of Charlemagne and his paladins; but it must be remembered that the Russians did not realize that they were often fighting a mere handful of men. A dull morning, heavy with mist and sleet, aided the magnificent courage with which single lines of British soldiers gave the enemy the impression that they were advance parties from great columns. "Heroic" is too weak a word for the battle of Inkerman.

In describing the course of the battle, we shall follow the division into seven periods, originally made by Kinglake, to whose skill and diligence every student of the Crimean War owes the possibility of understanding the history of one of the most confused combats ever fought.

> "Generals and their Staff," wrote Haines in the letter from which we have already quoted, "had but little to say to the battle. Regiments turned out as best they could, hurried to the menaced point, and fought to their front the moment they could find an enemy. Arrangement there was none. No one felt the presence of generals, but having a firm reliance on themselves and men, fought the battle for them. Lord Raglan may consider himself lucky in having the men to do it for him. Had orders been waited for, the position was not worth five minutes' purchase."

A battle of this kind, fought within a narrow area, can better be described by temporal than by local divisions; our story is specially concerned with the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth of Kinglake's "periods."

The first period (5.45 to 7.30 a.m.) is that of Soimonoff's attack on Mount Inkerman,[1] before the junction with Pauloff's troops and the assumption of the command by Dannenberg. Shell Hill was captured by the enemy without opposition, and on it were posted Russian troops, protected by artillery. General Pennefather was now faced with the problem of defending his camp; his right and front on the Fore Ridge and the Home Ridge were threatened by 15,000 men, and a body of Russians was marching through the Careenage ravine to attack his left. Two courses were open to Pennefather, who had to act immediately and on his own responsibility. He could either devote his whole force to the task of protecting the Home Ridge, expulsion from which would mean irretrievable disaster, or he might scatter his men in the attempt to save his entire line, falling back, if necessary, upon the Home Ridge for the last great battle. Pennefather chose the latter alternative, and his decision affected the character of the fighting throughout the day, and made Inkerman a struggle of isolated combats. He pushed forward small bodies to reinforce the pickets, and Lord Raglan, when he came up, did not interfere with the arrangements. The first British reinforcements increased Pennefather's available troops to 3,600 infantry and 18 guns,

[1] By Mount Inkerman is always meant the ground so described by our troops—not the real Inkerman heights across the Tchernaya.

but the Russian numbers were also increased by an advance of Pauloff's army. The first attacks raised the hopes of the Russians, for they captured three guns of a battery which had been pushed into the Mikriakoff glen (a small ravine on the British side of Shell Hill), and one of their columns, which had moved through the Careenage ravine, was now close to the Second Division Camp. This last grave danger disappeared as if by miracle. A young lieutenant, Hugh Clifford, to whom was awarded the Cross of Valour, charged with some twenty to forty men the Careenage column on one side; Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar, with a company of the Grenadier Guards, attacked it on another. The enemy had no conception of the slight forces opposed to them; they fell back, and finally retreated, nor did they repeat this flank attack. In front, Colonel Egerton of the 77th forced his way to the slopes of Shell Hill; the Russians were alarmed by his appearance there, and abandoned the guns they had captured. General Adams now led a force of 500 men to attack some 4,000 Russians who held the position of the Sandbag Battery on the end of the Fore Ridge, and drove them off. By half-past seven o'clock a Russian force, originally consisting of 15,000 men, and reinforced by nearly 10,000, led by the gallant Soimonoff, who fell mortally wounded in the course of the fighting, had been repulsed by less than 4,000 British troops. The mist, which had helped the defenders to accomplish this great feat, concealed from them the fact of its achievement, and deprived them of the inspiration of victory.

The second period of the battle (7.30 to 8.30 a.m.) is that of Dannenberg's first attack, and it is marked by

a series of struggles for the possession of the useless Sandbag Battery. Before the majority of Pauloff's troops, and a portion of Soimonoff's, had come into action, Dannenberg, advancing with 10,000 fresh men and 97 additional guns, easily re-took Shell Hill and attacked the Sandbag Battery. British troops still held the Barrier, but between it and the force under General Adams, which was defending the Fore Ridge and the Sandbag Battery, was a Gap through which the Russians were able to make flank attacks. It was natural that the enemy should imagine that the Sandbag Battery was an essential point of the British defences, but our artillery officers were well aware that it was useless as a vantage ground, and it is hard to understand why outpost after outpost of British infantry was permitted to occupy an isolated position, difficult to maintain, and in itself valueless. The fascination of retaining at all hazards a post which the enemy showed a determination to assault doubtless played its part in the opposition to the Russians at this point, but while this explanation is creditable to the soldiery, it does not relieve the authorities of their responsibility. Adams, attacked on his left and in front, was driven back, and the defenders of the Sandbag Battery were compelled to fall back with the rest of the line. Adams was mortally wounded, but fresh guns were brought up, and the Grenadier Guards, under the Duke of Cambridge, again recaptured the "Castle Perilous" of the battle, and held it with great loss against terrible odds. When the detachment of Guards left the Battery to seek a better position, the Russians made a dash for it, and were again driven back by the 7th Royal Fusiliers, who had been acting

on the right. The Russian column re-formed and again attacked, and the Fusiliers this time pursued them for some considerable distance.

Meanwhile, two French battalions came up. General Bosquet had soon discovered that Gortschakoff's threatening movements were merely a feint, and early in the morning he had offered help to Sir George Brown and Sir George Cathcart; but these officers had not then realized that a general action was impending, and had declined his offer. Lord Raglan, soon afterwards, sent requests for reinforcements both to Canrobert and to Bosquet, but considerable time had to elapse before troops could come up. Bosquet's two regiments, which were now in rear of the gap, had received no orders to advance, and their commanders were unable to accept instructions from the Duke of Cambridge and General Pennefather. Sixteen hundred French troops were almost in position; but the gap was still open. The Russians—for the sixth time that morning—seized the Sandbag Battery; they advanced beyond it, and were charged by the Grenadiers, who again found themselves in possession. A Homeric combat ensued, in which stones and fragments of rock aided more modern weapons. Fresh troops were now brought up in defence.

Sir George Cathcart, with a force of 400 men drawn from the Fourth Division, was instructed, after the vain appeal to the French, to take up his position in the Gap between the Fore Ridge and the Barrier, but seeing an opportunity on the Russian left, he joined the defence on the right of the Sandbag Battery, where a long series of personal combats was in progress. Magnificent charges by the Guards and

by companies of the 20th, 46th, 68th, and 95th Regiments routed the assailants, but in their pursuit the victors abandoned the high ground. While they were engaged in this pursuit, Sir George Cathcart, most of whose troops were following the retreating foe, found behind him, on the head of the Kitspur, a Russian column which had marched through the gap and turned the position. With his staff and some fifty men Cathcart attacked, and succeeded in sharing the crest of the hill with the enemy. There he fell dead, and his small following made their way down, leaving the Russian column on the Fore Ridge. The Duke of Cambridge and 100 men, now its sole defenders, were compelled to make their way past them as best they could. The position was critical; our men were straggling back from the pursuit, and the enemy were again advancing from the front, when the 6th French regiment interposed. Its gallant onslaught on their right forced the Russians to retreat, and the French passed through the fatal Sandbag Battery, making no attempt to hold it and moving on to the right to guard the flank. Out of 2,600 British troops who had defended the Battery at various times, nearly one thousand were killed or wounded.

The interest of the Second Period of the battle attaches to this struggle on the Fore Ridge, but, meanwhile, Pennefather had been conducting an obstinate defence of the Home Ridge and of the ground between it and the Barrier, and had beaten off a Russian attack on the right. We have now reached the beginning of the third period (8.30 a.m. to 9.15 a.m.) and the fighting at the Barrier, with which we are more immediately concerned.

When the firing was heard in the early morning, the 21st had been warned to be in readiness to turn out; and soon orders came for the small proportion of the regiment which had not been occupied in duty on the trenches during the night. Some sixty men under Captain Dalzell had scarcely gone when the rapid increase of heavy firing indicated an advance of the enemy in force, and the remainder of the regiment marched to the right of the Fourth Division camp. It did not form part of General Goldie's Brigade, to which it properly belonged, and no definite orders had been given to its Colonel (Ainslie). As they approached the Windmill, an officer besought Ainslie to give support to his ranks, which were hard pressed and had run short of ammunition. The Colonel sent forward the left wing under Lord West, who with his 200 men acted separately throughout the day, and played a gallant part in the defence of the Home Ridge. The right wing, moving on to the front, witnessed the *mêlée*[1] in which the three guns were lost in the first period of the battle (cf. p. 130), but were too far in the rear to take part in it, their front being covered by other troops. Bearing to the right, they found a vacant space, where they wheeled into line and advanced. A very heavy cannonade from Shell Hill caused a halt, and the men were ordered to lie down. Colonel Swyney with the 63rd Regiment, which properly belonged to Torrens' Brigade, was on the right of the 21st; neither of the colonels had received orders, and they decided to act together.

[1] Kinglake makes both Lord West and the left wing, and Colonel Ainslie with the right wing of the 21st, come up at a later period of the battle: but Sir Frederick Haines was quite clear in his recollection as to the first event he witnessed.

At this point the right of the 63rd was menaced by the enemy. The preliminary word for a change to the right had actually been given, when Ainslie, seeing that the front of the two regiments was becoming closely threatened, said, "D—n it, we must go in at these fellows first," and ordered (to use Kinglake's phrase) his superb Fusiliers to attack. The 21st was ill prepared to meet the enemy. The men were tired by their night-duty in the trenches; their powder was damp, and from their ranks, on which the Russian volleys were telling heavily, there came with horrible monotony the sound of musket after musket as it missed fire. With undiminished courage they fought on to the front; the damp powder being used up, their fire began to tell, and the enemy wavered.

> "So away went the two regiments, charging side by side along the face of the hill towards the Post road. The Russians were driven before us like sheep. It was a weird journey down that hill, with we know not what before or behind us; the mist was too heavy to allow us to see much in any direction, but away we went, the men evidently caring for none of these things. It was Donnybrook Fair revived. I have never seen troops behave better; my great anxiety was to steady and keep them together, the thick rush through which we advanced tended much to break our formation."

As they rushed along the post road, pushing the Russians before them, they left on their right the Picket Wall to which the too-flattering name of the Barrier was given, and only halted about eighty yards short of the trench which had been cut across the road at the entrance to the Quarry ravine. On the other

side of the cutting stood a Russian column, guarding the road which ran at some considerable height above the bed of the Quarry ravine. Another column occupied the bed below, on the right of the road. The sudden appearance through the mist of two columns of the enemy, both advancing upon them, steadied the men, and Haines looked round to see who were with him. That first charge had been, he says, "really a joyous thing," but it was not without some anxiety that he discovered that his following consisted of about forty men drawn from both regiments, and three or four officers, including Major Dalzell of the 63rd and a young officer of the Bombay army, whose love of fighting had led him to the Crimea. There was little time to think, and Haines, whose brevet rank was to place upon him greater responsibility than this before the day was over, rejected Major Dalzell's suggestion of an advance across the trench and hastily took up his position.

The road was narrow, and he was able, not only to occupy its width with files, but also to detach two small parties; one as a look-out to the rising ground on the left, and the other to line the stone parapet on the right of the road, whence they might act upon the column in the bed of the ravine. A brisk fire was at once opened upon the column across the cutting. It had been with surprise that Haines and his forty men found themselves confronting two large columns.

> "I was still more surprised when I found that the wretched fire we could open stopped their advance for a considerable time. . . . We were sorely behindhand in having nothing but the

smooth bore,[1] but still Brown Bess did her work admirably."

In spite of their success, they were losing men fast, and it was essential to obtain support. Haines therefore ran back the three hundred yards to the Barrier —he was on foot throughout the day[2]—and found there Colonel Ainslie attempting to collect the scattered remnants of the 21st. The Colonel at once moved forward, with his handful of men, to reinforce the advanced post at the trench, to which Haines returned with him. Before they reached the gallant little band, Ainslie received a severe wound. He dismounted and continued his advance on foot, growing weaker at each step, until at last he could do no more than lean exhausted against the bank, and kind hands carried him off the field, stricken unto death. Two lieutenants—Killeen and Hurt—were mortally injured about the same time, and Major Dalzell's horse was killed under him. Yet

> "our opponents fared worse than we did. The advance of the column on the road was completely checked, the column in the ravine much annoyed by the shots thrown into it, to which it could give no effective reply. The nature of the ground and our thin formation favoured us, whilst their dense masses were fully exposed to our fire. We were perfectly protected from the fire of the artillery on Shell Hill by the abrupt back on the left of the road."

The Russians did not permit this condition of things to continue for long. Throughout that anxious half-

[1] The Fourth was the only Division not armed throughout with the Minie rifle.

[2] Kinglake in one place speaks of him as on horseback.

hour, Haines had been conscious that his left was open to attack and had decided that, should it be menaced, he must retreat to the Barrier. It was for this purpose that he had posted a party on the slope above. About nine o'clock in the morning the alarm was given by the outlook, and Haines at once ordered a retreat.

> "The position we abandoned was a good and useful one, but to have held it longer would have been to sacrifice my party."

It was no easy task to retire in safety from such a position. At first an effort was made to charge down the road before retiring, but the fire was so heavy that it was impossible to keep a front, and Major Dalzell, who had ridden many yards in advance of the party, had to give up the attempt. They retired in perfect order, and the men took up at the Barrier the positions to which they had been directed. At this moment Sergeant Higdon of the 21st thought he saw Lieutenant Hurt, who had been left for dead on the other side of the Barrier, move slightly, and asked permission to bring him in. Another sergeant, Rutherford, volunteered to accompany him; they advanced under a heavy fire, and, untouched, they brought him back; but he was dead.

In their first wild rush the 21st had turned the enemy out of the Barrier. Their task for the rest of the day was to prevent them from retaking it and advancing from it to the centre of the Home Ridge. The party commanded by Haines was augmented by stragglers from the 57th and 68th Regiments, and from the Rifle Brigade; "so the post was tolerably efficiently manned by odds and ends of Corps." The

Russians had followed up rapidly from the trench, but Haines was ready to receive them. Their first attack was close and prolonged: it was made both by the road and from the bed of the ravine, and it was supported by the full force of the batteries on Shell Hill, from which there was at the Barrier no abrupt slope to protect the defence. The death of his Colonel left Haines the senior officer at the Barrier, and he at once took such steps as were possible to secure the post. After examining the ground on each flank, he placed on the left a small party of the 68th in charge of an officer. They found cover under a broken wall, and their instructions were to fire deliberately on the guns on Shell Hill and to report any movement there. Fortunately, some of these men had Minie rifles.

After the first long duel at the Barrier, Haines found his ammunition nearly exhausted, and he wished to obtain support and instructions from some one in authority. General Pennefather was at some distance to the left, and Haines asked Major Roper of the 1st Battalion of the Rifle Brigade to report the position to him. Roper was uncertain about finding his way, and Haines, who had carefully examined the ground some days before, went in person, while Roper took charge at the Barrier. He had no difficulty in finding Pennefather, to whom he described the critical position he held, his weakness in numbers and his want of ammunition. Pennefather, always cheerful and sympathetic, heard his story, and assured him of a supply of ammunition, but could only promise him one company of the 77th to increase his attenuated force. During his conversation with Penne-

father, Haines saw General Strangways mortally wounded as he sat on horseback talking to Lord Raglan.[1]

The return of Haines to the Barrier coincides approximately with the close of Kinglake's third period, in the course of which the 21st Regiment played so important a part. Lord West and his wing had guarded the Mikriakoff Glen; Colonel Ainslie, by his first charge, had enabled an unauthorized attack by a small body of Zouaves to secure permanent possession of the three British guns captured and recaptured early in the battle; and Haines at the cutting and at the Barrier had been of invaluable assistance during an anxious time when the Home Ridge itself was with difficulty held by a combined Anglo-French force. It was now about a quarter-past nine, the hour chosen by Kinglake for the beginning of his fourth period (9.15–10 a.m.). The enemy had been driven back, but were again advancing on the Home Ridge; they had scarcely even slackened in the assault of the Barrier.

Bad news awaited Haines when he returned to his post; for he found Major Roper incapacitated by a wound so serious that he died a few days later. Misfortune continued to dog his steps, for the promised supply of ammunition turned out to be for Minie

[1] "The officer conversing with Lord Raglan—the one on his right with the long silver hair—was the Commander of the English Artillery—a veteran whose ennobling experiences—he fought at Leipsic and Waterloo—had linked him with England's great days. While still conversing with Lord Raglan, General Strangways was mortally wounded by a round shot or shell which tore off his leg; and the brave old man tranquilly asked that some one would help him to dismount, but did not fall from his saddle."—Kinglake, Vol. V, pp. 332-3.

rifles, which only a few of his men, and none of the 21st, possessed, but soon the pouches were replenished with a supply suited to the requirements of "Brown Bess." The arrival of the ammunition reassured the men, who were beginning to imagine that the Barrier was cut off from the rest of the army, and that they were in a trap. Any remaining doubt on this point was set at rest by the appearance of General Goldie, who, since Cathcart's death, would have been in command of the Fourth Division if it had been a unified force. He had no definite information about the troops at the Barrier,[1] and had sent them no instructions; but he seems to have given an order which proved of some importance. Knowing how weak was the force at Haines's disposal, he told Major Ramsay Stuart[2] to gallop back to the Second Division camp and "send up the camp guard or any available men he could find." If Kinglake, who is the authority for this statement, is correct, Stuart found no available men in the Second Division camp, for when stragglers did come up to the Barrier, they proved to be men of the Fourth Division. Their camp was over two miles from that of the Second Division, and considerable time elapsed before the order was carried out.

Meanwhile, Goldie had joined Haines, who explained his dispositions and asked to be allowed to

[1] Kinglake (Vol. V, chap. vi) is inaccurate as regards the whole of the fight at the Barrier, and especially with regard to the part he thought Goldie had played, and the time of Haines' absence in quest of Pennefather. Many of the details he gives are irreconcilable with the facts as described by Sir Frederick Haines; but he is wrong only in detail.

[2] Major Ramsay Stuart belonged to the 21st Regiment, but had been sent away early in the day for supports and never acted with the 21st in the battle.

visit the small party which he had thrown out to his left and from which he had heard no firing. He found them "all snug," but they had been so plied with grape from Shell Hill that the officer in charge had ordered them to cease firing. "In this he was right, for the position was exposed, and valuable merely as a look-out." Leaving them in their position, Haines made his way once more back to the Barrier, and was again met with bad news. During his absence, General Goldie had fallen mortally wounded. The whole responsibility once more devolved upon the regimental captain, who had already directed operations of vital importance and had maintained his calm courage through so many perils. But the worst was now over. The defenders of the Barrier by degrees grew more numerous. The promised company of the 77th, led by Lieutenant Acton, had been delayed by mistaking the way and getting in front of the Barrier. They were soon driven back by the enemy, and came shouting at the pitch of their voices: a method of approach which impressed Haines as indicating unsteady conduct, but which had been recommended to them by Pennefather himself, apparently in the hope of suggesting to the Russians the approach of large numbers. They were followed by a company of the 49th under Lieutenant Astley, and by Colonel Horsford with a detachment of the Rifle Brigade.[1] The fire of the two 18-pounder guns, ordered up by Lord Raglan, was now brought to bear upon Shell Hill, and it was aided by incessant volleys from the Barrier.[2]

[1] Haines was senior to Horsford, and therefore retained the command.

[2] Kinglake does not seem to have been aware of this fire.

> "Our Rifles never ceased tormenting the gunners on Shell Hill, and one Battery which moved forward to get on better terms with us, was distinctly repulsed by our fire, and retired to its old position."

By ten o'clock the Russian artillery on Shell Hill had begun to slacken, and now large French reinforcements came up.

At this crisis Kinglake draws his dividing line, and the story enters on the fifth period, 10–11 a.m. Bosquet and his troops came up to find, in Kinglake's words—

> "the English thrown forward in advance of Home Ridge exerting the same kind of power and performing the same kind of duty as if they had been the men of the pickets not yet driven in. They combated upon a front which—by help of the Barrier—was riveted fast at its centre, but shifting at all other points."

Failing to appreciate the situation, Bosquet repeated the error of advancing on the Sandbag Battery, the uselessness of which had now been realized by the British troops, and posted his infantry on the Inkerman Tusk. This was not the only error into which the French were led by ignorance of the precise position. Fortunately the Russians did not take advantage of their opportunity, and continued the attack at the Barrier instead of pursuing the French. At the Barrier Haines still stood firm.

From eleven to one o'clock (Kinglake's sixth period) the French, under Canrobert's directions, remained inactive, rendering no assistance beyond the mere fact of their presence on the right and rear of

the British. The Russians still held Shell Hill, and were so well assured of their possession that they were actually beginning to entrench. They had failed to penetrate the British line; but they were not likely to regret the battle if it resulted in the retention of Shell Hill, which might well have enabled Todleben to save Sebastopool. For a time the battle languished. The Russians slackened fire, waiting in vain to hear of an attack by Gortschakoff on the rear of the allied armies, and the British artillery was compelled to follow their example because ammunition began to run short and had to be brought up with great difficulty. The French stood ready to defend what the Russians had not already captured. Only at the Barrier the fight went on persistently, remorselessly—

> "Haines," says Kingslake, "had been constantly augmenting his strength by welcoming or commanding the accession of other troops; and, whether the Russians came on by the line of the Post-road, to attack him in front, or whether, swarming up from the bed of the Quarry Ravine, they strove to turn his right flank, he always found means to repress them, and drive them back into their lair. . . . Our soldiery, whether combating at the Barrier or on its left front, passed gradually and almost unconsciously from the task of defence to the task of attack, for in truth the same kind of acts which before would have been acts of defence had now an aggressive force. To fight for the Barrier in the hours when Dannenberg was an assailant had been to defend the Home Ridge by fighting half a mile in its front. To fight for the Barrier now was, as it were, to hold open by force the gate of the enemy's castle, and grievously embarrass his defence."

When the long-expected ammunition arrived, the 18-pounders again came into action, and, as the day wore on, the Russian attacks at the Barrier grew weaker. All the regiments of the Fourth Division were now represented in the force under Haines, and he had welcomed a few French stragglers who came up to the Barrier. Seeing signs of weakness in the enemy, Haines went back to Pennefather on the Home Ridge, and suggested to him that an attack on the batteries on Shell Hill might with advantage be made from the Barrier. The General hesitated, for the suggestion involved his sparing some men to the Barrier, to replace the attacking party. "No, no," he said, "we must keep strong at home," and Haines returned to his duty, feeling that he was forbidden to attack Shell Hill. No material weakening of the numbers at the Barrier could yet be seriously thought of. But, a little later, when the enemy seemed decidedly weaker, and an orderly advance of Zouaves had added to his resources, he made up his mind that an aggressive movement on his own responsibility was now feasible.

Collecting the men armed with the Minie rifle, he placed them under the command of Lieutenant Astley of the 49th, instructing him to advance in skirmishing order through the brushwood towards the artillery posted on Shell Hill, and harass the gunners as much as possible, but warning him not to compromise himself by definite attack. Lieutenant Acton, with his company of the 77th, was dispatched with similar orders.[1] Acton interpreted his orders in a liberal

[1] Kinglake ascribes this movement on Shell Hill to Lord West. On this point Sir Frederick Haines says in his memorandum, given to the present biographer in 1904, but written

sense, and, seeing the increasing effect of our 18-pounders, moved up the hill, and Astley, after some hesitation, followed. Haines sent up Colonel Horsford with forty or fifty men in support. All these detachments and some others were called up by a Staff Officer to make a final assault on the Russian batteries. At about one o'clock Dannenberg gave the

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many years earlier: "I have mentioned this incident to very few, but General Pennefather often alluded to it in conversation in after years. I cannot imagine Lord West to have acted so immediately with the troops at the Barrier as he is shown to have done in Plan No. 7 facing page 396 [of Kinglake's fifth volume]. Had he done so we could hardly have failed to have met. Not only did we not meet, but when he came back to camp he did not know that I had been engaged (or what the right wing of the 21st had done), for I was Field Officer of the day in Camp, and ought not to have left it. Further, when on the 6th he and I went over the ground over which the right wing of the 21st had operated, I explained all our movements, took him to where the Russian column stood, barring our further progress down the road, and back to the Barrier, where I explained to him our defensive and subsequent offensive operations. Neither then, nor subsequently in our most intimate conversations did he ever say: 'I was near you then,' or in any way claim to have co-operated with us. I went with him afterwards to the head of the Mikriakoff Glen, from which he pointed out to me his sphere of operations; this was absolutely distinct from ours. He had every reason to be proud of the excellent work done by him and the left wing of the 21st at that point, and whatever he may have done or not done, no truer estimate of character was ever formed than by him who wrote of him [in words quoted by Kinglake]: 'A splendid soldier. No truer gentleman, no more honest, or braver, man ever lived.'"

Lord West had died before Kinglake's fifth volume was published, and Sir Frederick Haines preferred not to contradict the statement in his own lifetime; he believed that the error arose through Kinglake's informant mistaking himself for Lord West. They were brother officers of the 21st, intimate friends, and each held a Brevet Lieutenant-Colonelcy. Kinglake, in the footnote on p. 423 of Vol. V, remarks: "Though communicating to me full information on other subjects, the late Earl de la Warr abstained from volunteering any statement of the part he had taken in bringing the Inkerman battle to its final crisis."

signal to retreat. The guns were carried off in safety, but eight ammunition wagons were captured by Horsford. The retreat and the abandonment of the wagons were in no small measure due to the offensive operations from the Barrier.

The retreat of the Russians from Shell Hill marks the beginning of the seventh, and last, period of the battle of Inkerman. If General Canrobert had agreed with Lord Raglan that it was desirable to press the retreat, the enemy might have suffered an overwhelming disaster; but they were allowed to retire almost unmolested. They had lost over 10,000 men in killed, wounded and prisoners.[1]

It was already near nightfall when Haines was permitted to withdraw his Fusiliers from the Barrier, and even then under orders from Pennefather to return when the men had got their rations—orders which were countermanded when it became apparent that there was no danger of a fresh attack. He had held the post for six hours. "No body of Russians who attacked after nine o'clock," he says, "had made good their advance over the picket wall or to the left of it. If they did, they came and went enveloped in mist." To the stress of the long day's combat had been added that sadness which must always restrain the joy of battle. In his own right wing he had witnessed the loss, in killed and wounded, of one in three, officers and men alike. His colonel had fallen by his side, and after him some of the "youngsters" who fought so well to keep the post.

[1] Including about 3000 killed. The total British loss on Mount Inkerman was 2,357 killed and wounded (597 killed). There were, of course, losses in other parts of the field.

He had looked on while General Strangways, the white-haired veteran of Leipsic and Waterloo, received his death-wound, and after brief absences from the Barrier he had found first Major Roper, and then General Goldie, mortally injured. Two other incidents of these hours are worth recording. At one period, suddenly through the mist, there appeared a strange visitant, an officer, who, in the delirium of fever, had risen from a sick-bed and made his way to the Barrier, where he remained for half-an-hour, his fevered words half-drowned by the noise of battle. Towards the end of the fight, a French general, "a man," says Kinglake, "distinguishing himself by his bravery, but conspicuous also from his excessive corpulence,"[1] came up to the Barrier. A short time before he had been the hero of a moment when a small Anglo-French body of infantry was fighting on the Kitspur. Now, as he talked to Haines, a round shot struck him down.

The importance of the defence of the Barrier was gratefully acknowledged by General Pennefather, who said to Haines at the end of the day: "You have been in many battles, but you never were of more service than in this." Some years later in supporting an application made by Haines to the Horse Guards, he summed up his exploit thus—

> "At Inkerman, a wing of the 21st Fusiliers was posted at the stone barrier across the road, in front of the position of the 2nd Division, where it held its ground most toughly, though repeatedly attacked, indeed constantly attacked, and pressed

[1] It was not until he read Kinglake's description that Haines realized the identity of this French officer.

by very heavy odds of the enemy. Here Col. Ainslie of that corps was killed, and Haines succeeded to the command, and, as the wing was immediately under my eye and in a most important post, I had an anxious watch on their conduct, and I never saw a man more efficient, more cheery, more cool, and more with his wits about him in my life than Col. Haines showed himself during a long and trying struggle. When his ammunition was expended, he urged me for more, and on my promising to get it for him as soon as I could, and telling him he must at all events stand his ground with the Bayonet, his cheerful answer and buoyant lively manner of obeying had great effect on his men.

"As I did not command the 4th Division in which the 21st were, though many of that Division were for the day under my orders, I felt delicacy in reporting in my written report what I have now told of Col. Haines, but I mentioned it warmly to Lord Raglan. Lord Raglan knew it well. I know no man I would sooner have under my command on active service to-morrow as a Brigadier than Col. Haines."[1]

The delicacy to which General Pennefather alludes deprived Haines and the 21st of the references in dispatches to which their conduct had entitled them. Their divisional commander, Sir George Cathcart, and one of the brigadiers (General Goldie), had been killed on the field. The other brigadier, General Torrens, who himself was severely wounded, knew nothing of the work of the regiment. It was for this reason that, in the first list of distinctions for Inkerman, Haines had no acknowledgment of his services, while two lieutenant-colonels who had taken orders

[1] The letter was written in 1857.

from him at the Barrier received decorations and were otherwise rewarded. "The responsibility in the Field was on my shoulders," wrote Haines in reference to this incident. "Well, decorated or not, I hope it may always be so. I had rather have the satisfaction of knowing that such responsibility has been borne than wear a dozen crosses." When the Victoria Cross was instituted, Lord West wrote to Haines urging him, "for the sake of the credit of the 21st Fusiliers," to put in a claim on the ground of his defence of the Barrier. He did put in a claim, not for himself, but for the sergeant (Higdon) who brought in the body of Lieutenant Hurt; but it was disallowed.

With the publication of Kinglake's *Invasion of the Crimea*, the part played at Inkerman by Haines and the 21st Fusiliers came to be appreciated.

> "I cannot tell you," wrote Kinglake to Haines, "how great a value I attach to your statements, for, proving, as they do, the retention of the Barrier down to the commencement of the Russian retreat, they go to the very pith of the business. . . . It augments the glory of the day as far as concerns the English, and gives much more simplicity and consequently more grandeur to the battle than would otherwise belong to it."

The pages of the second half of his fifth volume bear witness to the justice of the remark. A later writer on the Crimean War, Colonel Malleson, pays a still more enthusiastic tribute to "the gallant Haines, the type of the calm and resolute soldier, full of resources in danger," and he attributes, in large measure, to his "splendid offensive action" the abandonment of Shell Hill by the Russians.[1]

[1] Kinglake scarcely does justice to this. His fidelity to Lord

The battle of Inkerman, in Sir Edward Hamley's judgment, decided the fate of Sebastopool. Not only had the Allies escaped a terrible peril—

> "When Inkerman had proved that the Russians could not beat us in battle," says Hamley, "we were sure to win, because it was impossible for us to embark in presence of the enemy. We could do nothing else but keep our hold; and, keeping it, it was matter of demonstration that the Powers which held command of the sea must prevail over the Power whose theatre of war was separated from its resources by roadless deserts."

But much had to be done and many things to be suffered before the flags of the Allies flew over Sebastopool. The record of their deeds in the Crimea, so far as they concern our story, is almost ended, and a few pages must suffice to conduct our hero homewards from the unfinished war.

The diary of the 5th of November tells of the happy meeting with West on the return to camp, and of the mourning for missing comrades. When the two friends rode over the whole position next day, they found, marking the farthest limit of the British advance, three bodies of men of No. 1 Company of the 21st Fusiliers. Haines's reflections on the battle are given in his letter of the 26th November—

> "The result to us is material, insomuch as we defeated a desperate attempt upon our position, but its moral effect is beyond all calculation, elevating our Infantry both in their own and the enemy's estimation, whilst theirs must have suffered a corresponding depression. Instead of

Raglan's two 18-pounders, both here and at the Alma, led him to minimize the "extraneous aid" they received.

remaining on the defensive throughout the day, we should about 12.30 have assumed the offensive. We should have finished the business then and there instead of submitting, as we did, to be cannonaded for some two hours longer, but to effect this something like command was necessary; isolated efforts would be of no use in attack, good as they had proved in defence. Guns might even have been taken, I think, but that is merely an individual opinion. So much for Inkerman."

The letter goes on to relate the course of events up to the end of November, and to foreshadow the calamities which were to mark the Crimean winter of 1854–5—

"Since Inkerman, rain and wind have been our most damaging adversaries. We have once had our camp blown down, in such a hurricane that the oldest inhabitant in the Crimea (that most respectable authority) don't remember to have witnessed. We scarcely refit from the effects of one storm when another comes and destroys us again. However on the whole we have been wonderfully fortunate in the weather considering the time of year. We cannot complain at having to *wade* through November. The mud is of the most adhesive nature, making the journey to the trenches and back one of extreme labour. The trench duty on the soldier is frightfully severe in this weather. The exposure it entails, the difficulty of supplying his rations on account of the state of the roads, and the damp state of their tents must tell on the health and strength of the men before long. Indeed in many instances it has already. The 46th arrived on the 6th; this day they buried their 70th casualty, in this a few trench casualties may be included; the great

majority have been from bowel complaints. We have a great number in hospital, and I have no hesitation in saying that our hospital arrangements are disgraceful, both as to the supply of medicines, and the tents furnished for the sick. Of medical comforts I have heard nothing. I went round the tents this morning and was disgusted with the whole thing. . . .

"The final storm which levelled all our tents took place on the 14th. Mine, through the united efforts of Dee and other servants, with myself at the pole, stood longer than many of its neighbours, but at last the pole went, hitting me a crack on the head which sent me down amongst the kit, under the wet folds of the canvas. I crept out but found I positively could not stand, so crept in again under the flopping fly. Dee came in too, and here we breakfasted off cold beef and Rum; such a position for a British officer! West's tent fortunately stood, and in it I found a refuge for the remainder of the day and the following night. Major Stuart, ill with rheumatism, had also a refuge there. An alarm sounded and we were turned out for an hour, up to our nose in mud, to listen to some smart firing which was going on to the left at the French advanced works. The British Army was thoroughly wretched for that 24 hours.

"Our own discomforts we can laugh at, but the loss we have sustained at sea is frightful, in provisions and winter clothing for the army, and in ammunition for the siege. Great exertion is being made to make all these good again, but days and nights of this kind cost much human life and sow the seeds of permanent disease in many. The cavalry suffered most from this gale: the horses were standing up to their girths in mire, some were smothered at their pickets.

"On the 20th we had a very smart affair in front of the Green hill trench. . . . Lieutenant Tryon with a party of Rifles was sent forward to dislodge some sharp shooters who occupied pits and stone heaps about 800 yards in front. Batteries annoyed our gunners and took some French trenches in reverse. Tryon advanced quietly on their left, and was challenged by their look-out taking him for their relief. His men then opened fire on them and their advanced men bolted. The reserve, however, quickly came up and tried to retake the place. These he repulsed as well as a second attack made in still greater force. Sad to say, poor Tryon was killed, together with seven or eight of his men. The French are delighted with the exploit and Canrobert has published an Ordre du jour on the subject, thus shaming our cold-hearted authorities into an acknowledgment of it in like manner. . . . There is a good deal of sniping at this line of works, we have some casualities there now daily.

"I have set up house with West, a very great improvement in every way. He is in command of the regiment and likely to remain so, for the Colonel's wound is a very serious one we fear, and Stuart has had Rheumatism and is going to Scutari on sick leave. . . . I am therefore acting Major.[1] As it seems certain that we are to winter in the Crimea, and most probably on the bleak heights over Sebastopool, West and I have determined to make ourselves as comfortable as we can. We have sent home for an Australian emigrant's iron house, &c. I have begged Robert Blagden[2] to manage the business

[1] The Majority was confirmed without payment.

[2] Mr. Blagden, a cousin of Sir Frederick Haines, was his agent in London during almost all his Indian life, and an intimate friend.

> for us, and to send us with the house 6 doz. Port and 6 doz. Sherry. So we intend to be not only warm but jolly. West is a capital companion, takes a cheery view of matters, and is a first-rate commanding officer, doing everything to lighten the duty to the men, and indefatigable in his exertions to secure them a regular supply of rations. He worries the do-nothing pen-and-ink staff of this army most pertinaciously."

The last sentences raise a question into which it is not our duty to enter. The responsibility for the sufferings of the British army in the Crimea has already been sufficiently discussed, and we have no fresh light to throw on

> "the natural consequences of the unpractical and unworkable system, at once improvident and ineffective, which the nation permitted to exist for the conduct of its military business." [1]

Haines was not left long to discharge his duties as Major of the 21st Fusiliers, nor was he to share with Lord West the iron house and the port. Early in December he received from General Estcourt, the Adjutant-General of the Army in the Crimea, an invitation to accept the appointment of Commandant of Balaclava. "It is," wrote the Adjutant-General, "a post of great importance in respect to active military operations as well as those which relate to police, and the hundred questions which belong to the well ordering of things which are for ever going wrong." The papers which relate to Haines's short tenure of this post show that General Estcourt had good grounds for saying that it required "vigour, method,

[1] Hamley's *War in the Crimea*, p. 189.

and some sternness," and there were not wanting critics who alleged that these qualities had been lacking in its recent management. "Every one," said the *United Service Gazette*, "is crying out at the state of Balaclava." Before the middle of January *The Times* correspondent had called attention to the improvements carried out by Haines, and it was with great regret that the Adjutant-General announced to him, on the 14th, Lord Raglan's decision that, being now second in command of his regiment, it was necessary that he should rejoin it. It is worth recording that at Balaclava, Haines was under Brigadier-General Sir Colin Campbell, with whom his relations, though on the whole pleasant, were not always quite smooth.[1] From the 17th January to the 7th of February, Haines performed responsible duties in the trenches, but his experience of the rule of "General Fevrier" was cut short by his recall to England. The General Orders of the 5th February include a notification that—

[1] Campbell, of course, remembered Haines in India, and one day, at Balaclava, after reproving him for taking excessive precautions, he was heard to remark to his companion, "That d—d fellow was with the Chief at Chillianwalla" (cf. *supra*, p. 65). Campbell, though apt to lose his temper, was not unfair to Haines; he was the Brigadier of the day to whom reference is made in the footnote on p. 112; and when they met after the Crimea they were on cordial terms (cf. p 190). That there was some jealousy of the reputation gained by Campbell at the battle of the Alma is evident from an anecdote which belongs to Inkerman. Sir Colin Campbell had no important work to perform at Inkerman, but his brigade was stationed on the extreme right rear of the British, *i. e.* on the right of the Fourth Division camp. When the 21st returned to camp, Haines remarked to a sergeant, "I am proud to have been with the regiment to-day." "Yes, your Honour," was the reply, "it won't be two half-pence to us, for there's the Curse of Glencoe on the right."

"the following Officer, Supernumerary of his rank with the Service Companies, will proceed to England by the earliest opportunity to join the Depot of his regiment—21st Regiment, Brevet Lieut. Colonel F. P. Haines."

With deep regret he turned his face homewards, deprived of the opportunity of fighting to the finish, of sharing in the long-continued trench-work and in the last great assaults upon Sebastopol, or of welcoming his old Chief when Lord Gough went to the Crimea to invest the French heroes with the Orders conferred upon them by Queen Victoria. The war lingered on till September, and, when Sebastopol fell, neither of the Chiefs who had fought at Inkerman was in command of the Allied Armies. In May General Canrobert had asked that Pelissier should be appointed to the chief command, and with his advent the vigour of the French assault increased by leaps and bounds. In June Lord Raglan succumbed to a mild attack of cholera, worn out with anxiety and wounded to the quick by the ignoble attitude adopted towards him by the statesmen who had set him one of the most difficult tasks ever undertaken by a British soldier. After the fall of Sebastopol, Russia, governed by a new Czar, was persuaded by Austria to consider terms of peace. At Paris, in the beginning of 1856, she agreed to her exclusion from the banks of the Danube and to the neutralization of the Black Sea, and she abandoned any claim to interfere in the affairs of Turkey except as a member of the European Concert. The settlement could not be permanent; at the first opportunity, Russia began to restore Sebastopol and to build a Black Sea Fleet,

and the other Powers were not able or even willing to object to her action. The policy of the invasion of the Crimea may have been a blunder; the effort to carry it out taught us many lessons which we straightway proceeded to forget; but after the lapse of more than half a century a younger generation associates the names of Alma and Balaclava and Inkerman and Sebastopol not with the intrigues of politicians and the blunders of officials, but rather with the patient courage of the men who endured hardships and fought the good fight and of the women who tended the sick and the dying on a soil rendered sacred by numberless English graves.

CHAPTER V

SIR PATRICK GRANT AND THE INDIAN MUTINY

INKERMAN was not to pass without reward, for the name of Frederick Haines was honourably mentioned in a supplementary list of regimental officers who had distinguished themselves on the field, and his brevet Lieut.-Colonelcy was converted into substantive rank. In April 1855, he was gazetted Lieut.-Colonel unattached, and in June he was appointed Assistant Adjutant-General at Aldershot, where the camp, started after the grim experiences of the Crimean War, was now in course of construction. He had held temporarily a similar appointment at Dublin in the preceding year, and during his brief tenure of the post at Aldershot (20th June 1855, to 31st January 1856) he showed a zeal and ability which were handsomely acknowledged by his chief, General Knollys.

A fresh call to India was the cause of Haines' departure from Aldershot. General Patrick Grant had just been appointed to the command of the Madras Army, and he invited Haines to accompany him in the capacity of Military Secretary. Grant, though he lived well into the nineties, had already seen, in 1856, more than thirty years of Indian service. In January 1821 he had joined a regiment of the Bengal Army, and seventeen years later his great talents for administration led Sir Henry Fane, then Commander-

in-Chief in India, to appoint him Assistant Adjutant-General at Headquarters. His application to join the army in Afghanistan was refused, but when Sir Hugh Gough succeeded Sir Jasper Nicolls in the command in India in 1843, he promoted Grant to the position of Deputy Adjutant-General. In this capacity he served through the short Gwalior campaign, and at the battle of Maharajpore had the opportunity of saving his future wife from a position of some danger. Lady Gough, Mrs. Harry Smith, Miss F. Gough, and Mrs. Curtis, wife of the Commissary-General, were watching the progress of the battle, when their elephants, frightened by the explosion of a powder magazine, ran away with them, and were stopped by Grant, who conducted them back to the British camp. In 1844 he married, as his second wife, Frances Gough, the youngest daughter of the Commander-in-Chief. Through the first Sikh War he acted as temporary Adjutant-General, was twice severely wounded, and on three occasions had his charger shot under him. From 1846 to 1851 he was Adjutant-General of the Bengal Army, and his services to Lord Gough in the conquest of the Punjab and to Sir Charles Napier in his Kohat campaign were warmly acknowledged by both Chiefs and by the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie.

Haines was bound to Grant by many ties of affection and by the memory of years of labours and of perils shared together. It was therefore natural that he should accept the offer to accompany him to India, although the pecuniary value of the secretaryship he was to hold had just been greatly reduced and its prestige somewhat diminished. They sailed from

England in the spring of 1856, and the voyage was a memorable one in the personal life of the younger soldier. Among their fellow-passengers were a Mrs. and Miss Miller, the wife and daughter of an officer of the Madras Army, Colonel E. Miller, then stationed at Bangalore. "Fred is fairly smitten," wrote Grant from Aden, and, three weeks after their arrival at Madras, Haines proposed and was accepted at a reception at Government House. The engagement delighted the Chief: "a nice merry little girl, the essence of good temper and brightness," he calls her. On the 11th September, Frederick Haines and Charlotte Miller were married. The chivalrous devotion with which he regarded his young wife (she was just eighteen at the time of her marriage) continued undiminished until the union was broken by death, more than twenty years later.

Sir Patrick Grant (he was made a K.C.B. in 1857) assumed command of the Madras Army on the 10th June 1856. It was a critical period in the history of British Dominion in India, and Sir Patrick, who was intimately acquainted with the feeling in the Bengal Army, was not long in office before he commenced a campaign of reform at Madras. He called the attention of the authorities to the danger of maintaining a native army broken up into small detachments and dispersed here and there over the whole Presidency, and to the alarming insufficiency in the numbers of European officers, "the very life-blood of the service." The condition of the Madras Artillery he described as deplorable, and he pointed out the risk of entrusting guns to native officers. The state of the barracks, and the condition of the arsenals in the Presidency seemed

to him to require urgent measures, and he advocated an entire change in the system of Camp Equipage. While these and similar matters were occupying his attention, a problem arose, the solution of which gave Sir Patrick Grant an opportunity of making a decision memorable in the history of the Madras Presidency and of India. That problem was the much debated question of the greased cartridges, which, in the beginning of 1857, aroused suspicion and alarm throughout the native army.

> "The recent researches of Mr. Forrest in the records of the Government of India," says Lord Roberts,[1] "prove that the lubricating mixture used in preparing the cartridges was actually composed of the objectionable ingredients, cows' fat and lard, and that incredible disregard of the soldiers' religious prejudices was displayed in the manufacture of these cartridges."

Sir Patrick Grant had no doubts upon the subject. When the first complaint was made, he sent for some of the cartridges that he might personally inspect them, and on the 23rd February 1857, he addressed the following letter to the Governor of Madras, Lord Harris, a grandson of the famous General who took Seringapatam—

> "I beg the attention of Government to the article in accompanying newspaper, the *Madras Advertiser* of this date, on the subject of the insubordinate feeling stated to have been exhibited by the native troops in Bengal, in consequence of grease being used in the preparation of rifle cartridges, the upper portion of which the

[1] *Forty-one Years in India*, Vol. I, p. 431.

soldier must bite off with his teeth, to enable him to drop powder into the barrel of the rifle.

"The grease used for cartridges is tallow or lard; and there is no doubt whatever that applying the lips to such a substance is opposed to the religious prejudices of natives, Hindoo or Mahommedan.

"No order ought ever to be issued which cannot be legitimately and justly enforced; I consider that we are bound by every principle of policy and justice to abstain from any measure which is really opposed to the religious prejudices of the native troops; and I strongly recommend that immediate instructions should be issued prohibiting the issue to native corps of these greased cartridges.

"It has been suggested that *ghee*, which every native eats, might be substituted for tallow or lard; but I am sure that this would not suffice, and that it would be impossible to satisfy the minds of the men that ghee only, and not grease of any other description, was made use of.

"After much firing, fear that difficulty in loading will be experienced with cartridges not prepared with grease; but I hope that some expedient to remedy this serious drawback may be devised by some of the officers employed at the several Depôts of Instruction. Meanwhile, the Military Board should be instructed to prohibit, quietly and without fuss, the issue of greased cartridges to native troops, and it might be stated that they are to be retained exclusively for European soldiers."[1]

When news reached Madras of the outbreak at Meerut and Delhi, the Commander-in-Chief in the Madras Presidency was able to write—

[1] This and other documents dealing with Sir Patrick Grant's Administration are quoted from the record of a Military Consultation held at Fort Saint George on 10th August 1858.

> "Here we shall have no disturbance about greased cartridges. On the 23rd February last I laid before this Government a Minute on the subject, and none have since been issued to the native troops from the arsenals; they grease for themselves with ghee or vegetable oils which they procure themselves."

The prompt action taken by Sir Patrick Grant had a most decided effect in securing the loyalty of the native army in the Madras Presidency throughout the Mutiny. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of that loyalty, and it is not less difficult to understand why the services of the man who secured it have been so largely ignored by historians. They received warm approbation and gratitude from both the civil and the military authorities of his own day.

Grant did not fall into the error of imagining that the removal of one new grievance was a sufficient measure of precaution. He was, as his official Minutes and his private correspondence alike give evidence, in the habit of conversing with native soldiers. This had been his practice in Bengal, and the use which he consistently made of his numerous opportunities gave him special authority in speaking of the Sepoy. On the 16th March 1857, he again addressed the Government of Madras in terms which indicate a full appreciation of the dangers which had to be faced. He expressed his conviction that "a widespread spirit of sullen dissatisfaction pervades the minds of the native infantry of the army. The loyalty and fidelity of the native troops have been often severely tried, and triumphantly withstood temptation, but all human endurance has a limit, and I emphatically warn the

Government that that limit has been reached in this army." He pointed out that the native army was overworked ("one-third of the army is permanently on duty from year's end to year's end"); that the European officers were inadequate in number, and that as soon as they became experienced they were detached for other employment; that the regiments were too frequently moved, and that these frequent movements involved the Sepoy in personal expenditure. The remedies which, not for the first time, he recommended were the organization of an efficient police to do the civil duties which now devolved upon the native army;[1] a concentration of the troops and an increase in recruiting; and the adoption of a rule that fourteen European officers should always be present with each corps.

The danger of the situation in the Madras Presidency was naturally the first thought of Sir Patrick Grant from the moment of his arrival in India in 1856; but he was, of course, aware that this danger was not confined to Madras, and he had been watching, not with entire approval, the progress of events in Bengal. He had foreseen danger in the change made in 1856 in the conditions of enlistment in the Bengal Army, by which every soldier had to undertake to serve in any quarter of the globe.

> "This," he wrote, "was a most unwise and foolish step, and wholly uncalled for, inasmuch as difficulty never has been experienced in raising volunteer battalions in Bengal for foreign service beyond sea. Why, then, force upon a whole army

[1] Lord Harris had frequently urged the adoption of some such scheme.

a condition of service opposed to the religion and feeling of a vast majority?"

He knew how sensitive the Sepoys were to any suggestion of designs hostile to their creed or their caste, and he felt that the legalization of the marriage of Brahmin widows, and the growth of missionary enterprise in schools and colleges under Government auspices had given "only too good a handle to priestly Brahmins and Mahommedans" to awaken suspicions of the intentions of the Government. The objections to the new cartridges and the assertion of some mutinous regiments that even the old ones had become contaminated were but illustrations of a widespread feeling of alarm. The apprehensions were genuine, and Grant considered that the authorities had committed a grave blunder in disbanding "*en masse*—good, bad and indifferent alike" the 19th Native Infantry which was the first to mutiny, but which had been guilty of no act of violence against its officers.

On the 17th May, the news of the insurrection at Meerut and of the capture of Delhi by the mutineers reached Madras. That very day, Sir Patrick Grant telegraphed to Calcutta, urging an immediate movement upon Delhi with the corps from the surrounding stations and offering a suggestion with regard to the troops destined for China. He believed that "the appearance on the scene of some six or seven thousand European soldiers would be looked upon by the superstitious natives as miraculous and supernatural, and would impress them with the conviction that our resources were inexhaustible." The telegram, which had a considerable influence upon the Governor-General, Lord Canning, ran as follows—

"The chief object is to crush the Delhi insurgents—every other consideration should give way to this. It may be effectually attained by promptly moving upon Delhi with the Europeans, Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry from Meerut, Umballa, Agra, and the Hill Stations, and the Goorkas from Petoy and Dehrali.

"To evince confidence in their continued loyalty, I would also take three or four Native Regular Regiments who have proved loyal. However willing to aid the Insurgents they would be powerless amongst such a force of Europeans.

"A second-class siege train should be sent from Agra with the force, and lay on and spare not till Delhi is destroyed.

"I most earnestly recommend the dispatch to Singapore of the swiftest steamer available, with an urgent request to Lord Elgin to forward on to you the whole of the troops intended for China. All is safe at Hong Kong, and whether China is coerced now or six months hence is of no moment.

"The moral effect of such a force being brought to the spot would be incalculable, and regarded as something miraculous and supernatural. It should be done with the utmost secrecy to secure this effect."

This telegram, dispatched on the day on which the news reached Madras, was not the first suggestion made to Lord Canning with regard to the China troops. On the 15th, General Hearsey had written to Colonel Birch, Military Secretary to the Government of India, advising that steamers should be sent to meet and bring to Calcutta the European troops then on their way to China. On the 16th, Sir Henry Lawrence had telegraphed—"Get every European you can, from China, Ceylon and elsewhere." But Sir

Patrick Grant's suggestion of intercepting Lord Elgin at Singapore was the method adopted by Lord Canning, and he himself told Sir Patrick that the Madras telegram had an important effect upon his decision. The first indication of Canning's intention occurs in a telegram dated the 18th May, and his letter to General Anson was written in language which recalls Sir Patrick's telegram. "Yeh may wait," he said, "but Bengal . . . cannot wait if the flame should spread." Among the influences which led Lord Canning to take the wise course of asking for the China troops must be included the advice of the Commander-in-Chief at Madras.

Though Sir Patrick Grant had followed closely the course of events in Bengal and had not hesitated to communicate his views to the Indian Government and also to the authorities in London, he was so far from entertaining any ideas of personal ambition that when the death of General Anson was announced, he wrote to Lord Harris suggesting that he should at once communicate with Lord Canning,

> "most strongly recommending his lordship to place Sir Henry Lawrence at the head of the Bengal Army. . . . .I assure you he is the only man at all capable of dealing efficiently with the present emergency, and if any one can right matters I feel confident he will, and I repeat that Sir Henry Lawrence is, star height, the best man available for the command of the Bengal Army at this critical time."

The letter to Lord Harris was written on the 8th June, the day on which the news of General Anson's death on the 27th May reached Madras. On the 10th, Sir

Patrick himself was summoned by the Governor-General to take the command.

> "I hope," he wrote on the 12th, "to start to-morrow, and to join Lord Canning in four days. I have an arduous task before me, and God grant I may be able to discharge it with the efficiency for which the Governor-General is so good as to give me credit."

When Lord Canning's message reached Sir Patrick Grant, his military secretary was at Bangalore, where he had taken his young wife early in June. A telegram from the Chief reached him on the night of the 10th, and on the morning of the 11th he set out for Madras, leaving Mrs. Haines in the care of her mother and of his brother Gregory and his wife, the beloved Mona of his earlier Indian days. At Madras, on the 12th, he found with the Chief, Colonel Henry Havelock, just returned from Persia. He had been a passenger on the P. and O. liner *Erin*, which was wrecked off the coast of Ceylon, and was now on his way to Calcutta in the *Fire Queen*, in which the Commander-in-Chief and his staff were to travel. Some others of the passengers on the *Fire Queen* had also been on the ill-fated *Erin;* among them a Bombay officer whom Haines recognized as the stranger who had come to his assistance at the barrier at Inkerman. They had a long talk and an interchange of recollections, and "I had great pleasure in showing Johnston my slight notes of Inkerman, in which a blank was left for his name, for at the time I had not realized it."[1] It was a happy chance, and the two were not destined to meet again. On the 17th June the *Fire Queen* reached Calcutta,

[1] Diary, 14th June 1857. Cf. *supra*, p. 136.

and Sir Patrick found waiting for him the sad news of the murder of his second son, Aldo, who was among the first victims at Lucknow.

> "He was on picket the night of the disturbance. An old Subadar who appears to have behaved well, begged he would leave the men and provide for his own safety by going to the European barracks, as the others were doing. Some firing commenced and he was wounded. Grant refused to leave his post. Hardinge then rode up and begged of him to come away, as no officer was safe with the men. But Grant said he had been told to hold the post to the last, and that unless regularly relieved he would not leave it. The old Subadar then tried to hide him, but the men on picket attacked him with their bayonets."[1]

It was on such men that Henry Lawrence depended for the safety of Lucknow.

The Chief and his Military Secretary were guests at Government House during their stay in Calcutta, and Sir Patrick had numerous opportunities of consultations with the Governor-General, with whom he worked happily and cordially during his eight weeks' tenure of the command. The situation at the date of his arrival in Calcutta he thus describes in a letter addressed to the Duke of Cambridge on the 19th June—

> "I grieve to say the native army of Bengal no longer exists. The few regiments which have not broken out into open and defiant mutiny have been disarmed; there is no doubt that their sympathies are with the mutineers at Delhi, although

[1] Haines's Diary. The family tradition is that Aldo Grant was murdered by Sepoys who did not belong to his own regiment.

the presence of an overwhelming European force has, in some instances, checked the demonstration of it.

"Between Benares and the cis-Sutlej Seik states every part of the country not under the range of our guns in the posts held by European troops is more or less under the influence of the mutineers. The line of electric telegraph and our postal communications are interrupted. Allahabad is besieged by the turbulent populace of that place.

"At Cawnpore our force is entrenched under Major-General Sir H. M. Wheeler.

"Lucknow is held by Sir Henry Lawrence, but the cantonments have been destroyed, and the whole of the out-stations and country have passed from our control. Sir Henry Lawrence has known well how to punish mutiny, even with the small European force under his command.

"Agra, Meerut, in fact all our posts, are situated in like manner."

The situation was even more serious than appears from this letter. When Sir Patrick arrived in Calcutta he was informed that the fall of Delhi was imminent, and for some time he hoped that the good news might soon arrive; but many months of anxiety were to pass before it came. The one bright spot on the horizon was the work of the 1st Madras Fusiliers, which, on the first outbreak, Sir Patrick Grant had dispatched to Calcutta under its illustrious commander, Colonel Neill. As, exactly a hundred years before, it had fallen to the lot of the Madras Fusiliers to be the first to exact vengeance for the Black Hole of Calcutta, so now they were foremost in the punishment of an even greater crime. The regiment reached Calcutta on the

23rd May. On the 3rd June, Neill disarmed the mutineers at Benares, and on the 11th he re-established order at Allahabad. When Grant reached Calcutta, Neill was attempting to equip a small force for the relief of Cawnpore.

The first decision which the new Commander-in-Chief had to make was that of his own immediate action. Should he join the force which was attacking Delhi, or proceed in person to the relief of Cawnpore and Lucknow, or should he remain in Calcutta until his plans were matured and an adequate force was collected? At Maharajpore, on the banks of the Sutlej, and in the final contests with the Sikhs at Chillianwala and Gujerat, he had tasted of the joy of battle, and it was a strong temptation to win for himself in the field a reputation which he could not earn in the office of the Commander-in-Chief. Had he realized less deeply the difficulty of the task before him, he might have hoped to finish the struggle before a permanent appointment could be made, as Lord Gough had subdued the Sikhs before Sir Charles Napier could sail from England. He has been blamed for not making the attempt.

The first necessity was to reinforce Allahabad and to provide a sufficient number of men to advance from there to the relief of Cawnpore and Lucknow. If no officer worthy of this great trust could have been found, it would doubtless have been the duty of the Chief to lead in person the small army which, in the third week of June, was all that could be assembled for the purpose. But in Colonel Henry Havelock it seemed to Sir Patrick Grant that he possessed the lieutenant he required. Havelock had fought in the

first Burmese war, in the first Afghan war, at Maharajpore, and in the first Sikh War. When some one jeered at him as "one of those d—d saints," Lord Gough had replied that it was to such d—d saints that he looked when a stiff piece of fighting had to be done, and Havelock's skill and courage drew a remarkable encomium from Lord Hardinge, who described him as the man who could save India. When Havelock met Sir Patrick Grant at Madras he had just returned from the war in Persia, in which he had commanded a division. On the 18th June, Grant introduced him to Canning with the words, "Your Excellency, I have brought you the man."[1] On the 20th, in a formal Minute, he recommended Havelock's appointment with the rank of a Brigadier-General, and expressed complete confidence in his vigour, resource and energy.

For himself, the Chief decided that the public interest forbade him, at present, to leave Calcutta. The Minute in which he expressed his view has suffered so much from inaccurate descriptions that it is necessary to print it in full—

> "If the present disturbances were confined to a particular locality, and we had an army in hand and under control, a few concise general instructions would answer every purpose.
>
> "As it is, however, we have no native army, and the very limited European force available must operate on many distinct and separate points, each body under its own commandant, the whole being subject to the general control and guidance of the Commander-in-Chief.
>
> "I think the Commander-in-Chief can most

[1] Forrest, *The Indian Mutiny*, Vol. I, p. 349.

efficiently, and assuredly most expeditiously, control and direct all general military arrangements and movements now—and the re-organization and regeneration of the army hereafter—if he has the advantage of being in personal communication with the head of the Government—if he learns the views of Government with respect to the innumerable questions which must constantly arise—and, which is highly important, if he is made acquainted with the mass of intelligence which may be expected to reach the Government from every quarter of the empire.

"If the Commander-in-Chief is at the seat of Government, he can readily direct and guide the military arrangements of every description of the whole army. If he attaches himself to one of the small isolated bodies of troops moving about the country, he can only direct its proceedings, and the general conduct of matters connected with the entire army must be altogether neglected and put aside for the time.

"I may also observe, that it is quite impossible to conduct the multifarious duties of this large army without a numerous staff and extensive office establishments, requiring, when moving about the country, a complete regiment as an escort, and a large amount of carriage for their transport; neither the one nor the other of which can be supplied under present circumstances.

"On the whole, therefore, I entertain a decided opinion that the duties of the Commander-in-Chief can be most efficiently and most usefully discharged at the seat of Government. But if the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council thinks otherwise, and considers that my presence at some other point would be more beneficial to the public service, I am prepared to start at once for any destination to which it may be desired I should repair."

Lord Canning and his Council did not "think otherwise," and there was good reason for their concurrence in the view of the Commander-in-Chief.

> "When I reached Calcutta on the 17th June 1857," wrote Sir Patrick Grant in a memorandum dated some years later, "military matters were at a complete standstill. Not a single Field Gun was available for service, not a single set of harness, nor a horse for Artillery or Cavalry purposes. No ordnance ammunition had been prepared for immediate use. The supply of Small Arm ammunition was most scanty; there was no camp equipage, no Field Hospital had been thought of, nor had any steps been taken to supply summer clothing for the troops of the China expedition, whose arrival in Calcutta was daily looked for. The Cap and Bullet manufactory was at Dum Dum, seven miles from Calcutta, and wholly unprotected. In like manner, the Gun Factory at Cossipore and the great powder magazine at Duckinsore, three miles distant, were without any protection."

In subsequent communications, Sir Patrick Grant expressed his intention of soon taking the field in person, and he become increasingly eager to do so as the siege operations at Delhi were prolonged. But his intention was never carried out. The Governor-General felt that the time had not yet come when he could be spared from Calcutta, and before it arrived, Sir Colin Campbell had reached India as Commander-in-Chief. Neither Lord Canning nor Grant himself ever doubted that he was right in remaining at Calcutta in June, and in this view Haines concurred. "The C.-in-C.," he wrote in his Diary of the 20th June, "has been talking over his own movements. He seems to think, and I agree with him, that he

should remain here until some troops can be brought together."

The record of Grant's two months at Calcutta shows the wisdom of this decision. In Havelock he had found the man; it remained for him to find the arms. It was the first duty of the Commander-in-Chief to prepare an adequate force, while the flag was kept flying by such small columns as could be made immediately available under the efficient leadership of officers like Neill, Havelock and Outram. Sir Patrick Grant was the chief official adviser of the Governor-General, and the direct responsibility for all the movements in India lay with him. New arrangements had to be made in every department: each day brought some fresh problem in adapting the old routine to an essentially different situation. His first step was to send home an urgent demand for an additional European force of nineteen infantry regiments, two regiments of dragoons, and twenty-five companies of artillery;[1] his next, to create the transport with which an economical Government had dispensed. Government cattle had been sold, and commissariat establishments had been replaced by engagements with contractors. Every available European soldier had already been sent to the front by bullock train and horse carriage. The purchase of horses was a pressing necessity: it was at once sanctioned by the Governor-General; and, until horses could be procured, bullocks were attached to the batteries for Havelock's force. Government elephants were collected and employed, "not only

[1] As events developed, Grant was compelled to ask for a total force of 80,000 Europeans.

for the transport of camp equipage, stores and baggage, but also for the conveyance of men, who may knock up or fall ill upon the march."

By the 20th June Havelock's force was ready. His instructions were to relieve Lucknow and Cawnpore, and Grant gave him full control over the small number of available troops, provided that he did nothing to endanger the safety of Allahabad. To Sir Henry Lawrence at Lucknow and General Wheeler at Cawnpore, the Chief, in announcing the departure of Havelock, sent some words of encouragement and hope. "What man can do, I well know you will do, my trusty old comrade," he wrote to Wheeler. General Neill, who had by his courage and promptness saved Benares early in June, and who was now engaged in pacifying the districts round Allahabad, was instructed to send Sir Patrick's letters to Lucknow and Cawnpore, by any means in his power—

> "Bribe highly and you shall be reimbursed. . . . It would be a good plan if you were to dispatch copies of the notes . . . every day for a week or until you learn that they have safely reached their destination."

For Neill's own services Grant expressed his gratitude and admiration—

> "You and your sweet 'lambs' are indeed doing your work most nobly. Every enterprise is carried out with a vigour and decision which cannot fail to command success."

The letter closed with a warning as to the importance of Allahabad—

> "You talk of an early advance to Cawnpore, and I shall be right glad to hear of a move in that direction, but I pray you to bear in mind that Allahabad is a point of the very greatest importance, the perfect security of which ought not to be neglected on any account."

Havelock having started on his eventful career, Grant at once turned his attention to the equipment of ordnance for the expected reinforcements. "We are lamentably deficient in the chief requirements for efficiently equipping an army for field service," he told the Governor-General, and the remaining weeks of his tenure of the chief command were largely occupied in making arrangements of this nature. The arsenals at Fort William and the mazagine at Allahabad were devoid of stores of every description; not only was the ammunition inadequate, but there was no harness for horse field batteries; and camp equipage was of the slightest. All stations below Cawnpore had already been denuded of stores to supply the North-west Provinces, Oude and the Punjab, and two regiments which could be spared to reinforce Havelock were compelled to remain at Allahabad for want of carriage.

It has been asserted that no steps were taken to remedy these defects until the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell—that Campbell had to order equipment for the reinforcements; the purchase of horses; the preparation of gun-carriages, harness and tents, and the supply of ammunition from England. All these things had been fully considered by Sir Patrick Grant and his recommendations had been sanctioned by the Governor-General and were being vigorously carried

out. A steamer had been sent to Madras to bring to Calcutta the camp equipage, clothing and regimental necessaries prepared for the China force. Contractors for harness had been called upon early in July to expedite the completion of their contracts, and every effort was being made to supply a thousand sets. Horses had been ordered immediately on Grant's arrival, and a large number had been procured when he gave up his command. The construction of gun-carriages had been ordered at the Cossipore foundry, and a large increase in the reserve of small arms ammunition. A Field Hospital had been established. Armed steamers had been placed on the Ganges and the Jumna. A Naval Brigade was on its way to Allahabad. European marines, from the seamen in the port of Calcutta, had been employed to guard the gun foundry at Cossipore and the powder magazine at Duckinsore. Help had been asked from the other Presidencies. Madras sent more than the equipment prepared for China, and Bombay was requested to send a full supply of ordnance and small arm ammunition up the Indus and the Sutlej to the magazine at Philour,[1] on which the besieging force at Delhi depended. Sir John Lawrence had been instructed to send from Peshawar to Delhi one European and two Sikh regiments of infantry.

Sir Patrick Grant reached Calcutta on the 17th June, and Sir Colin Campbell arrived on the 13th August. It was impossible that the deficiencies of

[1] The importance of the seizure of Delhi is indicated by the enormous supply of ammunition obtained by the mutineers. The number of percussion caps in the magazine was returned as 13,089,082. Cf. *supra*, pp. 16–17.

years of peace could be made good in eight weeks, and the increase in the disturbed area rendered still greater efforts necessary. Campbell in August had, therefore, to consider the same alternatives as had presented themselves to Grant in June, and he made the same choice, remaining in Calcutta for two months.

The diary which Haines kept during these anxious days, and his letters to his wife, speak of the burden of work that fell on the Chief and himself.

> "I am at it from morning to night with no respite. I don't even go to tiffin, I find it takes up too much time. The ride with the General of an evening is the only relaxation."

There is little in either diary or letters that is not to be found in other sources: but their description of the state of feeling in Calcutta is of some interest. When Grant and Haines reached Calcutta Neill was the hero of the day, and the Diary tells the well-known story of his imprisoning the railway officials who wished to start the Benares train before the arrival of his men.

> "He was told that the engine, being tubular, would burst. 'Let it go to the devil. No one goes near it until all my men are ready.' Had he missed that train, he would have been too late to quell the mutiny at Benares. . . . The features of his command are great energy in attack, and constant action against the rebels, and the supersession of all incapables amongst our friends. He has in two instances superseded the actual commandants of stations. He has doubtless committed mutiny, but right loyal mutiny."

There was, of course, considerable anxiety in Calcutta.

> "People are nervous and fidgety about what is to happen on the 23rd [June], the centenary of Plassey. It is this day in which the Mohammedans in accordance with some old prophecy believe our Raj is to come to an end. Precautions are taken, but so unostentatiously that they attract but little notice, and people will hardly believe their safety is at all cared for."

The 23rd of June passed quietly enough; on the 28th, Haines describes the last sermon of Bishop Daniel Wilson, one of the noblest men who did his Master's work in India, then within a few months of the close of his long and strenuous life.

> "Poor old man, he looks frail, as if a puff of wind would blow him from the pulpit. He, however, preached a healthy sermon, inculcating confidence in the authorities, showing how by the blessing of God hard times had been surmounted on previous occasions. . . . He rebuked the panic-stricken and as a sedative to fear recommended people not to babble about things they do not understand."

As bad news continued to reach Calcutta, and as report after report of the fall of Delhi proved to be untrue, panic after panic spread through the city. Nor was it entirely unjustified, for, after an attack on Benares, early in July, Grant wrote thus to the Governor-General—

> "From Benares to Calcutta, a more unfavourable position in a military point of view it is impossible to conceive, for on no point of our enormous, our broken line of communication, have we any force that we can dignify with the name of army, whilst the rebels in Oude, concentrated in large masses on the cord of the arc

described by our river line, can attack at pleasure any point of it with overpowering numbers. . . . It is my deliberate opinion, if at any time we fail at Benares, that we should not attempt to send more detachments to the upper provinces. We ought, I conceive, to form here the largest force that can be collected, and I propose that I should myself proceed in command of it by the river route."

The emergency here suggested never arose: but from numberless stations there came the news of mutiny after mutiny. The Diary of the 23rd June records an incident of some interest—

"At Fyzabad, Oude, a mutiny has taken place like at other stations, but under circumstances showing two distinct features, an absence of bloodthirstiness and a marked system showing complete organization. The officers were collected together and told to leave in boats by the Gogra. An advance of pay was given them from the Treasury. They were allowed to take their own arms, but the non-commissioned officers were not allowed to do this. 'Their arms,' said the mutineers, 'belong to Government and become the property of the new Raj.' Captain Gordon was seated in his boat when an old subadar of his regiment came and sat by him, when the following remarkable conversation took place. The old fellow expressing his regret at parting with his officers under such circumstances, said: 'As you are going away and the blow has been struck, I may as well tell you all about it. This has been long planned. We have long since determined on taking the country and re-establishing the old Mahommedan dynasty. Do you ever expect to see Oude again?' 'Yes, certainly, we shall be back in a few months;

remember with how few men the English conquered India originally. Do you think they could not do it again?' To which the old man replied: 'The Hindoos were then against the Mahommedans, they are now united against the English.' Captain Gordon then asked if they intended to put up the King of Oude. 'You never knew us, what is the Nawab Wazid Ali to us? The King of Delhi is the only King we know. He never made a King of Oude, you made him.' The old man then left them. The troops spared the lives of officers and others, but many were killed and died from exposure before they reached Dinapore, etc."

The first rumours of the disaster at Cawnpore reached Calcutta on the 3rd July, just as hopes were high that Havelock and Neill were about to accomplish its relief. A native bearer of a letter from Lucknow told the sad story of Wheeler's compact and of the broken faith of the Nana Sahib.

"I think the story incredible," wrote Sir Patrick Grant on the 3rd July. "No man in India knew the native character more thoroughly than Sir H. Wheeler, and I cannot believe that he would ever put himself so completely in the power of miscreants proverbial for treachery and utter disregard of all good faith."

Three days later the report was confirmed in every detail. Cawnpore had fallen on the 27th June.

On the 7th July Havelock left Allahabad for Cawnpore, with instructions to retake that place and to inflict a further blow on the Nana Sahib at Bhittoor, unless the latter operation should be likely to cause more than a few hours' delay in the advance upon Lucknow.

On the 13th July came the news of Havelock's victory at Futtehpore, but the rejoicings were hushed by the announcement of the death of the heroic Lawrence at Lucknow. "In every relation of life, public and private, he had no superior," wrote Grant when the news reached him. "The General [Grant] was called," says the Diary, "to meet the Councillors on the subject of Lucknow. He is all for Havelock's advance to its relief at all risks." On the 16th Havelock re-occupied Cawnpore.

> "I have the fullest reliance on your judgment, discretion and ability," was Grant's message to him, "and I am instructed to say so has the Governor-General: and we wish you clearly to understand that you are free to pursue whatever course you may think best for the public interests."

Havelock telegraphed on the 23rd, expressing a confident hope that Lucknow would soon be in his hands, and Grant recommended that, after relieving it, he should remain on the Lucknow side of the Ganges and re-establish order in that part of Oude. By the 28th he had crossed the Ganges, an operation which, though unopposed, was no easy task with the small means at his disposal. On the following day he defeated the enemy; but in spite of his success, felt himself compelled to fall back towards the Ganges. Such reinforcements as could be spared were on their way to him, and it was believed in Calcutta that he would almost at once resume his march upon Lucknow.

This fact is the explanation[1] of the "supersession"

[1] This explanation has been put forward by Mr. Forrest in

of Havelock on which so much eloquence has been expended. Sir James Outram, who had just returned from the war in Persia, reached Calcutta on the 1st August, and the Government at once offered him an important command. Until the beginning of August, the whole country below Benares had been tranquil, but the insurrection had just spread to Behar, and a strong man was required to suppress it. Havelock was supposed to be permanently on the other side of the Ganges, and Sir Patrick reported to the India House that "the Dinapore and Cawnpore Divisions have been united, and the two placed under the command of Sir James Outram . . . he proceeded upward towards Dinapore yesterday (4th August), and I trust that, even with the very limited means he will have at disposal, order may soon be restored in Behar and its neighbourhood. . . . Havelock has been obliged to fall back to within six miles of the Ganges. . . . Three 24-pounders have been tolerably equipped for him, and he has been reinforced with one hundred men, all that could be collected, and I trust he may now succeed in relieving Lucknow."

Havelock, in point of fact, was compelled to retreat upon Cawnpore, where Neill was threatened. On his return to Cawnpore he found himself under the command of Outram. This was a development which the authorities at Calcutta could not have foreseen, and if Havelock was superseded, it was through the accidents of warfare, and not by the intention of the Commander-in-Chief or the Governor-General. It was for this reason that no explanation of his "super-

his *Indian Mutiny*, Vol. II, pp. 5, 6, and his view is corroborated by the letters which we quote in the text.

session" was sent to him. His promotion to the rank of Major-General had been recommended, and Grant, in announcing to him the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell, told him that in falling back upon the Ganges (he was unaware of the re-crossing) he had "exercised a sound military discretion" and thanked him "heartily and cordially" for his invaluable services. To Colin Campbell Grant reported the position of Havelock in the following sentences—

> "My instructions to Brigadier-General Havelock on his departure from Calcutta to assume command of the movable column then under formation at Allahabad, are on record in the office of the Adjutant-General of the Army, and I have, on two occasions since then, conveyed full authority to the Brigadier-General to conduct his operations as circumstances at the time may render most expedient; in short, I have left him entirely to the exercise of his own unfettered judgment. I know him to be a most able and experienced soldier, and worthy of all confidence."

Had Grant been in office when the news of Havelock's return to Cawnpore was announced, some step might have been taken to redress the unwitting injury done to him: the new Chief could scarcely be expected to realize the situation. What the authorities might have tried to bring about was accomplished by the generosity of Outram. He waived his rank on the occasion and tendered his military services to Havelock, who performed the great task which Grant had entrusted to him.

That there was no feeling of ill-treatment in Havelock's own mind is evident from two letters which he

wrote to Grant, on the 23rd August, after he had returned to Cawnpore and learned of Outram's appointment, and before the "Bayard of India" had made his chivalrous offer to leave to his junior the glory of the relief of Lucknow.

> "The general orders announce your return to Madras and I cannot refuse myself the satisfaction of returning you very grateful acknowledgments for the honourable position in which your kind selection placed me, which has given me the gratifying opportunity of nine times meeting in fight and defeating the enemies of British India. As deeply do I feel the fair, honourable and soldierlike support you gave me at a painful crisis, when imperious circumstances compelled me to retire from Oude, a movement to be justified on the soundest principles, and executed without disaster, but sure to be misrepresented by all the malevolent in the land. . . . I have only to add my sincere wishes that your career at the head of the Madras army may be as successful as I am sure it will be honourable, and that you may return to your native country as happy and prosperous as your efforts to serve the state have been faithful and persevering."

These letters anticipate, to some extent, the course of events, and there is one incident of Grant's temporary command at Calcutta to which some reference must be made. The insurrection at Behar, which delayed the dispatch of reinforcements to Havelock, and which formed part of the task assigned to Outram, may be traced to the mutiny at Dinapore. This was an event the possibility of which Grant had foreseen. On the 15th July he had written in these terms to Major-General Lloyd, who commanded at Dinapore—

> "The detachment of H.M. 5th Fusiliers left Chinsurah this morning, on flats towed by steamers, in progress towards Benares, and the remaining portions of the regiment will follow by the same means of transit to-morrow and Friday. If, when the regiment reaches Dinapore, you see reason to distrust the native troops at the station, and you entertain the opinion that it is desirable to disarm them, you are at liberty to disembark the 5th Fusiliers to assist you in this object; but it is imperatively necessary that the detention of the regiment should be limited to the shortest possible period. If you decide on disarming, it should extend to all three regiments, and it should be carefully explained that it is merely a measure of precaution to save the well-disposed from being led to commit themselves by the evil machinations of designing scoundrels, some few of whom are always to be found in even the best regiments. If resistance to authority is exhibited, the most prompt and decided measures for its instant suppression should be taken."

Lloyd was an officer of high rank, who, two years previously, had distinguished himself in suppressing the rebellion of the Santhals, and the Commander-in-Chief left to him the decision between confidence in his Sepoys and prompt and decided action in disbanding them. The Major-General chose neither alternative. The 5th Fusiliers reached Dinapore on the 22nd July and were not detained. On the 24th two companies of the 37th Regiment were, by Lloyd's orders, disembarked, and, with a portion of the 10th Foot, were ordered to parade on the morning of the 25th. In their presence and that of the Sepoys the percussion-cap cases stored in the magazine were

removed from it and placed in safe keeping. At one o'clock the Sepoys were again paraded, without arms, in the absence of the European troops, and were ordered to surrender the caps in their own possession. They seized their muskets and fired on their officers. The Europeans were at once called out, but Lloyd was on a steamer some distance away, and no one took the responsibility of giving orders. The mutineers were allowed to escape undisturbed. When a pursuit was made the officer in command was decoyed into an ambuscade, and his force was defeated. It would doubtless have been wiser if the Commander-in-Chief and the Government had definitely ordered the disbanding of the native regiments, but no one could have foreseen the course which General Lloyd adopted. The mutiny at Dinapore was probably part of a concerted scheme, for, on the same day, the 12th Irregular Cavalry mutinied at Segowli and murdered their commander, Major Holmes, and his wife, a daughter of Sir Robert Sale, and one of the survivors of the horrors of the first campaign in Afghanistan. Holmes, who had raised his regiment after the first Sikh War, had always been confident of their loyalty. His numerous letters to Haines, written between the outbreak of the Mutiny and the day before his death, testify to his indomitable courage and to his possession of the spirit which had guided Herbert Edwardes to victory. His death was a great personal sorrow to Haines.

At this inappropriate moment, when Lucknow was yet in danger, and Delhi still untaken, and while the area of the rebellion was still widening, our narrative ceases to be concerned with the tale of the great revolt.

During his weeks of command, Sir Patrick Grant did not know whether Lord Canning's recommendation that he should be appointed to succeed Anson was to be accepted by the home Government or not. There was no cable to India in 1857. On the morning of the 13th August Grant received an urgent message from the Governor-General. Lord Canning put a telegram from Diamond Point into his hand; it announced Sir Colin Campbell's arrival as Commander-in-Chief. He landed the same day, and Grant, accompanied by Haines, welcomed him as he stepped ashore.

> "Sir Colin was immensely civil to me," wrote Haines to his wife, "I am his 'dear friend' here. At Balaclava, I was 'that d—d fellow.'"

It was of course a disappointment to Grant to learn that he was to have no opportunity of concluding his preparations and leading his army to battle, and the decision of the Home Government did not pass without criticism in England. "The appointment of Sir Colin Campbell to India is good if we are eternally doomed to a royal officer under all conceivable circumstances," wrote Lord Dalhousie, who was well acquainted with Grant's work as Adjutant-General to Gough and Napier. "But H.M. Government would have done better and wiser if they had confirmed the temporary selection of their own G.-G., who has undoubtedly picked out the very best man living [Sir P. Grant] to be at the head of the Bengal Army at this juncture. By so doing they would have added moral weight to their Governor-General; they would have got (as I have said) the fittest man living

for their purpose, and they would have had him on the spot."[1]

In a letter to Lady Grant Sir Patrick tells of his meeting with Sir Colin—

> "He tells me, and I believe him implicitly, that returning to India, even as C. in C. was anything but what he wished for, that his position at home as Inspector-General of Infantry just suited him, that he has no one in the wide world dependent on him, and that his means, £2,800 a year, far, far exceeded his wants. But he really had no option. He was riding in the Park in London on Saturday afternoon the 11th July, when an orderly Dragoon galloped up and gave him a message from the Duke of Cambridge, desiring to see him immediately. Off he went; the Duke told him that that instant a telegram had been received communicating the death of General Anson, and that he, Sir Colin, must proceed to India as C. in C., and without waiting for an answer he hurried him away to Lord Panmure, who took him to the Queen, and the following forenoon, almost before he had time to collect his thoughts, he was bowling along to Marseilles to catch up the mail steamer which had been stopped there to take him on board, and on the 13th August, one month and half a day later, the hardy old fellow was here. He had no communication with or from the Board of Directors, and in consequence he has not a seat in Council, but of course his appointment to Council will come out by next mail. All his credentials consist in a letter from the Secretary of State for War, Lord Panmure, intimating to him that H.M. the Queen has been graciously

[1] *Private Letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie*, p. 380.

pleased to appoint him C. in C. of all the Forces of every description in India, and directing him to proceed forthwith to his destination."

Lord Canning and Sir Colin Campbell alike suggested to Sir Patrick Grant his remaining as acting Commander-in-Chief of the Bengal Army, but the difficulties of the position of a second-in-command might have been considerable, and Grant, while offering to be of use in any way that they might wish, expressed the view that it was better that he should resume his command in Madras. He remained in Calcutta ten days in order to place his knowledge of the situation at the disposal of Campbell, and on the 23rd August sailed for Madras. To Grant's Military Secretary the sudden appearance of a new Commander-in-Chief was a scarcely alloyed pleasure, for he had just heard of the birth of his first-born, and the anxiety of the husband and father to return home was in conflict with the desire to take part in a fourth campaign.

Haines remained at Madras for three years, and took his share in the reorganization of the Madras Army, which was carried out by Sir Patrick Grant to the entire satisfaction of the authorities both at home and in India Lord Canning in a Minute expressed his gratitude to Grant for his services in Calcutta, and Lord Stanley, the President of the Board of Control, told the House of Commons that they were "deserving of public and even national acknowledgment." His share in the suppression of the Mutiny did not end when he handed over the chief command in India. He had entire confidence in the Madras Army, which was,

throughout the Mutiny, the main Indian reserve, and, when the great struggle was over, the Governor of Madras referred to his services in terms which the Secretary of State for India put on record as "having the entire concurrence and approval" of Her Majesty's Government—

> "I should fail in my duty," wrote Lord Harris, "if I did not add that besides his claims as chief and representative of the Madras Army, Sir Patrick Grant has established special claims on the national gratitude by the wise hardihood, with which, calculating on the loyalty of the Troops and people of this Presidency, he assumed a responsibility which few would have dared to encounter, and promptly answered every demand for reinforcements until there were hardly any European troops left to put down a rising, if one had occurred."

To discuss Sir Patrick Grant's measures for the equipment of the Saugor Field Force, in which General Whitlock won fresh laurels for the Madras Army, would be foreign to the purpose of this book, as would also be any account of his scheme of army reform. The records of the Madras Government show that his Military Secretary served on various committees and drew up many reports, and the experience of organization thus acquired was of value to him at a later stage of his career. For some time before he left Madras, Haines had been anxious to return to regimental duty, and his application to the War Office was warmly supported by his chief. In October 1859 he was gazetted Lieut.-Colonel of the 8th Foot, but Sir Patrick Grant was at this time in weak health, and Haines was, fortunately, able to remain with him till

the following summer. On the 24th June 1860, he sailed from Madras with his wife and family, now consisting of three sons. The voyage was not without its adventures, for the boat, meeting the monsoon, cut away from its moorings and drifted helplessly for some time off Galle. The danger was considerable, for they were almost on the rocks and were only saved by the state of the tide, which prevented them from touching. The day after they left Aden the vessel broke down, and it was deemed advisable to signal another boat to lie by them all night. Three days later they found themselves back at Aden, and thenceforth the voyage was uneventful. It was August before they reached England; but Haines was some weeks in advance of his new regiment, which had left India in April and sailed home by the Cape. On the 5th September the Headquarters of the 8th Foot landed at Gosport, and on the 10th its new Lieut.-Colonel took command of the regiment.

CHAPTER VI

MADRAS

THE 8th Regiment of Foot with which Colonel Haines became connected in 1860 is now known as the King's Liverpool Regiment. As its regimental number implies, it is one of the oldest corps in the army. Raised in 1685 for the suppression of Monmouth's rebellion, it was first styled the Princess Anne of Denmark's Regiment. When its patroness ascended the throne in 1701 it became the Queen's Regiment, and, under Queen Anne's successors, the King's Regiment. Its first Colonel was the great Duke of Berwick, with whom, owing to the religious difficulties of the time, it was not on the happiest terms. It welcomed the Revolution and earned its first laurels under William of Orange in his Irish campaigns. The regimental colour bears the names of Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenarde and Malplaquet, to commemorate its exploits under Marlborough; and its famous Colonel, Webb, is known alike to students of history and to readers of *Esmond*. Like Haines' old corps, the 21st Foot, it fought at Sheriffmuir and at Dettingen, and it met the Highlanders again at Falkirk, where the Prince beat General Hawley, and at Culloden, where the gallantry of the English troops was stained by the brutality of their commander, the Duke of Cumberland, under whom the regiment had already been

engaged at Fontenoy. It rendered honourable service in the Seven Years' War, the American War, and in many campaigns of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era. It was engaged in the war of 1812 with the United States, and, when Haines took command, it had just returned from the Mutiny, having borne a distinguished part before Delhi and in the relief of Lucknow.[1]

The period of Colonel Haines's command was brief and uneventful. The 8th Foot was stationed at Gosport from September 1860 to August 1861, when it was transferred to Aldershot. From December 1861 to the following June, Haines was an Acting Brigadier-General at Aldershot, and on the 1st July he was gazetted Deputy Adjutant-General at the Headquarters of the army in Ireland. This appointment severed his connection with the regiment, and he went on half pay. The 8th Foot was, however, destined to serve under his command in India and to add to its regimental colour the name of Peiwar Kotal.

The position of Deputy Adjutant-General in Ireland was held by Colonel Haines for less than a year. He was glad to have his home in Dublin, where his mother still lived, and where he found himself near both his old Chiefs, for Sir Patrick Grant, whose health had compelled him to return from India in 1861, was now residing with Lord Gough at St. Helen's. For a year (March 1863 to March 1864) Haines was unemployed—the only period of leisure in the whole course of his active life. From March to December 1864 he held the command of a Brigadier-General in Ireland, and it

[1] Cf. *Historical Record of the King's Liverpool Regiment of Foot*, 1904.

fell to him to suppress the great riots at Belfast in August of that year. The anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne had passed with only the usual demonstrations of fanaticism; but early in August the return of a Roman Catholic deputation from attending in Dublin the ceremony of laying the first stone of a monument to O'Connell, was the signal for a series of tumults in which several lives were lost. After some days of hesitation, the civil authorities on the 15th August invited military aid for the maintenance of peace in the town, and two days later General Haines considered that the situation required his personal presence. He was soon successful in restoring order.

On the 25th November 1864, Haines was gazetted a Major-General, and appointed to command the Mysore Division of the Madras Army. This was the position held by Lord Gough when Haines first made his acquaintance, and Bangalore, which was to be his home for the next five years, was not only the scene of his first Indian experiences, but was also associated with the early years of his married life. His tenure of the command at Bangalore (March 1865 to March 1870) was not marked by any important events; but it is worth recording that, as a Major-General commanding a Division, he continued to play cricket until he received a hint that his doing so was regarded as undignified by authorities higher and less wise than himself. Returning to England in 1870 he was in August appointed to special duty in the Quartermaster-General's Department, Army Headquarters, and in November had bestowed upon him the high and responsible office of Quartermaster-General. Mr.

Cardwell's scheme of Army Reform had just been introduced, and the Duke of Cambridge, who had great confidence in the ability and judgment of General Haines, wished to have his assistance in working out the details of the scheme. In the spring of the following year he was offered the command of the Madras Army,[1] and, after some hesitation, decided to accept it. He was Commander-in-Chief at Madras from May 1871 to December 1875. On his assumption of the command he was made a K.C.B.,[2] and, two years later (23rd May 1873), he became a Lieutenant-General.

His work at Madras was a continuous effort to improve the condition of the army of that Presidency. Conservative by instinct, he was no enemy to reform, and was ready both to initiate and to welcome change when he was convinced of its wisdom. His name as Commander-in-Chief in India is not associated with any schemes of army reform, partly because he was continuously engaged in preparation for and in the conduct of wars, and partly because the reformers of that period were imbued with ideas of which he thoroughly disapproved. During his years at Madras he was engaged in opposing some of the suggestions which he was again to meet in Bengal; but he was also able to take, on his own account, some steps which have a place in the history of the Madras Army.

Sir Frederick's experience in Mysore had revealed

[1] He liked to think that he had followed in Lord Gough's footsteps, both in Mysore and at Madras, and finally in Bengal. Gough had been appointed C.-in-C. at Madras, though he did not assume command.

[2] He never held the rank of Companion.

to him the essential weakness of the military machine which he was now to direct.

> "The Madras Army," he wrote in September 1871, to Lord Napier of Magdala, then Commander-in-Chief in India, "has been so shut out, of late, from all participation of Field Service and Expeditions, that officers and men are in danger of falling into the delusion that they have nothing but police duties to perform. I am sorry to say this notion prevails in high quarters. Reductions are advocated on the ground that all Madras has to concern herself with is her own internal tranquillity, that questions of strategy are for Imperial, not local, consideration. This view of the functions of an army must tend to lower military spirit in all its members. I am therefore anxious to associate some of our officers from every branch of the service with the troops about to be assembled in the camp of exercise at Delhi, when they will have an opportunity of studying their profession on a scale this Presidency has long ceased to afford. .... I trust to having your support in this matter, but above all I would earnestly request, in the event of an expedition being formed under Your Lordship's auspices that this Army may be allowed to take part in it, in order that its officers and men may know that they have other and higher duties to perform than those which belong properly to Police."

The attendance of Madras officers at Delhi was only a preliminary step. Sir Frederick soon determined to hold a camp of exercise at Bangalore for the Madras Army. The suggestion was very unpopular, and met with strong opposition in the newspapers and in other quarters; but the Commander-in-Chief pursued his way undisturbed, and, although his arrange-

ments for the winter of 1872–3 had to be abandoned, the camp was formed in the winter of 1873–4, and proved an entire success. It was visited by Lord Napier of Magdala, who, Sir Frederick told the Duke of Cambridge,

> "has looked very closely into everything. I have thought it right to bring our weak points most prominently to his notice that I may have his support when a proposal for amelioration is put forward; I am certain our strong points have not escaped His Lordship's observation. . . . On the 22nd January I had the honour of marching past the Commander-in-Chief in India at the head of the very efficient portion of the Madras Army which had been under His Excellency's very close inspection for the last week. I doubt if in the course of our Indian History a like event has ever occurred before. The ground chosen for this was the site on which Lord Cornwallis's Force was encamped prior to the taking of Bangalore in 1793."

Lord Napier's report more than fulfilled expectations, and the manœuvres convinced Sir Frederick that "though long debarred from participation in war, we could at very short notice take the field with a respectable force complete in every branch, including transport."

Sir Frederick Haines' programme of reform was not confined to the provision of proper training for the Madras Army.

> "The first and most crying evil," he considered, "is the system on which this army is officered. I feel convinced that nothing can possibly be done in the way of re-organization until the Staff Corps shall have been done away with,

or at least so reduced and modified as to disconnect it from the regimental system, leaving sufficient to provide for staff duties only. . . . The so-called irregular system which the Staff Corps entails is entirely unsuited to this army, and I am beyond measure anxious to revert to the old regimental system, largely to increase the number of European officers with regiments, and to give them the command of companies, now nominally held by native officers. I say nominally, because though they command them on parade, they do not exercise the most important of the functions of officers commanding companies, viz. the dealing with minor offences. I would on no account delegate these powers to the native officers of this Army; their low social position, want of education and their great age, all tend to show that they are really unfit for the exercise of these functions, and, generally, for the position ostensibly assigned to them under the irregular system. The new tactics demand exceptional vigour, activity, and self-reliance from officers in that position. These are qualities rarely to be found in Native Officers in this army. Some radical measures must soon be applied to the Staff Corps list, by means of which we may hope to see a way opened for the entrance of young officers to the service, and of attaching them for good and all to a regiment, be it of one or more Battalions, which must be his home, and in which alone he must expect promotion. To make our regiments real fighting machines, we must have more direct and intimate leading of Companies by European officers than the Irregular System affords. . . . Although not inclined to press as a necessity the cutting off from all officers all hope of civil employ, I cannot but think it detrimental to military efficiency that a young officer, on joining his regiment, should

have an object in view outside of his own profession, the attainment of which confers at once higher emolument and greater consideration, together with prospects of rapid advancement. I think when once an officer has permanently selected this line of employment, he should give up all thoughts of military status. With a return to the regimental system of promotion, which I strongly advocate, seconding might well be applied to all officers on staff employ. . . . I have always considered the complement of British officers to be lamentably insufficient. I would propose such an increase as would give one British officer to each company, even after a liberal deduction for casualties. The command of companies should again be vested in British officers as executive, not as supervising officers, both in the field and in quarters."

The same general considerations, in the opinion of Sir Frederick Haines, applied to cavalry as to infantry, and he opposed any attempt to bring the Madras system into line with that of Bengal. The armies, he argued, served under different conditions—

"In Madras all regiments are constituted alike; the balance of interests as between the Hindoos and Mahommedans is maintained in each. . . . The Bengal Army is recruited from various warlike races, Sikhs, Pathans, Rajpoots, Hindostanees, &c., whose peculiarities have to be studied and provided for."

To try to secure uniformity of organization in the Bengal, Madras and Bombay armies was, therefore, he considered, a mischievous attempt to ignore the facts of the case. "The more distinct the three armies are kept, the one from the other, the better for the

Empire." On many occasions during his command in Madras, Sir Frederick expressed his sense of the necessity of retaining separate Ordnance and Magazines in the Madras Presidency, and of maintaining the manufacturing establishments and the horse-breeding station at Oossoor. The introduction of railways did not seem to him to justify the authorities in unlearning the lesson of the Mutiny, and he insisted upon the invaluable assistance supplied by Madras in 1857, not only in men but in stores and ammunition. It was true that, in England, practically the whole war material was stored at Greenwich, but distances were short, the railway system was highly developed, and communications were safe. "Yet," he argued, "who has contemplated the diffusion of war material and stores which an attempted invasion of England would necessitate, without feeling the deepest anxiety as regards the success of the operation?" Prussia, he considered, supplied a better model for Indian administrators, and the "preparedness of the Prussians" in 1870 "largely consisted in securing store accommodation in each district capable of containing all the munitions, stores and equipment necessary to enable the troops dependent on it to take the field complete in those respects at a moment's notice." In a long Minute he discussed the circumstances in India which seemed to him to show that "diffusion of military stores and equipment, in contradistinction to centralization," was so much more adequate a preparation for war or revolt as to outweigh considerations of economy in time of peace.

It would be useless to re-awaken further these echoes of old controversies, and we shall have to refer

again to the question of the separate Presidential armies; but the discussion of these topics occupied so much of Sir Frederick's time and thought during his years at Madras, that his biographer could not pass over them without some indication of his views.

An interesting experience fell to Sir Frederick in the last year of his Madras command. From December 1874 to February 1875 he made an official tour through British Burma. Its object was partly to inspect barrack accommodation, and partly to obtain information which might be useful in the event either of hostilities with the sovereign of Native Burma or of a campaign against China through Burma. The Journal of the tour was written[1] by Surgeon-General Gordon, who, like the Chief, welcomed "the opportunity of visiting what may in several respects be considered a 'new' country." Sir Frederick himself wrote few descriptive accounts of the journey: an extract from a letter written from Tonghoo may perhaps be of interest, even though Burma is no longer an unknown country—

> "We have reached this distant, and, by some, much-dreaded spot in first-rate health and spirits, after the most delightful march I ever made. There are no difficulties in the road. There are bad bits for horses, no doubt, but we rode large battery horses for the first three marches. Mine, a Roan Australian, 16 hands, became as handy and active as a hill pony. We were, however, right to discard them at that point, and take to an elephant, as the fourth march was considerably worse going. This brought us to the commencement if our real jungle life. No village, nothing

[1] *Our Trip to Burmah*, by Surgeon-General Alexander Gordon, C.B. London: Balliere, Tindall and Cox.

but the bank of a creek, and dense Bamboo jungle under towering trees upwards of 200 (feet) above us. Our Karen guides had sent on a detachment and had built us a first-rate bamboo house, open in front, but walled in on three sides with split bamboos and covered with leaves. The floor was raised about 2 feet off the ground and made of split bamboos interlaced. There was ample room for our five beds. We dined in the open under the Giant Trees. It was a wild scene that night, when the camp fires burnt up in every direction, our little police guard in front of our sylvan hut with its fire, two tremendous fires on our own account and every Mahout with his at each elephant's picket. Our Karen guides must not be forgotten; they were duly provided for in this respect. Wild looking fellows they are, too. The elephants added not a little to the wildness of the scene, gathering their supper from the bamboo clumps, munching them like biscuits, and gathering more with great crackling and noise. We had sixteen elephants close about us, all engaged in this work, so you may imagine the noise. Then came many trumpetings and uneasiness on the part of the ponies in camp. This was announced as denoting the presence of a Tiger, and leave was requested for the police to fire off a few rounds. This was done, the camp relapsed into quiet, and we slept the sleep of those well tired with wholesome exercise in a delightful climate. . . . I look upon this trip as the only way in which a C. in C. of Madras can avail himself of anything like privilege leave! It is awfully jolly."

Lady Haines had accompanied her husband through a portion of his Burmese tour; while in Burma her state of health gave her husband some anxiety, and

immediately after their return to Madras she left for Europe. When the late King, as Prince of Wales, visited Madras in December 1875, Sir Frederick had, therefore, to do by himself the hospitalities of the Commander-in-Chief, and in a letter[1] to his wife he describes the Prince's visit—

> "The Prince has just fairly won all hearts. The charm of his manner is felt and acknowledged by all, Natives as well as Europeans. On Monday morning we met him at the terminus and carried him off in great state through the very heart of Blacktown out on to the esplanade and so up to Government House. The Duke[2] is a great organizer of public displays, and all the arrangements for this processional entry were closely scrutinized by him, and in some degree modified to suit his views, especially at Government House itself. Everything went off superbly—without a hitch. The great feature in the thing was the orderly, quiet and respectful demeanour of the enormous crowd. The rowdy element seemed to be entirely absent, there was no hustling or jostling. Throughout the line of route people seemed satisfied with the positions they had taken up and kept them. It was only in the open spaces that any movement of people was observable; and yet there were hundreds of thousands of people afoot that morning. There was a dinner at Government House that night, attended by members of Council, Chief Justice, but no outside ladies except the Robinsons and Mrs. Harris (Dr. Harris being for the present body surgeon). . . . I took Lady Anne Gore Langton in to dinner, she

[1] 18th December 1875.

[2] The Duke of Buckingham succeeded Lord Hobart as Governor of Madras on the death of the latter in 1875.

being on the Prince's left, he having Lady Mary on his right. He chatted away at dinner, but when the ladies left, he lighted a cigarette and beckoned me to close up, then offered me his cigarette case, when I told him I never smoked, and regretted it then for the first time in my life —rather neat for an inexperienced courtier, was it not? From that time until we moved to rejoin the ladies, I had him all to myself—about three-quarters of an hour. The Chief Justice on the other side did not close up, and did not interfere. The Native Army was our chief topic of conversation.

"The chief features of the Prince's visit here have been the procession on arrival, a State Banquet, a Garden Party at Government House. . . . The Club Ball was a magnificent success, and the Prince enjoyed it immensely. After he had done the duty dances, he just made his own arrangements. . . . The Prince stayed until half-past three and evidently enjoyed the thing immensely. Last evening, H.R.H. honoured us by dining at Rutland Gate. How I wished for you to do the honours and to supervise matters with your good taste and judgment. . . . The house looked extremely nice, and H.R.H. remarked upon the excellent accommodation provided for the C. in C. He was much astonished when I told him it was a private house, and that I found myself in quarters. There was a guard of honour with the Band of the 89th, a double sentry in the Hall, and a double sentry at the foot of the stairs. He came punctually, and I received him at the steps with my personal staff, the A.G. and the Q.M.G. All the others were in the drawing-room. I took him round and introduced them all, and then we went down. . . . After dinner I proposed the health of the Queen, and that was the only

toast—this is the order rigidly adhered to. In sitting down, I said to the Prince, 'There are other healths I should have wished to drink, but I am aware of positive orders to the contrary.' H.R.H. replied, 'I shall drink your health privately, my dear General,' and held up his glass German fashion, to which I responded, and then he said, 'I wish to present you with a print of the Princess,[1] which I hope you will hang in your new home.' This was very nice, was it not? He lit up his cigarette immediately after the Queen's health and continued chatting away until the Duke of Buckingham told him it was time to be off to see the surf illuminated. This was a wonderful sight. We all went on the Pier a short distance; beyond the line of surf all the cargo boats were illuminated and in the surf itself Greek fires were thrown, then lit on touching the water, and burn out whatever happens to them. The surf rolls over them, but they come up again still burning. There were catamaran races and boat races, and such a wild sight it was, that no one who saw it could ever forget. There was enough surf on to make these sports look tremendously dangerous to the uninitiated. The Prince would have liked to stay there all the evening, but he had yet to go to the native entertainment at the station.... There was one very clever dancing girl who displayed more life and energy than they generally do.... The Prince soon had enough of this, and retired, especially as he had to get up for a meet of the hounds at the mount. At 5 o'clock this morning he was *en route* for that place. He embarks this evening at 4.15, leaving a most

[1] The Princess did not accompany the Prince to Madras. Photographs of both their Royal Highnesses were sent to Sir Frederick. The "new home" is a reference to his appointment as C.-in-C. in India.

> excellent impression upon every one, and I believe taking away with him the most pleasing reminiscences of Madras. He was greatly pleased with the parade last night, and the marching of the Native Infantry greatly surprised him."

In the beginning of September 1875 the Duke of Cambridge informed Sir Frederick Haines that he was to succeed Lord Napier of Magdala in the chief command in India. Among the numerous congratulatory messages which reached him, none was more welcome than a letter from the Viceroy.

> "I can assure you," wrote Lord Northbrook, "that no appointment would have been so agreeable to me, both because I believe it is the best for the public interests, and because it will be a pleasure to me personally to have your assistance in Council. Everything I have seen and heard of your work in Madras has satisfied me that to no one could the important functions of Commander-in-Chief in India be committed with greater confidence."[1]

The co-operation to which the Viceroy looked forward was not to be. Lord Northbrook soon found himself in disagreement with the Home Government on questions of Indian Policy, and early in 1876 he resigned. He was succeeded by the second Lord Lytton, a man of letters like his father, and a trained diplomat.

Immediately after the conclusion of the visit of the Prince of Wales to Madras, Sir Frederick Haines sailed for England. He had only a few weeks at home, for it was necessary to take up the duties of

[1] Lord Northbrook to Sir F. Haines, 30th September 1875.

his new appointment in April. While he was at home, he had the honour of being invited to dine with the Queen at Windsor. The Queen showed deep interest in Indian questions, and interviewed not only the new Commander-in-Chief, but also his native servant, whose replies to "Your Majesty, my Queen" proved him, in Sir Frederick's opinion, a better courtier than his master.

CHAPTER VII

RUSSIA AND AFGHANISTAN

THE new Commander-in-Chief landed at Bombay on the 6th April 1876. His predecessor arrived by train a few hours later, and the two generals held a consultation before Lord Napier of Magdala bade farewell to the East. The new Viceroy, Lord Lytton, left Bombay on the 9th April for Calcutta, whither Sir Frederick Haines followed him two days later, in order to be present at the first Council meeting. He was fortunate in finding a General Staff the members of which at once secured his confidence, and, in May, he wrote to the Duke of Cambridge of the excellence of his Adjutant-General and of his Quartermaster-General. The former of these, now General Sir Peter Lumsden, had a long experience of Indian service. He had won distinction in frontier campaigns, in the Mutiny, and in the second China war, and he had been a member of a special military mission to Afghanistan.

> "General Lumsden's frank and genial manner," wrote the Chief, "at once inspires confidence, and his perfect knowledge of every case brought up, together with his manly straightforward comments, render the transaction of business with him both easy and pleasant."

The Quartermaster-General was Earl Roberts, then

General Frederick Roberts, who had done gallant service in the Mutiny, and proved himself to be an able administrator in Abyssinia. "He is thoroughly master of his work," Haines told the Duke, "and in every way acceptable to me." These friendly relations continued throughout the whole period of Haines' association with Generals Lumsden and Roberts. As time went on there were differences of opinion between the Chief and Sir Frederick Roberts; but the generous tone of his references to him continued unaltered alike in public dispatches and in private correspondence.

For the ability of the Viceroy, Haines entertained a real respect, and Lord Lytton's skill as a diplomat combined with the amiability of the Commander-in-Chief to prevent any suspension of friendly intercourse, even at times when there were many possibilities of open rupture. The tone of the Viceroy's letters was always warm and affectionate.

> "In one respect, I am, thanks to you, the luckiest of Indian Viceroys," wrote Lord Lytton after eighteen months of work with Haines, "and indeed I should be the dullest of them all, if I did not appreciate my good fortune in having at the head of our army, during my Vice-royalty, its present loved and honoured Chief." [1]

Language of this character served, no doubt, a useful purpose, but it was evident from the first that the Viceroy's confidence was already given elsewhere. Lord Lytton had brought with him to India Colonel George Pomeroy Colley, who had displayed marked ability at the Staff College, and of whose talents Sir

[1] Viceroy to C.-in-C. 15th October 1877.

Frederick Haines used to speak with great admiration, describing him as the finest theoretical soldier he had ever met. But Colley had never commanded a regiment, and he had an infinite faith in the importance of the invention of the breechloader. French and German soldiers were, he said, impressed "with the impossibility of dislodging even the worst troops from any tolerable defensive position, if armed with breechloaders and well supplied with ammunition, unless shaken previously by artillery."[1] This belief led naturally to the advocacy of measures which seemed to older soldiers rash and dangerous, but which commended themselves to the Viceroy by their boldness and their economy. Throughout the period of Sir George Colley's residence in India, first as Military Secretary and afterwards as Private Secretary to Lord Lytton, there existed an ever-recurring difference of opinion between the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief as to the number of troops and the scale of preparations necessary for any military project. This will become apparent as our narrative proceeds. The influence which his Secretary exercised over the military counsels of the Viceroy, though universally recognized, never became apparent in any illegitimate manner.

> "Colonel Colley is always present," wrote Sir Neville Chamberlain in reference to Lord Lytton's military consultations, "but sits away and says nothing. I feel all the time that he

[1] Colley to General C. C. Ross in 1877, quoted in Hanna's *Second Afghan War*, Vol. I, p. 117. "Breechloaders, a weapon which, according to all recent experiences, has enormously increased the power of troops to defend any entrenched position." Lord Lytton to Sir Frederick Haines, 5th August 1877.

has given the Viceroy the key to the discourse, and is his real military mentor—and one cannot help admiring his reticence and apparent indifference to all that is said, and his being content to be a nobody."[1]

Successive Military Members of the Viceroy's Council, Sir Henry Norman and Sir Samuel Browne, found, equally with the Commander-in-Chief, the difficulties which must always arise when the head of a government relies upon others than his accredited military advisers.

The military problems which the Government of India had to face between 1876 and 1881 were chiefly connected with our relations with Russia and with Afghanistan. From the first months of his arrival in India, Lord Lytton felt that the attitude of the Amir of Afghanistan required the most careful attention of the British Government. Since his meeting with the Earl of Mayo at Umballa in 1869, the ties which had bound Shere Ali to the British Empire had been almost continuously strained. When Lord Northbrook succeeded Lord Mayo in 1872, the movement of Russia towards the northern frontier of Afghanistan was already giving the Amir legitimate cause of anxiety, and he invited from the Viceroy a definite pledge of British assistance in the event of unprovoked aggression. The Duke of Argyll, who was Secretary of State for India, refused to allow the Indian Government to offer more than a general promise of support, together with an assurance that a Russian advance was extremely unlikely. In 1875 the advance took place; Khokand was annexed to

[1] Forrest's *Life of Sir Neville Chamberlain*, p. 485.

Russia, and Russian officers began to make their personal influence felt at Kabul. Mr. Disraeli's Government was now in office, and Lord Northbrook was instructed to assure the Amir of British protection, on condition of his permitting a British agent or agents to keep the Government informed of the position on his northern frontier. It was largely upon this question that Lord Northbrook resigned, believing that it was impossible to persuade the Amir to consent to this demand. Lord Lytton was, therefore, instructed—

> "to ascertain and remove, if possible, the causes of Shere Ali's undisguised alienation from the government of India, and to spare no effort to place its relations with him on a more cordial and satisfactory footing." [1]

In order to effect this, Lord Lytton determined to avail himself of the opportunity afforded by Her Majesty's adoption of the title of Empress of India, and, in April 1876, he obtained the consent of his Council to the dispatch of an important letter. It announced the assumption of the Imperial title, and invited the Amir to name a place and date for the reception of a British Envoy to confer "on matters of interest between the two Governments." [2] Shere Ali replied that he could not guarantee the safety of the mission: that he thought it might do more harm than good: and that he could not receive a British mission and decline to receive one from Russia. The Viceroy, after some consideration, sent a temperate

[1] *Personal and Literary Letters of the Earl of Lytton*, Vol. II, p. 3.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 11.

remonstrance, indicating the serious character of the refusal to receive a mission. To this second communication the Amir responded by a request that the British Native Agent at Kabul should be the intermediary between the two Governments, and to this Lord Lytton agreed. In October the Native Agent informed Lord Lytton, at Simla, of the grievances of the Amir, and in December Shere Ali agreed to send a Minister to Peshawar to meet a British envoy.

It has been asserted that Lord Lytton intended, from the first, to provoke a quarrel with Afghanistan. His personal correspondence with Sir Frederick Haines does not bear out this view, and in the light of the European situation at the moment, it is difficult to accept it. On the 26th October 1876, the Viceroy made a startling communication to the Commander-in-Chief—

> "I have been most confidentially informed by a telegram from Lord Salisbury (the Secretary of State for India) that we are on the verge of a war with Russia, which may perhaps be declared in about three weeks' time, and I am asked by him whether in that case we can undertake to strike a rapid blow on Central Asia and raise the populations against her."

A week later the danger was less urgent, but the Home Government anticipated another crisis, and Lord Lytton was personally of opinion that a war with Russia was not likely to be postponed later than the spring of 1877, "unless the English Cabinet makes a complete surrender of its whole policy and position."[1] In the event of hostilities, the Viceroy

[1] Viceroy to C.-in-C., 3rd November 1876.

naturally desired to render the Home Government the assistance it requested: but he was emphatically of opinion that such assistance could not be rendered without the co-operation, or, at least, the acquiescence of the Amir of Afghanistan. The inference seems, therefore, irresistible, that there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Lord Lytton's intentions towards the Amir.[1]

The grave question of preparations for an advance into Central Asia had been present in the mind of the Commander-in-Chief before he received the letter from which we have quoted. The army, rigidly maintained on a peace footing, was not ready for war—

> "There is an immense work to be performed, before we can strike the rapid blow required of us, and in this work of preparation there should be no delay.[2]

Political considerations, as so often before, forbade any immediate open preparations. The Viceroy and the Chief, who were both at the moment on tour, held a conference at Peshawar towards the end of November, and the latter submitted, immediately afterwards, "a rough sketch of what might be done in the event of operations undertaken beyond our own frontier." At the same time he urged the exiguous ranks of the Native Army should be recruited at once.

> "I could by circular direct officers commanding regiments to recruit up to any named strength,

[1] "I suspect that an Afghan War is precisely what Russia would wish to see us engaged in, and that by engaging in it we should only be playing her game for her." Lord Lytton to the C.-in-C., 9th June 1877.

[2] C.-in-C. to Viceroy, 31st October 1876.

and it would go on as an ordinary event without putting anything in Orders." [1]

Without waiting for a fuller expression of the views of the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Lytton replied in a letter which illustrates the essential differences of opinion between the ruler of India and the head of its army. Sir Frederick Haines had suggested an advance into Central Asia by Kandahar and Herat.

> "I think it right to say at once," wrote Lord Lytton,[2] "that, in my own opinion, the only route by which, in the event of war, we may reasonably hope to strike a rapid and decisive blow at the heart of the Russian Power in Central Asia is the route through the Koorum, or Khyber, from Peshawar to Balk, straight upon Tashkend: and that, if we assume the aggressive at all, this should be the main line of our operations."

The Viceroy had not only made up his mind upon the route to be chosen, but also upon the strength of the force to be employed. If the Amir were to consent to the passage of a British Army through his territories, its success would depend upon rapidity of progress "even at some little risk" rather than upon strength and weight. Deprecating "cumbrous preparation for a long and slow campaign," he urged the immediate preparation of a small and carefully-chosen force. The organization of supporting columns and of stores and transport for them was to be duly considered and placed on record: but the Home Government must not be embarrassed by actual preparations of this sort, or by the recruiting for which Haines had asked permission.

[1] C.-in-C. to Viceroy, 29th November 1876.
[2] Viceroy to C.-in-C., 10th December 1876.

The Commander-in-Chief was aware that the daring project of sending a small force into Central Asia did not emanate from the Military Member of Council, for the Viceroy enclosed a long letter in which he had elaborated his plans for the information of Sir Henry Norman "in reply to a rather huffy letter from him." But, whatever its source, it represented the opinion of the Viceroy, an opinion diametrically opposed to his own. In a memorandum dated 31st January 1877, he at once pointed out the danger involved in Lord Lytton's project of a small force, and advocated his own alternative measures. The strongest reply to Lord Lytton lay in a consideration of the geography of Central Asia, of which Haines had long been an ardent student. Assuming the good-will of Shere Ali, he pointed out that after reaching Kabul, the force to be sent would have to traverse about 365 miles, which separate Kabul from Balkh.

> "The route to be traversed is very difficult, and in case of opposition offers serious obstacles. The Kohistanees inhabiting the valleys of Hindoo Koosh are a stalwart, brave and hardy race of mountaineers, not to be despised among their own mountains. An army advancing by this route, and having to maintain its communications, would have to detach a great number of posts along the road, and those of considerable strength. At about eighty miles from Kabul, the road reaches the summit of the Hindoo Koosh at an elevation of over 11,000 feet. Having crossed the Pugman range and traversed the pass of Unai, it at this elevation crosses the Hajigak pass, and proceeds from the Kushi Ghat to Bamian. The road from Bamian to Saighan crosses the Akrabad pass, at an elevation of

10,000 feet; and the difficulty of the road for guns may be appreciated from the fact that it took a battery all day to traverse six miles, with the assistance of heavy working parties. Between Saighan and Kurrum, a distance of 94 miles, the road runs through a valley generally not more than 400 yards wide, commanded by cliffs on each side, to a height of some thousand feet; from thence to Balkh, passing the foot of Hibak and the town of Khulm, there seems to be no difficulty."

The conclusion was inevitable.

"To attack Russia in Central Asia by this route, with a light column of troops, would be an operation so full of risk as to be prohibited by all considerations of military strategy and by prudence, even were we supported by the power of the Amir; for even then we must take into consideration the frail security afforded by the Amir's life, the uncertainty of the succession, and the proverbial treachery of the Afghans."

To send a British force in such circumstances to attack the headquarters of Russia's military power in Central Asia, did not in any case commend itself to the judgment of the Commander-in-Chief: but if such an operation was to be undertaken at all, it must be in force.

The proposals submitted to the Viceroy by Sir Frederick, advocated an attack by Kandahar and Herat, a line by which in the event of war with Russia, offensive measures could be taken in spite even of Afghan hostility—

"I am of opinion that the line by which Russia should be attacked in Central Asia is that of

Kandahar and Herat. Russia is virtually master of the northern part of Khorassan, and has a perfectly practicable route by which to attack Herat from her base in the Caucasus, and on the Caspian. It is of the utmost importance that we should anticipate her at Herat, make that important place a first-class fortress, and be prepared to push forward light columns from that base. By this move we should threaten the main line of Russian communication between the Caucasus and Turkistan. It is by this line that any Russian attack on India would be effected. As a menace to India, Turkistan is subsidiary to the Caucasus.

"The attitude of Afghanistan, or rather that of its present ruler, Shere Ali, should not, I think, be permitted to influence our determination to operate on the Kandahar route. Were Afghanistan to become the ally of Russia, affording her as such a convenient base for operations against India, she would be an intolerable neighbour. I cannot suppose that the Government of India would consent to remain in a position of defence waiting for the moment at which Russia might find it convenient to attack. Apart from considerations of a military nature highly adverse to such a step, the financial result of the position would arise in a serious form, for the ordinary peace establishment of our frontier guards would no longer suffice for the defence of the long weak line, and the construction of strong places to be held in force would become necessary. Our attitude would, moreover, be one of constant anxiety and alarm, one which, to say the least of it, would be undignified both in the eyes of our own subjects and in those of vassal chiefs.

"Granted that Shere Ali is or would be unfriendly to us, it by no means follows that our

relations with him and with the people of Afghanistan, at all events that portion of it with which we should come into contact, would be found to be identical. In Kabul his anti-British policy would doubtless find ready support, for there our former discomfiture is remembered, and our vengeance is neither forgotten nor forgiven; but it is different at Kandahar, where men have more pleasant reminiscences. Money freely spent by our troops, and the bold front shown by them under Nott, are well remembered there.

"We may fairly assume that on the Kandahar side we should find no lack of allies, who would be in no way influenced by the bearing of their feeble and unpopular ruler towards us. In fact we should probably be warmly welcomed by all except Barukzai chiefs and the Mohammedan priesthood; and in my opinion it would be far wiser to rely on this probability, than to trust in possible friendly assurances on the part of Shere Ali, whose state of health is such that he may die any day. The hostility of Kabul can do but little to hurt us, when once we are firmly posted at Kandahar, and hold Khelat-i-Ghilzie in force.

"From Kandahar to Herat would not be a difficult step. In possession of Herat we may defy Russia and Persia combined. The importance of Herat as against Persia is fully admitted; but has it not an equal significance with regard to the above combination? No doubt we shall find these powers arrayed against us. The base of operations against India, under these circumstances, is the Caucasus, and we must of necessity direct our main force upon this line.

"The troops under General Kauffman could probably be employed upon this line in small numbers only; for however strong he may be in his headquarters at Tashkendt, he cannot spare

a force in any way adequate to act on the offensive against India, nor can he afford to leave in his rear unwatched a population, which at the first sound of war between Russia and England would probably become actively hostile.

"Operations via Kandahar to Herat were, therefore," he concluded, "much more practicable than an advance to Tashkendt through mountainous wastes, inhabited by hostile tribes," and were calculated to strike a vital blow by preventing any further Russian advance. "For by Kandahar alone can they hope to make good an advance upon India; and were Tashkendt destroyed to-morrow, this line would still be open to Russia from her true base of operations."

Fortunately, the war so generally anticipated was not to be.

> "All chance of a brush with Russia in Central Asia seems to be hung up for the Greek Kalends, and the weathercock is setting all the other way," wrote Lord Lytton on the 20th March 1877.

But the project upon which the Viceroy had definitely made up his mind on the advice of neither the Commander-in-Chief nor the Military Member is worth the space we have devoted to it. The fact that such a proposal was seriously entertained by Lord Lytton is an interesting episode in Indian history which deserves to be rescued from the shadow of oblivion. In the biography of Sir Frederick Haines it is important both as indicating his views on the subject of Russian advance in Central Asia and as illustrating the kind of proposal which commended itself to the Viceroy, who, though bent on the heroic, was always compelled to have "a frugal mind." To do

great deeds with small means is a temptation which specially besets Viceroys of India, and the Indian Empire has owed its salvation from more than one grave disaster to the men who have persistently pointed out the limits of the risks it is lawful to take.

In a letter which has recently been published Lord Lytton describes his military advisers as "the powers of military darkness." Yet it seems that, if a war with Russia had broken out in 1877, those powers might have availed to save a British column from annihilation in Central Asia, for in subsequent discussions of the subject the Viceroy did not press the project to which he had committed himself in the end of 1876. The Commander-in-Chief, on his part, continued to insist upon the occupation of Kandahar and Herat. His scheme in the event of hostilities was to create the impression that Kabul and not Herat was the British objective, and so to make it easy "to secure at Kandahar all necessaries to ensure as rapid an advance as practicable on Herat." It might, he considered, prove to be necessary to strike at Kabul in reality, but this would be merely a subsidiary operation. The occupation of Herat he advocated, not as a mere incident in a campaign, but as a permanent measure for checking the advance of Russia. It would, he considered, enable the Government of India "to menace Russian lines of communication and to bring influence to bear on Persia."

An advanced post on the Kandahar-Herat line had already been established at Quetta. When Lord Lytton became Viceroy of India he found "Khelat seething with civil war" and very unsatisfactory relations between the Khan of Khelat and the Indian

Government. Impressed by the importance of Khelat for the defence of the N.W. Frontier of India, Lord Lytton succeeded through the firmness, tact and ability of Major Sandeman in negotiating a treaty, "the terms of which will make us virtually the masters of Khelat, not by annexing the country, but by re-establishing the Khan's authority on conditions which secure his implicit allegiance."[1] The arrangement thus made removed a danger of considerable magnitude in the coming Afghan war, and Lord Lytton justly claimed that, apart from relations with the Amir of Afghanistan, his policy had rescued "Beloochistan from horrible anarchy and restored it not only to peace, but prosperity." Yet, in England, it met with considerable opposition and was intensely disliked by the Indian Council in London. Suspicion of an adventurous foreign policy was created by the necessity of occupying Quetta, a step taken at the request of the Khan himself, and so strong was the feeling against a permanent occupation that Lord Lytton was compelled to refuse assent to the request of the Commander-in-Chief for an adequate garrison. If attention were drawn to the situation at Quetta, the Cabinet would find it impossible to support Lord Lytton's policy. Accordingly, the Viceroy sanctioned such steps as he considered expedient, and Sir Frederick Haines found himself compelled to acquiesce[2]—

> "As regards the relative value of the disasters which might occur to us in connection with the occupation of Quetta, I should look upon the withdrawal of our troops by order of the Secretary

[1] *Lord Lytton's Indian Administration*, p. 101.
[2] C.-in-C. to Viceroy, 8th August 1877.

> of State as a military failure of the first magnitude. . . . It would be a military failure, as in the eyes of Afghanistan and Central Asia it would be a retreat of the British—such a sight I trust may never again be offered to Afghan eyes."

Sir Frederick Haines has sometimes been credited with opposition to Lord Lytton's "Forward Policy." His correspondence shows that he was in thorough sympathy with its aims, though he not infrequently disapproved of its methods. He regarded a Russian occupation of Herat as a menace to the frontier of India, and, rightly or wrongly, he desired to find an opportunity of establishing a British garrison there. He was from the first convinced that Russia would move on Merv and thence towards Herat, and in this belief, at all events, he has certainly been justified. He believed in the fighting powers of the Turk, if well led, and he would have welcomed a firm alliance with Turkey against Russia. Mr. Gladstone's "most ill-advised and mischievous agitation on the subject of Bulgarian atrocities" he regarded as constituting a danger to British rule in India, where the Mohammedan subjects of the Queen were, of course, in sympathy with Turkey.

> "In India," he wrote, "his speeches and pamphlets fall flat. We have no mob of our own race to be worked upon, and native sentiment is dead against him. We have clearly before us the fact that, however atrocious may have been the acts committed in Bulgaria, the Russians have done as bad, if not worse, in Central Asia and elsewhere. Perhaps on the score of humanity between the Russian and the Turk, the latter has the best of it."

Believing that a conflict with Russia for the possession of India was sure to come, he watched with anxiety the effect of Anglo-Turkish policy upon Mohammedan feeling in India, and the assemblage of a great camp at Delhi for the proclamation of Queen Victoria as Empress of India afforded an opportunity of estimating the influence of recent events upon the native army.

> "This feeling," he wrote early in 1877, "is now thoroughly aroused, and every move as recorded in the daily telegrams is watched with the keenest interest. The Native Officers I have had about me as extra A.-D.-C.'s evince this feeling most strongly, and my Interpreter, who mixes freely with all classes of natives, tells me that one anxiety pervades all ranks. The present situation at Constantinople is not understood. . . . The value to England of the Turkish alliance is well known to them, and it is also well known to them that at some no very distant day contention for empire in India will arise between England and Russia. No one in India will believe that England will so act now as to forfeit a Turkish alliance on that day. . . . Moslem feeling . . . is of vast importance to us. For the moment it is favourable to us, perhaps the more so because credit is given us of good feeling towards Turkey. When it is seen that we are ready to join Russia in coercing Turkey there will be a reaction without doubt. I do not think I am wrong in supposing that no one contemplates the possibility of our finding ourselves at war with Russia in Asia without being backed not only by Mohammedan feelings and arms, but by Turkey as an ally. It is usual to hear it said, 'We can raise the Green Flag in Central Asia and make it

> too hot to hold the Russians.' But what if the Green Flag should be raised against us? The problem would be entirely changed with Turkey hostile or even neutral. The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus would be absolutely closed to us, and the Black Sea safe and open to Russia. It is easy to see what an advantage this would be to her as a means of reinforcing and supplying through the Caucasus and the Caspian an army operating towards Herat. There are many reasons why straining our relations with the Porte is to be deprecated. To India a cordial alliance with Turkey is invaluable."

During the year 1877 the British Government, having succeeded in maintaining an attitude of neutrality in the Russo-Turkish war, could only watch the progress of events and estimate their effect upon the diplomatic negotiations which must accompany the conclusion of hostilities.

In India the Commander-in-Chief was engaged in endeavours to obtain the sanction of the Government for various changes, which he regarded as essential for strengthening the defences of the country. The Peshawar Conference, for which Lord Lytton had obtained Shere Ali's consent, met in January, when the Afghan envoy, Synd Noor Mahomed Shah, intimated a refusal to contemplate the residence of British officers on the frontier. The position taken up by the Amir rendered further discussion useless, and Lord Lytton, in closing the Conference, placed on record an assurance that the British Government would "unreservedly respect" the independence of Afghanistan, so long as the Afghans refrained from "acts of aggression upon the territories or friends of the British

Government." The Viceroy's letter was written on the 3rd March. On the 26th the Afghan envoy died at Peshawar. Meanwhile, the Amir was obviously preparing for war and was busy inciting the border tribes against the British. The British native agent at Kabul was withdrawn and, in May, Captain Louis Cavagnari, a distinguished Punjab frontier officer, was stationed at Peshawar to watch the progress of events in Afghanistan.

The general situation on the frontier was now engaging the attention of the Government of India. Lord Lytton had written in April 1877 an elaborate Minute on Frontier Re-organization, in which he advocated that the Punjab Frontier Force should be placed under the Commander-in-Chief. In the following September a failure in an expedition against the Jowakis, a branch of the great Afridi tribe, who inhabit the hills between the districts of Peshawar and Kohat, gave the Viceroy an opportunity of insisting upon the adoption of his own views, though opposition at home prevented the inclusion of the Frontier Force in the Chief Command in India. On general principles Sir Frederick Haines agreed with Lord Lytton, but he realized to a fuller extent than the Viceroy the difficulties with which our frontier officers had to deal. He had carefully studied the history of frontier expeditions since the days of Sir Charles Napier, and the words which he wrote to the Viceroy on the subject are worth placing on record—

> "I cannot lightly view the difficulties imposed upon our frontier officers by the difficulty of the terrain over which they have to operate. The line of our frontier is defined by the lower slopes

of long ranges of hills which are pierced by numerous passes—few of them suited to military operations, though admirably adapted to the traffic of cattle-lifters and thieves. Our posts are well placed for the observation of the better known of these passes, but doubtless many exist with which our officers are unacquainted, for it is notorious that anything like exploration beyond our frontier has been entirely forbidden.[1] The rare instances in which there has been transgression in this respect have been met with removal from appointment, threat of removal, or reprimand. This is a sad drawback, repressing that spirit of adventure which should exist in such a force, and limiting the knowledge of ground to our own territory, whereas our opponents know every goat track. Raiders have every chance of escape, for their posts of observation command a full view of every disposition we may make on the plain below. If a more active system of patrol and ambush is desired, the Punjab Government must so instruct its officers. There can be no difficulty in carrying out any orders which may be deemed necessary. . . . I am bound to express it as my opinion . . . that our officers and troops will always be at some disadvantage in this class of warfare, notwithstanding their superior skill and training. We must remember that they

[1] In August 1876 Sir Frederick Haines had urged, in a Memorandum for the Viceroy, that the Indian Government should "refrain from declaring itself uninterested in distant travel and scientific research," and in February 1877 he again drew attention to the prevailing ignorance of lands immediately beyond our own frontiers. "Our scientific men," he told Lord Lytton, "our sportsmen, and our intelligent officers generally, could and would do much for us in the acquirement of topographical knowledge if they were allowed, but naturally refrain from doing anything at the risk of losing the positions they happen to hold."

> are called upon to act against mountaineers operating in their own hills, knowing every track (which for them forms a good and sufficient line of communication), every pool of water in an arid country, at home under every stone, and each man his own commissariat officer. On none of these points are our officers and men on equal terms with them. They are wary enough to avoid our blows, and are at all times able to do so; it matters little to them how far they retreat into the hills. They meet friends at every point, for local feuds are patched up in the face of the common foe. . . . I am in perfect agreement with Your Lordship as to the objects to be attained by such expeditions. The destruction or capture of fighting men first, second the capture of property, third the destruction of standing crops, and fourthly those of villages, deprecating most strongly the two last methods of punishment."

The initiation of a new and successful campaign against the Jowakis led to a prolonged controversy between the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief. Lord Lytton telegraphed to Sir Frederick Haines informing him that he had decided to send Colonel Colley to examine and report on defensive arrangements on the frontier and to ascertain the precise nature of the proposed operations, and he asked the Chief to instruct the Brigadier-General at Peshawar to give Colley every assistance. His wishes were at once and unreservedly carried out; but the Commander-in-Chief privately protested against "the intervention of an irresponsible officer" between himself and officers under his command. The Viceroy, in letters which were lavish in expressions of confid-

ence, gratitude and affection, gave assurances which closed the incident—

> "The very last thing I should ever dream of doing would be to take official action, or even to form or express a final decision upon any military measure, without previously and fully consulting both Your Excellency and Sir E. Johnson, and guiding my conduct by your advice. . . . I entirely agree with you that whenever it is decided on political grounds that a military operation is necessary or expedient, it is the C.-in-Chief and the C.-in-Chief *alone* who can say what the operation ought to be or can be, and decide how it shall be carried out; in short that it is for him exclusively to furnish the plan, issue the instructions and put in motion the secular arm."

The correspondence relating to the projected campaign in Central Asia had already shown how far the Viceroy might wander from the principles laid down in these sentences, and subsequent experience in Afghanistan was to provide further illustrations. To that campaign we now turn.

Early in 1878 a war with Russia seemed once again within measurable distance. A Russian army threatened Constantinople, and the Russian movement on Afghanistan proceeded at an accelerated pace. In March, terms of peace were agreed upon by the Russians and the Turks, and the former seemed likely to contest the demand of the British Government that the Treaty of San Stefano should be submitted to the Powers at a European Congress. Lord Beaconsfield's Government regarded a refusal as a *casus belli;* a mobilization of the reserve forces was ordered, and seven thousand native troops were sent from India to

Malta. In June Russia consented to take part in a Congress which, without any delay, assembled at Berlin. While the Congress was in session, a Russian Mission was received at Cabul, where the Amir had declared that he could not guarantee the safety of a British envoy. In August, Lord Lytton wrote to Lord Cranbrook, who had just succeeded the Marquis of Salisbury as Secretary of State for India, asking permission to send a British Mission to Kabul. His object was to obtain from the Amir—

> "1st. A treaty binding him not to enter into negotiations with, or receive agents from, any other State or nation, without our permission.
>
> "2nd. The right to send British officers to Kabul for special conference with the Amir whenever we see adequate occasion for such special missions, on matters affecting our joint interests.
>
> "3rd. The permanent location of a British agent at Herat."[1]

The sanction of the Home Government was immediately given, and the Viceroy offered to Sir Neville Chamberlain the charge of the Mission. "Were the British dominions searched from one end to the other, no fitter man could have been found," was Haines' comment on the selection. Chamberlain's departure was delayed by the death of the Amir's favourite son and by the evident unwillingness of Shere Ali to receive the Mission, and in the end the Viceroy had to fix a date for the entrance into the Khyber. On the 14th September Lord Lytton asked Sir Frederick Haines to give Sir Neville Chamberlain military powers, in case of urgency, and the Commander-in-

[1] *Lord Lytton's Indian Administration*, pp. 256, 257.

Chief availed himself of the opportunity of warning the Viceroy that "any movement of troops in the Khyber may involve us in operations not hitherto contemplated as likely to occur at the opening of a campaign against Afghanistan." Sir Neville Chamberlain moved from Peshawar to Jamrud (still in British territory) on the 21st September, and on the same day Major Cavagnari, with a small escort, advanced to the fort of Ali Musjid in Afridi territory, where an Afghan force was prepared to meet his party. An interview between Cavagnari and the Afghan general, Faiz Mahomed Khan, made it clear that the Mission would not be allowed to proceed without opposition, and Sir Neville Chamberlain returned to Peshawar. War was now inevitable, and was only delayed because the Home Government insisted that the Viceroy should make another effort to resume friendly relations with Shere Ali. An ultimatum was sent on the 2nd November, and the Amir was informed that if his acceptance of its conditions[1] did not reach the Viceroy by the 20th, he would be regarded as a "declared enemy" of the British Government.

In the interval between the repulse of the Mission and the receipt of the decision of the Home Government, the military advisers of the Viceroy came very near to precipitating the conflict. Lord Lytton was so far from understanding the situation in Afghanistan that he thought it was possible to enter on "military

[1] The conditions were (1) a full and suitably written apology for the repulse of the Mission, tendered on British territory by an officer of sufficient rank. (2) Consent to a permanent British mission in Afghan territory. (3) Indemnity for the tribes who had acted as guides to the Mission, and reparation for any damage already received by them.—*Lord Lytton's Indian Administration*, p. 294.

operations of a certain kind," and to restrict offensive measures to a mere support of political negotiations; and he hoped

> "to convince the Afghan people that our quarrel was with the Amir, who had deliberately forced it on us, and not with *them;* thus, if possible, isolating the Amir from his people, instead of uniting his people with him in a national opposition to our movements."[1]

A military operation of the kind contemplated by the Viceroy was suggested to him on the 2nd October in a telegram from Cavagnari, who proposed "to turn the present hostile action of the Amir's officials to our advantage" by a surprise attack on Ali Musjid, the fort commanding the entrance to the Khyber, which was about to be reinforced by the Amir.

That same evening Colonel Colley called upon the Commander-in-Chief with Cavagnari's telegrams and assured him that General Roberts and General Ross at Peshawar considered it feasible to surprise Ali Musjid with "a force consisting of the Guides, a regiment of native infantry, and a mountain battery." Sir Frederick Haines, who had not been informed of the negotiations with the tribes at the entrance to the Khyber Pass, replied that, if the Khyberies were fully and entirely on the side of the British, such an isolated blow might have a prospect of success.[2] But he de-

[1] *Lord Lytton's Indian Administration,* p. 286.

[2] Sir Neville Chamberlain never considered the project feasible even as an isolated blow. Sir Frederick Haines was influenced by the assurance that the scheme was approved by General Ross, who commanded at Peshawar. General Ross wrote to General Lumsden on the 10th October: "I concurred as to the feasibility of supporting the movement, but after information had been received of very heavy reinforcements

clined to discuss the question as an isolated blow: it must be the commencement of hostilities.

> "I consider," he told Colley, "if a hostile shot is fired in the Khyber, we ought to be prepared to follow it up by an advance to Jellalabad."

The Viceroy had forbidden such preparations, and the Commander-in-Chief could not give his consent to the proposal. Without waiting for a reasoned memorandum, which Haines sat up far into the night to write, Lord Lytton telegraphed to Cavagnari approving the proposed attack, on condition that the Khyberies were by their participation in it, fully committed to the British alliance. Soon after midnight Sir Frederick Haines was informed of this decision, and at the request of the Viceroy he telegraphed to General Ross—

> "Carry out the views of Government regarding Ali Musjid. Chief understands you are in accord with Cavagnari as regards plan of attack and troops to be employed."

The Memorandum sent by the Chief to the Viceroy on the morning of the 3rd October reaffirmed his view, on the inadequate evidence before him, that the project was feasible, but laid stress on both the military and the political dangers involved in it.

> "We are in no wise prepared to follow up this first act of war against the Amir, either on the line of the Khyber or at any other point where our territories touch those of Afghanistan. . . . I am constrained to say that such an attack on the

having reached the garrison, and it was still proposed to make the attack, I objected, not having in my opinion an adequate reserve at Peshawar."

national troops of Afghanistan is an act likely to exasperate the Afghan people, and to bring together in opposition to us all the discordant elements and opposing factions from whose want of coherence we hoped to derive great advantage."

When Sir Frederick wrote, the Viceroy's decision had been made, but he urged a reconsideration. If, however,

"our negotiations with the Khyberies, and, I may add, the necessity of not permitting a strong post to be prepared and established at Ali Musjid be held to override all other considerations, I would say that an assembly of troops far beyond what has been already sanctioned must be prepared for."

In his reply to this Memorandum, the Viceroy entered into a long defence of the action he had taken, but declined to follow it up by preparations for an advance on Jellalabad. He was, he said, anxious to avoid, at all events for the present, any such movement, and the Secretary of State had specially deprecated action by the Khyber. The last sentence indicates that the phrase "an isolated blow" as applied to the project was to be understood in the fullest sense. The imagination of the Afghans was to be impressed by the brilliant and unexpected capture of the fort, which was then to be handed over to the tribesmen to hold as best they could.[1]

The Home Government confirmed the Viceroy's sanction, and preparations went on at Peshawar for a surprise attack. It is needless to discuss the possibilities of a surprise—the strength of the fort greatly

[1] *Lord Lytton's Indian Administration*, p. 289.

impressed Sir Frederick Haines when he saw it some months later, for the attempt was never made. It was discovered that large reinforcements had already arrived at Ali Musjid, and offensive movements against the fort were suspended on the 8th October. At a Council held at Simla the same day the Viceroy expressed the reluctance with which he had abandoned the projected attack, and, in spite of his unwillingness to attempt any action by the Khyber, asked for a project for future operations not only upon Ali Musjid, but upon Jellalabad. At this point the story of Cavagnari's project for the capture of Ali Musjid merges into the general question of the preparations for the war in Afghanistan.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1878–9

SIR FREDERICK HAINES had never shared Lord Lytton's sanguine views about the probable course of a war in Afghanistan. Even when it became likely that the quarrel would be fought out with the Afghans alone, and not with Russia, he insisted upon the serious character of the operations on which the Viceroy was about to enter. He had no delusions as to the possibility of waging war upon the Amir personally or of restricting offensive movements within the limits upon which diplomats and financiers might agree. Even if Russia did not intervene at some point in the conflict (a possibility which he judged it necessary to keep in view during the early stages of the war), the Afghans would fight for their Amir, and "we shall find them better armed and better drilled than they were when we were in contact with them years ago. . . . We are bound not to despise our enemy." The Commander-in-Chief differed from the Viceroy, not only on the nature of the situation, but also on the measures to be adopted for the solution of the problem. From the first he regarded Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission as doomed to result in hostilities—

> "The dismemberment of the Turkish Empire as a consequence of Russian victories in Europe, and our failure to interpose by force of arms, bear

> a totally different gloss in Central Asian Courts and Indian Bazaars to that it is sought to give them at Westminster. No doubt Shere Ali will look upon Russia, active, enterprising and grasping as he knows her to be, with greater fear and respect than he will be induced to regard us with; for we in his eyes do nothing. . . . In my own opinion the Mission would have a better chance of success if supported by an assemblage of troops on the frontier than it has now that it is backed only by the moral influence of our prestige and a perfectly quiescent attitude on our part. I can but think that Russia's prestige, backed as it is by a strong movement on the Oxus, and in the Akhal country, will have the greater influence at Cabul." [1]

The decision as to whether the Chamberlain Mission should be supported by a demonstration of superior force, or by the absence of every indication of anything but the most pacific intentions, lay properly and inevitably with the Viceroy, and the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief was merely that of a Member of Council; but, in the discussion of the military measures to be actually adopted, Sir Frederick Haines might reasonably claim a greater influence, as he undoubtedly possessed a higher responsibility than any other of Lord Lytton's advisers. In August 1878, when the dispatch of the Mission was determined upon, Lord Lytton invited from him an estimate of the force required for hostilities in Afghanistan. The form in which the Viceroy addressed the Commander-in-Chief recalls the Central Asian correspondence of the

[1] Sir F. P. Haines to the Duke of Cambridge, 18th August and 16th September 1878.

autumn of 1876. Sir Frederick Haines was not instructed to draw up a scheme for an invasion; he was informed that, "in view of certain contingencies which might arise with reference to events at Cabul," it was necessary to consider

> "(a) the occupation of the Kuram Valley and the strength and composition of a force for that purpose, and to form a cantonment near the head of the valley.
>
> "(b) the strength and composition of a force to occupy Kandahar and which might be required to advance as far as Girisk and the Helmund on one side and Khelat-i-Ghilzai on the other, but no further."

There are five routes from India into Afghanistan. The Khyber and the Kuram passes lead straight to Kabul. The Thal Chotiali and the Bolan lead to Kandahar; and the Gumal to Ghazni, between Kandahar and Kabul.[1] Lord Lytton decided in August upon a double advance, following two of these lines, at the same time intimating to Sir Frederick Haines that no immediate preparations were required. Two days after the Viceroy's request was sent to him, the Commander-in-Chief recommended the equipment of four columns, known respectively as the Kuram column, the Quetta reinforcement, the Kandahar column, and the Kandahar Reserve Division.

The differences of opinion which subsisted between Sir Frederick Haines and Lord Lytton throughout

[1] An excellent account of "The Theatre of Operations" will be found in Colonel Hanna's *Second Afghan War*, Vol. I, chap. xv.

the war related to the value of the Kuram valley as a basis of operations against Kabul, the necessity for immediate preparation, and the number of troops to be employed. While negotiations were in progress, and the reception of the Chamberlain Mission still uncertain, the Viceroy deemed it essential to avoid any appearance of military activity, just as Lord Hardinge had regarded it as his duty to forbid preparations for the first Sikh war. When, after the repulse of the Mission, there was a similar reluctance to admit the importance of the struggle, a historical parallel could scarcely fail to occur to Lord Gough's Military Secretary, and in the end of October he wrote to the Duke of Cambridge—

> "I have now been in a position to know somewhat of the discussions which have preceded the preparation of armies for war in India, viz. that of the Army of the Sutlej in 1845; the Army of the Punjab in 1848, and now the Forces to be employed in 1878, to which no special name has yet been accorded. On all these occasions it was at first considered that diplomacy was more likely to settle the matter than the sword, and troops were grudgingly given. It was this and this only which prevented our having the Meerut Brigade in line at Moodkee and Ferozeshah, and Sir Hugh Gough's military reputation suffered considerably from that which was no fault of his own. I trust a more grievous error even than this may not now be committed: my case is so strong that I don't think it can occur."

The more grievous error to which Sir Frederick Haines referred was connected both with the number

of troops[1] and with transport preparations. He had recommended on the 10th August the equipment of four columns. It was not until the 23rd September that sanction was given for any of these. The approach of the crisis produced by the Chamberlain Mission had increased Sir Frederick's anxiety about the small garrison at Quetta, which he had been forbidden to strengthen. Lord Lytton now agreed to his sending about 4,000 men as a Quetta Reinforcement. The first division of the Kandahar Column (about 6,000 men) was on the same date (23rd September) ordered to be held in readiness for service, and the Kuram Column of about 4,500 men was likewise approved. The Kandahar Reserve Division was not sanctioned, but, as we have seen, on the 8th October the Viceroy suggested operations in the Khyber and indicated that these might extend as far as Jellalabad. The Commander-in-Chief considered that a force as large as the First Division of the Kandahar Column was requisite for this purpose, and that the garrison at Peshawar should be strengthened without delay. The Khyber column, known as the Peshawar Valley Field Force, numbered some 6,500 men, inclusive of the garrison at Peshawar. The assembly of a Reserve Column of 5,000 men at Hussan Abdal was also agreed upon.

The task assigned to each of these columns remains

[1] "Colley tried to convince me quite seriously that a British regiment, 1,000 strong, armed with Martini-Henry rifles, ought to be able to march at will through the length and breadth of Afghanistan, when once clear of the Khyber and Kuram Passes."—*My Service in the Indian Army—and After*, by General Sir Luther Vaughan, p. 182.

to be described. The Kuram Force was to occupy the Peiwar Kotal at the head of the Kuram valley, to expel Afghan garrisons south of the Shuturgardan Pass, and possibly to make reconnaissances in the Khost valley. The Peshawar Valley Field Force was to capture Ali Musjid and to hold the pass, possibly as far as Jellalabad, but preferably only up to Dakka.[1] The Kandahar Force was to reinforce Quetta, and would probably be required to advance to Girishk and the Helmund on one side and to Khelat-i-Gilzai on the other.

The Kuram Force was, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, amply sufficient for its purpose, so long as the scope of its operations was not enlarged. With the provisions for the Peshawar Valley Force he was similarly satisfied, except on one point. The Viceroy had placed under Major Cavagnari a small movable column of the Punjab Frontier Force, in readiness for any service that sudden political calls might require. Against this arrangement Sir Frederick Haines made a strong protest—

> "This force is in the very forefront of our line; the very extreme out-post; but it owes no allegiance to the officer commanding the troops, for the political officer seems to have a power of initiative absolutely independent of him. . . . This sort of independent action is admittedly valuable in the punishment of refractory villages; but it is absolutely dangerous in the face of a powerful enemy. . . . I would most earnestly beg that whenever the frontier troops may appear in

[1] Sir Frederick Haines was in favour of an advance to Jellalabad.

> the field—especially in a case like this when a large force is in the immediate presence of a possible enemy—they may be placed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief and, through him, under those of the officer commanding the troops on the spot. In such a position complete unity of command is essential to the safety of the troops."

The protest was ignored, and no disaster occurred; but the incident is suggestive of the conditions under which the Chief had to conduct the war.

Still more serious was Sir Frederick's opposition to the provision made for the Kandahar Force, which might have to meet some 15,000 of the Amir's troops. The only Division which had been sanctioned was not permitted to have a brigade organization, which its commander agreed with Sir Frederick in regarding as essential. The formation of a Reserve Division was even more necessary. The Peshawar Valley Force had been constituted since Sir Frederick originally recommended a Kandahar Reserve, and he now modified his proposal by suggesting that the Bombay and Madras armies should be called on to supply the troops required for this purpose. If this was to be done, the Governments of Madras and Bombay must be immediately warned to prepare supplies and carriage and warm clothing for the climate of Afghanistan.

At a Council held on the 18th October, Sir Neville Chamberlain and Sir Samuel Browne supported the demand of Sir Frederick Haines for additional Kandahar troops, and the Viceroy, while he reluctantly

accepted the proposal, refrained from giving it his final sanction. On the 26th the Viceroy reopened the question through Sir Samuel Browne; but the Chief insisted that a forward movement from Kandahar to Girishk and Khelat-i-Gilzai "might be forced upon the officer entrusted with these operations, whatever limit the authorities in India might seek to impose upon him," and that "a forward movement from Quetta to Kandahar should not be attempted with less than a marching-out strength of from 10,000 to 11,000 men, all casualties excluded and all contingencies provided for in rear." So anxious was Lord Lytton to avoid this extension of the forces employed, that he sent Sir Samuel Browne to inform Sir Frederick Haines that the Viceroy would take the sole responsibility and all blame of failure. To this, of course, there could be only one reply—that the Commander-in-Chief had a separate responsibility of his own, and that this responsibility affected more especially any question of the nature of the force required to carry out specified military operations. Next day Lord Lytton wrote to ask for a fuller statement of the views of the Commander-in-Chief, whom he informed that, "of the numerous and increasing difficulties of a very delicate and dangerous situation, the military are far less serious than the political and financial ones." The statement was duly sent on the 30th October. It gave the numbers of the force then sanctioned for service against Kandahar as 11,636, inclusive of the Quetta Garrison, the Quetta Reinforcement, and the First Division, and it showed that the total available for an advance beyond Quetta was

5,836 men with 36 guns. Haines believed the Viceroy's desire to refrain from occupying Kandahar to be a departure from sound strategy, and pointed out that to leave it without a British garrison would prove "an aggravation of the military task in every case except one, viz. that of finding the place unoccupied by the Amir's troops, and its inhabitants in thorough accord with us." To leave it in the hands of a hostile population would be, not only strategically false, but detrimental to the *moral* of the troops, and likely to be misunderstood both by friend and by foe. If it became a base from which to harass the British advance, the necessity for its capture could no longer be disputed. The enemy which the force, as at present detailed, might have to meet beyond Quetta would be probably three times its size and well supplied with artillery, while the small British detachment, as it traversed the 148 miles separating Quetta from Kandahar, would be still further decreased, not only by sickness and casualties, but also by the ever-lengthening line of communications. Any hitch or failure at any point of the enterprise "would make painfully apparent the true economy which adequate preparation in the commencement confers on all military ventures in their issues."

This important Memorandum was considered by the Viceroy in personal consultation with the Commander-in-Chief, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir Samuel Browne, and Sir Neville Chamberlain, and the Chief's proposal for a supporting division was, with some modifications, accepted. It was agreed that the force should be assembled: the Bombay Brigade at

Sukkur, and the Madras contingent at Multan; and that these troops should be held available for the Kandahar force as they might be required, provided always that they could be fed. The Viceroy's final sanction was, however, delayed until the 28th November.

The series of unnecessary delays which we have just recorded told heavily upon the troops. There was no difficulty in moving them up in time for military operations, and the only force that suffered from a hurried march was the Quetta Reinforcement, the presence of which was urgently required. The delay in sanctioning brigade organization for the Kandahar and Peshawar Valley forces gravely hampered the commanders of these columns; but far more serious was the effect of the Viceroy's hesitation upon Transport and Commissariat. It was inevitable that there should be considerable difficulties of this nature at the close of a long period of peace, during which "the Army was looked upon as the source from which retrenchment was always possible." These difficulties, in the Ordnance Commissariat, Transport, and Medical departments, were, in the view of Sir Frederick Haines, greatly accentuated by the continual postponement of final decisions.[1] The history of the war bears witness to the amount of suffering thus entailed upon the troops.

The choice of officers to command the various columns had by this time been made. Major-General

[1] In the summer of 1878 a quantity of surplus transport stores at Rawal Pindi was actually sold—"a most ill-timed measure," wrote Sir Frederick Haines, who attributed it to a false feeling of security induced by the Berlin Congress.

Roberts was appointed to the command of the Kuram force, and the selection of a distinguished officer, in whom the Viceroy was known to repose great confidence, was regarded by Sir Frederick Haines as an indication that the modest task assigned to it in the first instance was likely to develop into a more important military operation. He himself considered that the presence of a force in the Kuram was useful inasmuch as it would "damage the Amir both in prestige and revenue," and because "it dominates the Wuzzuris and threatens the flank of any attempt which might be made from Ghuzni by the roads giving out towards Dera Ismail Khan." He did not contemplate an advance on Kabul by the Kuram, and was prepared to reduce the number of troops posted in it.

Major-General M. A. S. Biddulph was placed in command of the original Quetta Reinforcement, and Lieutenant-General Donald Stewart was given the First Division of the Kandahar Field Force. When General Stewart arrived at Quetta, the Quetta Column became the Second Division of the Kandahar Force. General Biddulph had seen active service in the Crimea, and had a long Indian experience. General Stewart was a distinguished Scotsman who had taken part in the great siege of Delhi, had served with conspicuous gallantry throughout the siege and capture of Lucknow, and had commanded the Bengal portion of the force in the Abyssinian campaign.

It was at first intended to place the entire Peshawar Valley Force under Lieutenant-General F. F. Maude, a soldier who had served under Lord Gough in the Gwalior campaign, and had won a Victoria Cross in

the Crimea; but it was soon found necessary to divide the command. Lord Lytton was anxious to retain Sir Neville Chamberlain near him throughout the war, and the only position that could be offered to the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army was that of Military Member of Council, in which Sir Samuel Browne had succeeded Sir Henry Norman in 1877. Sir Samuel Browne was known to desire a post at the front, and, at the suggestion of Lord Lytton, Sir Frederick Haines offered him a command in the army which was to advance up the Khyber. Sir Neville Chamberlain therefore became Acting Military Member, and the Peshawar Valley Force was divided, General Browne commanding the First, and General Maude the Second, Division.

By the 8th of November Sir Frederick Haines had issued such orders for the formation and equipment of the various columns as the Viceroy had sanctioned, and he employed the interval before the outbreak of hostilities to visit the Divisions in course of mobilization. At Multan he had a conference with General Stewart.

> "I have not come here," he told the Duke of Cambridge, "to supervise his proceedings, for there is no man in the army more fit to carry out the work he has in hand independently, but there are a few things he has at heart which cannot be done without the sanction of Government. I shall be able to support his demands with greater effect after personal communication with him and after having seen things for myself."

Among the things which he saw was the railway station at Multan: "a perfect mass of sacks of wheat"

without the means of moving them; but General Stewart was straining every nerve to recover the opportunities lost by delay. From Multan the Chief moved to Peshawar in order to stimulate the comparatively backward movement there—"comparatively backward as the unavoidable result of the short notice given to the various departments of the heavy demands which would be made upon their resources." The difficulty was specially felt in connection with General Browne's column. "General Roberts' column is admirably equipped. . . . It was sanctioned first, and had all the resources of the Peshawar arsenal at its back." Satisfied that everything was being done by the generals in command to prepare for the approaching invasion, Sir Frederick Haines returned, at the Viceroy's request, to discuss arrangements with him at Lahore.

The 20th of November arrived and brought no answer from the Amir. The Viceroy had informed the Commander-in-Chief that he required "no invasion of Afghanistan on a large scale"; but he was none the less desirous that the 21st of November should be signalized by a triple advance into Afghan territory, and by the capture of Afghan forts.

Sir Samuel Browne was instructed by the Government of India to take Ali Musjid on the 21st. The limit of time allowed him interfered to some extent with the plans he had formed; but the operation was carried out successfully and without serious loss. He had been instructed to limit his advance to Dakka "or such position as might be selected for the defence of the western debouche of the Pass," and, having cleared the Khyber of the Amir's troops, to withdraw the

bulk of his force to British territory, leaving a sufficient garrison for the western extremity of the Pass.[1] In spite, therefore, of the insufficient character of his transport and general equipment, Browne pushed on without delay over the Lundi Kotal to Dakka, which his force reached on the 23rd November. It soon became apparent that the whole strength of the Division would be required to keep the line of communications between Jamrud and Dakka; partly because of sickness among the troops, and partly because of the hostility shown by the Afridis and the Mohmands. On the 1st December Browne telegraphed for reinforcements, and Sir Frederick Haines persuaded the Viceroy to consent to move up the whole of the Second Division of the Peshawar Valley Force under General Maude.[2] A difficulty was created by his arrival, for the Viceroy's refusal to sanction the Chief's proposal to combine the two Divisions into an Army Corps under a single Commander left two independent authorities at the head of separate Divisions.

> "The dangers of this arrangement were so clear to General Maude that he openly expressed the opinion that he and his Division should have been placed under Browne's orders, and throughout the whole campaign he acted as though this had been the case."[3]

Scarcely had General Maude moved up with his 6,000 troops when the scope of the operations of the

[1] *Summary of the Operations in Afghanistan during the War of 1878–9*, p. 3.
[2] Hanna, Vol. II, p. 38.
[3] Hanna, Vol. I, p. 338.

Peshawar Valley Force was widened, as Sir Frederick Haines had seen that it must be widened. On the 10th December a letter came from the Revenue Collector of the Amir at Jellalabad praying for a British advance. The Amir's troops had evacuated it after the capture of Ali Musjid, and the town was in a state of anarchy. Sanction for the advance was at once given by the Government, provided that the commander considered the operation feasible with the troops at his disposal. Browne moved forward on the 17th December and occupied Jellalabad on the 20th. In the end of December, and through the months of January and February, a number of punitive expeditions against the tribesmen were rendered necessary, and these, together with the maintenance of the line of communications, fully occupied the energies of the Peshawar Force.

On the 21st November General Roberts began his advance up the Kuram Valley, and occupied without opposition a small Afghan fort. The enemy retreated before him and abandoned the defences known as the Kuram Forts. He was now approaching the Peiwar Kotal, the narrow and precipitous pass which leads from the Kuram Valley into Afghanistan. Here the Amir had sent a large force to dispute his passage. The assemblage of the main body of Afghan troops on this route gave the work of the Kuram Field Force an importance which had not been contemplated. Fortunately, General Roberts, who had already inspired his men with a feeling of confidence, was a soldier not easily disheartened either by the unexpected difficulties of the route or by the size of the

force which opposed him.[1] His brilliant action on the Peiwar Kotal on the 1st and 2nd December is familiar to all who have read his fascinating autobiography. After this "exceedingly smart affair,"[2] General Roberts commenced a reconnaissance of the Shuturgardan Pass, which convinced him[3] "that there was nothing between us and the immediate vicinity of Kabul to prevent a force moving rapidly on that place." Further operations in the direction of Kabul were, however, not as yet in the Viceroy's programme, and General Roberts was occupied during the rest of the campaign with his exploration of the Khost Valley and with inspecting the new roads and defensive posts along his extended line.

Lord Lytton's demand for a threefold advance on the 21st November had thus been carried out in the Khyber and in the Kuram. On the same day a portion of General Biddulph's force entered the Afghan valley of Pishin, where it remained for some time unopposed. General Biddulph was not strong

[1] On approaching the Peiwar Kotal, General Roberts applied for reinforcements. Sir Frederick Haines was unwilling to grant all that he asked, deeming his force adequate to carry out his instructions. These, it will be remembered, were confined to the occupation of the valley and of the Peiwar Kotal, the expulsion of Afghan garrisons south of the Shuturgardan Pass, and reconnaissances in the Khost Valley as military considerations permitted. General Roberts, however, considered that his "work would be incomplete if we stopped short of the Shutargardan Pass" (*Forty-one Years in India*, Vol. II, p. 149), and Sir Frederick Haines was not disposed to advocate his receiving an additional force large enough to render possible an advance to Kabul by this route. No such advance was as yet contemplated by the Government of India.

[2] Sir Frederick Haines to the Duke of Cambridge, 12th December 1878.

[3] *Forty-one Years in India*, Vol. II, p. 150.

enough to make any real advance, and there would have been no advance at all if it had not been known that the Amir's forces in Pishin were very weak. A number of reconnaissances were made, but the troops were really marking time until the arrival of General Stewart, whose division could not move beyond the Bolan Pass until two months' supplies had been accumulated. The march by the Bolan to Quetta was a most trying one, and Sir Frederick Haines desired "to open communications via Dera Ghazi Khan and Thul Chotiali as a route fairly practicable at all seasons of the year." He was, however, informed that political considerations[1] prevented any such measure and the force marched on through what Colonel Hanna (himself an eye-witness) describes as

> "a fœtid swamp, reeking with poisonous emanations from millions of dead fish left behind by the subsiding floods . . . a belt of jungle interspersed with slimy pools . . . and lastly through the horrible Kachi desert."

General Stewart reached Quetta on the 8th December, and assumed the chief command of the forces in Southern Afghanistan. On the 12th a detachment of Biddulph's force occupied the Khojak Pass.

The limits prescribed by Lord Lytton in his original instructions were almost at once doomed to be dis-

[1] The political reasons assigned for the refusal were difficulties with the Pathan tribes. "I imagine that the Khan of Khelat's interests in maintaining the Bolan as the chief line of traffic between Western Afghanistan and Sind are the chief obstacles."—Sir F. Haines to the Duke of Cambridge, 12th December 1878.

regarded. The Kandahar Force was useless unless it proceeded to occupy Kandahar, and on the 31st December, the march was commenced. For this purpose both Stewart's and Biddulph's Divisions were required, and the Reserve Division, over which the Viceroy had hesitated so long, was entrusted with transport and supplies, the construction and garrisoning of fortified posts, road-making, escorts, telegraphing and signalling, the conduct of minor punitive expeditions, and the reinforcement of the main army.[1] After one engagement between the advance guard and a body of Afghan cavalry, Kandahar was occupied on the 8th January without further opposition. General Stewart and the 1st Division occupied Khelat-i-Gilzai on the 21st January, and made two important reconnaissances. The garrison left at Khelat-i-Gilzai was withdrawn on the 22nd February, in accordance with instructions from the Government of India. While Stewart was thus engaged, General Biddulph, with the Second Division, advanced to Girishk, which he reached on the 17th February, and examined the course of the Helmund River. A withdrawal upon Kandahar was commenced on the 23rd February. A rear-guard action was fought on the 26th, and the force reached Kandahar on the 28th.

In the end of February the Commander-in-Chief left Lahore to pay visits to the Peshawar Valley and Kuram Forces, and from his description[2] of these visits, we quote a few paragraphs—

[1] Hanna, Vol. II, pp. 131–2.
[2] Addressed to the Duke of Cambridge.

"Head Quarters, Jellalabad,
1st March 1879.

"The Khyber is now considerably safer than Peshawur was for years after we occupied it. The road between Jamrood and Peshawur is not recognizable as that on which I rode in November last. . . . No description that I have seen conveys an adequate notion of the strength of the position held by the enemy at Ali Musjid. The Fort itself is strangely undemonstrative as you approach it. The three heights, along which the enemy's entrenchments were, stand out boldly, but to recognize the Fort itself from a distance requires close observation. It stands on a sheer cliff 460 feet above the gorge of the Khyber, into which a stone tossed over the parapet at this spot would assuredly fall. . . . The physical difficulties (in the Khyber) are now minimised, huge boulders in the bed of the stream have been blasted whilst the smaller ones which rendered the passage of Artillery so difficult and so painful to horse and man have been removed by hand. This celebrated defile is now perfectly easy. I rode my pony along the stream without much thought as to the line he took. From the bed of the Khyber up to the summit of Lundi Kotal the ascent is most gradual, and a rise of some 2,000 feet is effected without knowing it. . . . The Shinwarris of this neighbourhood appear to be perfectly friendly, and are making the most of the opportunity afforded to them by contact with our troops to drive a thriving trade in their small products of fruit and vegetables. They have established a small Bazaar in camp, and benefit the troops as well as themselves. This point is valuable not only for its position on the road, but from the fact of its dominating the richest

lands and some of the principal villages of a powerful section of the Lakka Kheyls Afridis. Khawas, the Chief, has been ostensibly our friend throughout, but it will be well to hold him and his people tight. I met him at Jamrood, but he was at the gate of his village as I passed. He must be well to do, for he offered me a basket well filled with gold and silver coins, the former being Russian pieces of 5 Roubles. These of course I touched and refused. Captain Tucker, the political officer's horse taking the basket as containing food, pushed his nose in among the coins, and Khawas immediately said, 'That is a regular Khyberie horse,' alluding to the thieving propensities of himself and friends. This man is said to have acquired much of his influence through the extreme beauty of his daughters, three of whom have made good marriages. We of course have no opportunity of judging of the style of beauty so much admired by the neighbouring chiefs. He is a good-looking fellow himself, and his son remarkably so. This may be taken as circumstantial evidence in favour of the daughters. . . . After breakfast we rode out to Dakka. This is the march that was found to be so dangerous and difficult to Artillery in our first advance. Since that time about 900 men have been employed on this line of road, and have effected a great transformation. The road is now perfectly safe, and a heavy Battery might be brought down it with the greatest ease.

"Dakka is a vile place, but the Amir's fort is of use to us as a store room and quarter for men. The fort is a large quadrangle placed on a site which has positively no military value. . . . We slept at Dakka. Our next march commenced with the passage of the Khoord Khyber, a pass

presenting no difficulties; here, as elsewhere, excellent work has been done on the roads, which are perfectly practicable for all arms. . . . Yesterday morning brought me into Jellalabad. Sir Sam Browne met me a couple of miles out and had paraded the troops for my inspection on arrival."

"*Matumni, 10th March.*

"My last letter was from Jellalabad. I examined the position on which the camp now stands, and other positions which were suggested as suitable for a further cantonment, but I must confess I saw no ground on which I should like to locate British Troops as a permanent arrangement. The ground is either saturated with irrigation or covered with travelling sand. I have no doubt a suitable site will be found when we know more about the district of Jellalabad than we do now. The high ground about Gundamuk, Pesh Bolak, and other points on the spurs of the Safed Koh are all in the Jellalabad district. When we speak of Jellalabad as marking a possible frontier, we mean the District, not the Town. This is in a hole on a stiff black clay difficult to drain. It would in all probability be as detrimental to health as Peshawur itself."

"*Camp, Shiriak, 20th March.*

"We are now two marches beyond Thull—well on the road to Kurram. The Kohat Pass we got through without interruption; indeed each village community turned out under its head men with an offering of sheep. Some produced hard-boiled eggs and soda water, a refinement I hardly expected to meet with in the hands of an Afridi of the Kohat Pass. Every man was armed to the teeth. A good number had Enfield Rifles in

apparently good order. A Martini Henry was seen. The Enfields were probably purchased from the Khyberies who disarmed the routed Afghans after the evacuation of Ali Musjid. . . . The road between Kohat and Thull is dreadful. It has been completely broken up by heavy traffic after rain—it is so bad now that the convoys of stores for General Roberts' column have been parked along the road."

"*28th March.*

"At Kurram I found a magnificent force paraded under General Roberts' command. . . . The troops are in the highest state of health and efficiency—their style of march admirable. The next day we marched to Habib Killa, a village or rather a cantonment (for the place was occupied by Afghan troops) at the foot of the Peiwar Pass. It was from this neighbourhood that General Roberts made his reconnaissance in force on the 28th November, and his dispositions for the attack on the 2nd December. We ascended the Kotal and had the satisfaction of hearing the battle described and fought over again by the principal actors in it. I can add nothing to the descriptions already given beyond an acknowledgment that General Roberts had a most onerous task in hand when he attacked that most formidable position, and that it was carried with a loss of life merely nominal. . . . General Roberts is wholly innocent of having withheld anything from the public concerning the attack on the Peiwar Kotal."[1]

The news of the death of Shere Ali reached Sir Frederick Haines during his visit to the Kuram Valley

[1] Cf. *Forty-one Years in India*, Vol. II, pp. 165–6.

Force. The Amir, alarmed by the capture of Ali Musjid and the Peiwar Kotal, had fled from Kabul in December, announcing his intention of seeking Russian assistance at St. Petersburg. On the 21st February he died at Mazar-i-Sharef, in Turkistan. After his flight Lord Lytton had made overtures to his son, Ayub Khan, and he also contemplated the possibility of attempting to place a British candidate on the throne, in the person of Wali Mahomed Khan, a brother of Shere Ali. Sir Frederick Haines had an interview with this man in the Kuram Valley—

> "Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan paid me a visit; unfortunately I am unable to speak either Persian or Pushtoo, and he cannot speak Hindustani, so an Interpreter was necessary: but in spite of this drawback his visit was a very pleasant one. He is a most gentlemanly man and keen to converse on all subjects. Politics were of course excluded. The news of Shere Ali's death came in that evening. Our having renewed correspondence with Yakoob Khan can hardly be pleasing to Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan. It is a pity we ever took up the Sirdar, and raised his hopes, for I hear he is by no means so satisfactory a ruler as he is a conversationalist. It is he who drove the inhabitants of Kurram into a state of chronic revolt."

Yakub Khan wrote a friendly letter to the Viceroy to announce the death of Shere Ali, and Major Cavagnari was commissioned to treat about terms of peace. At the same time the Viceroy ordered an advance upon Kabul by the Kuram and by the Khyber. The decision reached Sir Frederick Haines

at Jellalabad, and he was able to discuss both with Sir Samuel Browne and with General Roberts the measures to be adopted. The progress of negotiations for peace prevented the movement on Kabul from taking place, and the remaining military events of the second phase of the war were confined to the punitive expeditions which proved so troublesome throughout the whole period of the occupation of the Kuram and Khyber valleys.[1] The feeling in the army when operations came to an abrupt conclusion is thus expressed by Lord Roberts—

> "I personally felt that the time had not yet come for negotiations, for I felt that the Afghans had not the sense of defeat sufficiently driven into them to convince them of our strength and ability to punish breach of treaty, and therefore that a peace made now, before they had been thoroughly beaten, would not be a lasting one, and would only end in worse trouble in the near future. The Afghans are an essentially arrogant and conceited people, they had not forgotten our disastrous retreat from Kabul, nor the annihilation of our army in the Khurd Kabul and Jagdalak Passes in 1842, and believed themselves to be quite capable of resisting our advance on Kabul. No great battle had as yet been fought; though Ali Masjid and the Peiwar Kotal had

[1] To two of these expeditions Sir Frederick Haines attached special importance. He considered that an action fought by Brigadier-General J. Tytler at Deh Suruk on the 24th March "completely disposed of the Shinwarri difficulty" (cf. *supra*, pp. 252–3), and that Brigadier-General Charles Gough's victory over the Kuggianis at Futtehabad on the 2nd April not only brought about the submission of that important tribe, but "may be supposed to have influenced Yakoob Khan in his determination to visit us at Gundamuck."

been taken, a small force of the enemy had been beaten by Charles Gough's brigade near Jellalabad, and a successful cavalry skirmish had occurred near Kandahar, the Afghans had nowhere suffered serious loss." [1]

Both in India and at home there was a strong desire for peace, and Lord Lytton had, since the end of December, been considering on what terms he could bring the war to a conclusion. The negotiations, commenced in January, were prolonged till May, and the final arrangements were settled, with the sanction of the Viceroy and the Home Government, by Major Cavagnari in conference with Yakub Khan in Sir Samuel Browne's camp at Gundamuk, to which the British force had, for sanitary reasons, advanced from Jellalabad. By the Treaty of Gundamuk, the Amir Yakub Khan agreed to receive a permanent British Agent at Kabul, to conduct his foreign relations in accordance with the advice and the wishes of the British Government, and to consent to the management of the Michni and Khyber Passes by the British. The districts of Pishin, Sibi, and Kuram were to be treated as assigned to the British Government, the surplus revenues, after deducting civil charges, being paid to the Amir of Kabul. Other clauses related to the protection of tribes who had given assistance during the war, and to protection of traffic, adjustment of duties, selection of open routes, &c.[2]

The Treaty, on the whole, seemed satisfactory to

[1] *Forty-one Years in India*, Vol. II, pp. 170–1.
[2] *Lord Lytton's Indian Administration*, pp. 321–2.

the Commander-in-Chief, though he dissented from its policy on three points—

> "As the problem was not to be solved by conquest and annexation, it is perhaps as well we have stepped upon the threshold of Afghanistan. The retention of all we hold now would have thoroughly dismembered the country, reducing it to the status of a mere Central Asian Khanate. If we admit of an Afghanistan state, she should be strong and independent. The points I most strongly object to in the terms we have come to are the omission of Khost from the arrangements we have made regarding Kuram, and what I consider to be our inadequate assertion of our right to the Thul-Chotiali route as a means of communication with Quetta and Pishin. . . . I fear the political authorities do not attribute the value to that slip of country [Khost] that I do. . . . As far as I can make out, between Khost and Kuram there is no well-defined geographical line, whilst the ethnological boundary is still more confused. Under Afghan rule, these valleys were always under our administration and should undoubtedly have remained so. . . . The Amir's need of peace was so overwhelming that with Kandahar and Jellalabad in our hands as gifts to be offered to him we might have had Khost without difficulty, and the Thul-Chotiali route into the bargain as a matter of neither interest nor value to him. It runs through a country so remote from Kabul as to be practically unknown there; the tribes inhabiting that tract do not consider themselves subjects of the Amir. Indeed it is only at certain points and for short distances that the road infringes on what is theoretically Afghan territory. As it stands, the

road is still open to us, but this is not enough, for in its present state it is not practicable for artillery, and in my opinion we should have been content with nothing short of a good made road from Dera Ghazi Khan to Pishin."

The preparation of the dispatch sent by the Viceroy and his Council to the Secretary of State in June 1879, dealing with the war which had just been concluded, raised the question of the value of the Kuram route to Kabul. A memorandum in which Sir Frederick Haines discussed this point is interesting, not merely as expressing the view he consistently held from 1878 to 1881, but also for its remarkable forecast of the position in which General Roberts was to find himself before many weeks had passed—

"I am at a loss to understand how we can assert that the line to which we attached at the outset the greatest importance was that of Kuram. Certain it is, that this is not borne out either by the instructions I received from Government, or by those issued by me to the various commanders under the authority of Government; nor was it shown by the force first detailed for the occupation of Kuram, or by the strength of that which fought at the Peiwar Kotal. I should rather say, that whilst great value was attached to the occupation of that valley as a military diversion, and as a political measure, the full import of the operations in Kuram was not recognized until after the defeat of the Amir's troops on the Peiwar Kotul. It must be remembered that the full import of the operation *could* not have been prejudged by us, for heavy reinforcements (four regiments) joined the enemy the very morning of the battle, of which neither our mili-

tary commanders nor our political officers knew ought, until after the capture of the position. This unknown element rendered the Amir's army far better worth the beating than had been anticipated; enhancing the value of the victory.

"Looking deliberately at the Shutr Gurdun as a means of access to Kabul, I cannot even now assent to the proposition that the Kuram line is the most important one. It affords one line of advance. Its approaches are difficult from the Kuram side (greatly improved no doubt since our occupation), the descent to Kushi is extremely so. So inferior is it as a line of military communication, that a General operating by it, unless in perfect accord with Jagi, Mongol, Ghilzai, &c., &c., must on leaving the crest of the pass sever his connection with his original base, and become dependent on a force operating either by Ghuzni or by the Khyber. In General Roberts' case, had he been called upon to advance, his division would have become a flying column, provided with a certain amount of food and ammunition, but after their consumption dependent on the Jellalabad force, with which he must effect a junction to enable him to live. I think it would be a grave error to assert that a line so situated is our most important line of operations against Kabul. In my judgment it is entirely subsidiary. Kuram for great operations is virtually a cul-de-sac, especially so without Khost, through which valley it is stated an easy route leads into Afghanistan. We were fortunate indeed in being able to inflict so heavy a blow on the troops which defended the Peiwar Kotul, but I think we can assert this without claiming for the Kuram line a strategic value beyond that which it really possesses."

The review of the operations compelled the Commander-in-Chief, both in defence of the commander of the Peshawar Valley Force and in the hope of providing against similar delays in the future, to lay stress upon the way in which military operations had been hampered by the unwillingness of Government to issue final orders, and by the general condition of unpreparedness which had been induced by unwise economy. But in spite of their numerous points of difference, Lord Lytton and Sir Frederick Haines continued to be on friendly, and even cordial, terms. At the beginning of the year Lord Lytton had sent his "affectionate good wishes" to his colleague, who was then recovering from an attack of fever, and had told him that "were it not for the sufferings of our dear Commander-in-Chief and our Frontier Hero [Sir Neville Chamberlain], I should say that the New Year opens with favourable auguries for the Government of India." After the conclusion of the war, when recommendations for honours were being made, Lord Lytton wrote—

> "The only military officer whose name I have admitted in that capacity in my own list of recommendations for civil honours is Your Excellency, whom I have recommended for the G.C.S.I."

This was a very unusual step to take, for the Star of India was regarded as a decoration exclusively civil, and in a later letter Lord Lytton justified his application for it. There had been at least one exception to the rule that the Star of India was not given to military officers except for special civil services. That exception was the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army,

on the occasion of the Delhi Proclamation of 1877. It appeared to the Viceroy that another exception might reasonably be made for the Commander-in-Chief in India, at the close of a successful war. The Commander-in-Chief was not only the Executive Head of the Military Administration, but a member of the Civil Government, and he told Sir Frederick, "more than any other member you have shared and contributed to the discussion of those political questions out of which the war arose and to the solution of which it was directed."

The Home Government adopted the Viceroy's suggestion, and the decoration of the Grand Cross of the Star of India was conferred upon Sir Frederick Haines in July 1879. Two years earlier he had received the Grand Cross of the Bath, and, on the institution of the Order of the Indian Empire in 1878, he, as a member of the Viceroy's Council, became an *ex officio* Companion of the Order. When the War in Afghanistan came to be discussed in Parliament, the thanks of both Houses were accorded to Lord Lytton and Sir Frederick Haines "for the ability and judgment with which the resources of the British Empire in India have been applied to the support of the Military operations in Afghanistan." The inclusion of the Viceroy's name in the vote of thanks was the subject of some discussion, in the course of which the late Earl Granville referred to rumours of dissensions between Lord Lytton and Sir Frederick Haines.

"It has been stated," he said,[1] "that Lord Lytton, without authority from Her Majesty's Government,

[1] *The Times*, 5th August 1879.

gave positive orders for an attack upon the Khyber Pass without an adequate force, which must have ended in a great disaster, and which was only stopped by the obstinate determination of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick Haines, and that since that time the relations between the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief have not been of a cordial character. It will be satisfactory if Her Majesty's Government can deny these allegations. It would be still more satisfactory if they could, like Lord Palmerston [in 1858], refer to a letter from the Commander-in-Chief referring in enthusiastic terms to the great services rendered by the Governor-General to the military operations."

No representative of the Government responded to the challenge.

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CHAPTER IX

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1879–80

IMMEDIATELY on the conclusion of peace, steps were taken for the withdrawal of British troops from Afghan territory. The Peshawar Valley Field Force was broken up in June, and the return march was saddened by numerous deaths from cholera. The Kuram and Kandahar columns were not reduced, but the grave error was made of reducing the transport organization on the ground of economy. It was, of course, impossible to resist the financial arguments for reduction, but the Commander-in-Chief never believed that the Treaty of Gundamuk was likely to be in any sense a permanent agreement.

> "We have yet to see," he wrote on the 16th June, "what Yakoob Khan's power in the country is really worth. His brother Ayoob Khan is at Herat at the head of troops. Afzul Khan is at Farrah, also with troops. How are these troops disposed towards Yakoob Khan? Brotherly love does not count for much in Afghanistan, and Afzul Khan is the grandfather of Abdulla Jan, the late heir to the throne of Kabul; he may be supposed to be hostile to Yakoob. Intestine strife will inevitably arise out of this situation; we may yet have to force our way to Herat through the midst of it."

Sir Frederick Haines realized that the members of the British Mission to Kabul were taking their lives in their hands. The feeling was shared by its leader, Cavagnari. "This is a great chance for you, Cavagnari," said the Commander-in-Chief as he bade the Envoy farewell at Simla. "Yes, sir," was the reply, "it is a case of a man or a mouse." The knowledge that he might be walking into a death-trap was present with him when he wrote confidently and courageously from Kabul about the prospects of his Mission. "He was endowed with the highest class of courage, both physical and moral," wrote Sir Frederick Haines about him, when the news reached Simla of the massacre of the 3rd of September; "he is a man not to be replaced."

In the beginning of September 1880 the Government of India had some 6,500 men on the Kuram line, and about 4,000 men on the Khyber line. The evacuation of Kandahar had begun on the 22nd August, and there were still some British troops in the city. A report of a disaster to the Kabul Embassy first reached Simla on the 5th September. Brigadier-General Dunham Massey was in command of the Kuram Division, in the absence of General Roberts, who was engaged in Army Commission work at Simla. Orders were sent to Massey to start at once for Kabul in the hope of relieving the Mission. Before these orders could be carried out, the receipt of more authentic intelligence destroyed all hope of finding Cavagnari or any of his suite alive. It was still felt that the retribution for the murders must be prompt, and that an immediate occupation of Kabul might prevent disorder from

spreading; but some time was required for preparation, and the necessity of instant action no longer existed. Massey was therefore told merely to occupy the Shuturgardan, and, at the same time, instructions were issued for the reoccupation of Kandahar and of Jellalabad. On the 10th September, it was announced that General Roberts, with a force of 6,500 men, was to march from Kuram upon Kabul. The Kuram line was useful for the purpose of the immediate advance now contemplated, for the Kuram force happened to be the only body of troops which could be sent to Kabul at once; but to depend upon it as a line of communication was impossible, as the Shuturgardan Pass was liable to be shut up by snow at any time after the beginning of November. In his project for the campaign, Sir Frederick Haines therefore pointed out that it would be out of the question for General Roberts to send back to, or trust to, Kuram for supplies—

> "When once over the Shuturgurdan, Major General Sir Frederick Roberts will sever connection entirely with Kuram."

The line of communication to Kabul via Jellalabad must at once be reopened, and the utmost energy would be required to secure carriage and supply. The Chief proposed to send 13,000 men in advance of the Khyber, with assured communications, and supported from Peshawar. Dakka and Jellalabad were to be garrisoned; a movable column located at Gundamuk; and a column, under Brigadier-General Charles Gough, at Jugdalak, a point about twenty-three miles in advance of Gundamuk and fifty miles from Kabul. The command of the Khyber force, known as the

Second Division of the Kabul Field Force, was entrusted to Major-General R. O. Bright, a soldier who had earned distinction in the Crimea and in the Hazara campaign. His instructions were to create and keep up supply communication with Kabul.

Lord Lytton had learned one lesson from his recent experience. In spite of the protests of the Commander-in-Chief, he had visited upon Sir Samuel Browne the discredit of the failure of his transport in the last campaign—a result which Sir Frederick Haines attributed to the Viceroy's delay in sanctioning the preparation of his column for service. But he took an important step to prevent the recurrence of the conditions under which Browne had worked, for, immediately on the outbreak of what was really a third Afghan war, he placed a General Officer in charge of the arrangements for the control and organization of Supply and Transport on the Kuram and Khyber lines, giving him special powers, both administrative and financial. He selected for this post Sir Michael Kennedy, an Engineer Officer who had done splendid service in the guidance of relief operations during the great famine of 1877. On the other hand, Lord Lytton had failed to understand the necessity for the creation of a reserve, which almost from the date of the Kabul massacre Sir Frederick Haines urged upon him. The difficulty of transport for a reserve force weighed heavily with the Viceroy.

> "It is most unfortunate," wrote the Commander-in-Chief to the Duke of Cambridge, "that we should have broken up all our establishments so immediately on the withdrawal of our troops

from the Khyber line in June, but there was an overwhelming desire to assume an aspect of perfect repose at as early a date as possible.[1] In fact, there is always a desire to do something either before Parliament rises or before it assembles, which sadly militates against the logical sequence of military plans and events."

On the 24th September, General Roberts moved forward from the Shuturgardan.

"The line by road," comments Sir Frederick Haines, "is so difficult and unsuited to the movement of troops encumbered with large convoys that I shall be disposed to give Roberts enormous credit, if he conducts the operation he is now engaged in with moderate loss, should there be anything like determined tribal opposition to be overcome."

As the march progressed his admiration increased. "In crossing the Shuturgardan in such good form as he appears to have done, Sir Frederick Roberts has performed a notable feat." But even after Roberts' victory in the very severe skirmish at Charasiab (eleven miles from Kabul), on the 6th October, he felt keenly the danger of the situation into which the Government had been forced by the urgency of the political situation—

"General Roberts' force is at this moment a strong flying column not in firm and well assured communication with his base at Kuram, whilst want of carriage sadly impedes the operation of opening up a fresh line of communication and

[1] The Commander-in-Chief was informed, at the close of the campaign of 1878-9, that the Government of India would never again enter upon a winter campaign in Afghanistan.

supply. Roberts' carriage, too, is not fully up to the measure of his wants, for I see he has to send back animals to assist in bringing up his reserves and his supplies. . . . Want of transport is a terrible drag upon us at every point. It retards Roberts, it prevents our getting full value out of the troops at Kuram, it prevents our acting with promptitude on the Khyber line, and it renders an advance from Kandahar on Ghuzni impossible. I trust the Government of India will see the necessity of forming and maintaining at all times an efficient Transport Department, for it is evident that it is through the means of such an establishment that our military power can be promptly and successfully applied in time of need like the present. This is acknowledged now, but when this affair shall have been settled and the inevitable financial reaction sets in next year, I shall be surprised if expenditure under this head is allowed."

On the 12th October, General Roberts entered Kabul, bringing with him the Amir Yakub Khan, who, on the 27th September, had arrived as a fugitive in the British camp, and who now abdicated the throne of Afghanistan. There was considerable anxiety, not only about the position of the main force, but also about the garrison which had been left on the Shuturgardan and which, after a gallant defence, had to be relieved from Kabul. With the arrival of the garrison at Kabul on the 4th November, communications by the Kuram were definitely secured, but by this date the Khyber force had occupied Gundamuk, and on the 5th November reached Jugdalak, whence it came into communication with Kabul. Meanwhile a serious danger

had menaced General Roberts. On the 16th October, a terrific explosion occurred in the Bala Hissar, the fortified palace at Kabul, then occupied by the 5th Gurkhas and the 67th Foot. Some gunpowder stored in a detached building had caught fire, and for some time the great magazine was menaced. Haines greatly admired the calm and confident tone of General Roberts' communications with Simla. Some commanders, he says, would have sent two or three telegrams explaining the progress of the flames towards the 250 tons of powder in the Grand Magazine.

> "Roberts, on the contrary, reports the explosion, states that his efforts were directed to cutting off the fire from the Magazine, and does not report at all again until he can say, 'Fire ceased yesterday after reaching and scorching wall of main Magazine,' winding up his telegram with 'country round Kabul quiet. All well.' People sleep better after Roberts' telegrams. . . . He is certainly doing his work most admirably."

For some time it seemed as if all were going well at Kabul, where General Roberts took up his winter quarters, not in the Bala Hissar (the demolition of which he recommended "as an act of retributive justice"), but at Sherpur, a large partially fortified cantonment about a mile from the city. Suddenly, in the early part of December, Sir Frederick Haines realized how dangerous was the situation.

> "Yesterday, as it were," he wrote on the 19th, "General Roberts seemed to be supreme at Cabul. To-day he is apparently besieged in his cantonment in the neighbourhood of that city."

The causes of this Afghan outbreak have been

admirably summarized in *Forty-One Years in India;*[1] but it is clear that the gravity of the danger was not foreseen in the autumn of 1879. General Roberts' courage and confidence had led him consistently to assure the Commander-in-Chief that he required no assistance. On the 8th December, when the situation was already developing, he had telegraphed in reference to his sending for the Guides from General Charles Gough's Brigade at Jugdalak—

> "I am not in need of reinforcements, but as bringing up troops from the direction of Jellalabad will have a good political effect, I have ordered the Guides Corps to Kabul. They will probably only remain a few days here."

On the 12th, in announcing the reverse of the preceding day, he said—

> "The combination against us is undoubtedly very extensive, but we are strong enough to do all that is required. Guides arrived last night. Thinking that excitement might spread along line of communication, have requested General Bright to reinforce Gundamuck to admit of troops there being used as a moveable column. It is very desirable that tribes should see that our communications are strongly held. At same time I don't think more troops are required from India."

The change of tone in the last sentence did not escape the observation of the Commander-in-Chief, and he immediately, and in anticipation of sanction from the Viceroy, ordered troops to advance from Peshawar, replacing them at Peshawar from Rawal

[1] Vol. II, pp. 260–2.

Pindi. Further he again urged Lord Lytton "to assemble at Peshawar as quickly as possible a Division, consisting of a Cavalry Brigade, three British and six regiments of Native Infantry, with artillery in proportion." The Viceroy, on the 14th, cordially sanctioned the step which had been taken, and subsequently the proposal of a Reserve Division. Next day a further telegram arrived from General Roberts, now besieged in Sherpur after the further reverse of the 14th—

> "I have ordered General [Charles] Gough to push on from Gundamuck as fast as he can, withdrawing a Lataband detachment as he passes by, as this excitement and combination are now sure to spread along line of communications. I strongly recommend more troops being pushed up so as to admit of General Bright being able to keep open communication, and to enable me to clear the country, should I find it impossible to do so with my present force, which seems likely, looking to the overwhelming numbers and the great determination the enemy exhibit. Your Excellency may depend on my doing all that is possible, but I foresee that I shall not be able to do all I ought, unless strongly reinforced, which should be done without delay."

This was the crisis of the early part of the campaign. The Viceroy was congratulating himself on having avoided the error of giving General Roberts too large a force.[1] The Commander-in-Chief was straining

[1] "I do hope that our military authorities will not encourage the foolish cry for 'big battalions' in a country where it is almost impossible to feed even small ones. Had I given in to this cry at the outset of the campaign, what would have been

every nerve to assemble the Reserve Division which he had been forbidden to prepare in October, and which he still believed to be insufficient. At Sherpur, General Roberts, fortunately amply supplied with provisions and possessing sufficient ammunition, was making a gallant and skilful defence of a cantonment much too large for his troops, against 100,000 Afghans,[1] inspirited by their re-capture of the city of Kabul. At Gundamuk, General Charles Gough was preparing for perhaps the most adventurous march of the war. Seventy miles lay between him and Sherpur, where Roberts, invested by an enormous force of Afghans and unlikely to be able to render him any assistance, was unaware of his subordinate's weakness in numbers, equipment, and transport. At Sherpur, Roberts could have held out for three or four months; there was a grave danger that the investing force might turn and fall on the relieving force, and any disaster to Gough's troops would greatly intensify the danger of Roberts' position, and might seriously aggravate the difficulties of the coming spring campaign. It was therefore essential that General Gough should not advance until he was able to take with him supplies for all probable requirements, and sufficient troops to meet what might be serious opposition. When, on the 14th December, he received Roberts' telegram, he replied that he had just arrived at Jugdalak; that he had only five hundred

the position of General Roberts during the last week? Absolutely untenable."—Lord Lytton, 31st December, 1879: *Indian Administration*, p. 395.

[1] Lord Roberts, in his autobiography, considers this estimate not exaggerated.

men with him, and that he would advance as soon as he possibly could. During the night the telegraph line was cut; the heliograph[1] was rarely available, for the weather was cloudy; and communications with Kabul were entirely cut off. General Bright shared Gough's view that the operation was too risky to be carried out with the small force at his disposal, and he pushed up reinforcements and supplies as fast as his resources permitted. The Ghilzais were up in arms and were attacking the communications. By the 20th, Gough's force was brought up to 1,800, and he had received sufficient supplies to enable him to advance, as he had intended, and in accordance with his promise to Roberts. The same day a Sepoy in disguise got through from Lataband, bringing an order from Roberts, forwarded by heliography, directing an advance at all hazards; and another message arrived from General Bright, who was unaware of Roberts' orders, directing Gough on no account to advance until he sent him further reinforcements or orders. In these circumstances Gough decided to

[1] The heliograph was now being used for the first time in warfare. "I have recently sent home full reports on the signalling done by heliograph in the course of our recent operations. It is an admirable instrument and cannot fail to be of great value in future European wars, though of course the sun cannot be so fully relied on as it can with us. When in Madras, I forwarded some interesting reports on this instrument by Captain Begbie of the Madras Sappers, showing how well it had answered its purpose for camps of exercise. Now it has been fully established as a most valuable means of communication in time of war. I sent some ten sets of instruments to Natal with Sir George Colley, and offered signallers. These latter were not accepted, but I believe the former were found very useful."—Sir F. Haines to the Duke of Cambridge, December 1879.

carry out Roberts' orders and advance next day. He resolved to hold on to Jagdalak as an advance base, and to protect his rear from being followed up by the Ghilzais, and on the 21st he moved on, taking 1,400 infantry, 4 mountain guns, and 20 cavalry—a very small force for such an undertaking; but he calculated on picking up the Lataband detachment of about 700 men on his way, and he expected that Roberts would be able to break out of Sherpur and give him some assistance.

His transport was wretched, the weather very severe, the road rugged beyond description, and over a mountain pass. Many breakdowns occurred, and tents and baggage had to be abandoned in order to carry on supplies and ammunition. On the 3rd, Gough arrived at Burkhak, and heliographed to Roberts, asking for orders. No reply was received, for clouds obscured the sun. He advanced to the Logar Bridge, and bivouacked there; the bridge was fortified and entrenched, but undefended. Late at night a messenger got out from Sherpur with instructions from Roberts. That night a heavy snowstorm commenced, through which Gough and his small force marched on to Sherpur, entering it at dawn. The Afghans had fled during the night; after Gough's arrival Roberts was able to send out cavalry in pursuit, but they could do nothing in the snow, and had to return.

The Afghans had spent the 23rd December in a vigorous attack upon the cantonment, but had been repulsed by the garrison with slight loss. Gough's approach had impelled the enemy to adopt the hazardous course of turning the siege into an assault, and they

had been defeated. He had met no enemy, but he had relieved Sherpur, and the Commander-in-Chief took occasion to record "his high appreciation of the very able and satisfactory manner in which Brigadier-General Gough conducted this extremely difficult operation." Fortune had favoured his bold advance, for two days after he left Jugdalak the Ghilzais had returned in numbers large enough to have seriously impeded his march.

The difficulty of finding immediate reinforcements for General Roberts in the middle of December had been increased by the operations in the Kuram valley. Lord Lytton, to the end of his period of rule in India, continued to believe in the value of the Kuram as a route to Kabul, although he admitted that the preponderance of military opinion was against him. Even after all communication between Kabul and the Kuram had been severed, British troops remained in occupation of the Peiwar Kotal. When Roberts telegraphed for additional troops, General Tytler was conducting in the Kuram an expedition against the Zaimukhts, a Pathan tribe adjoining Kohat, and no troops could be spared. After the conclusion of this expedition, in the end of December, the Commander-in-Chief felt more strongly than ever that "the occupation of Kuram through the winter months is a drag on our resources," and he urged the reduction of the force which held the valley. It was not, however, until after Lord Lytton had left India that the uselessness of the Kuram[1] as a permanent line of communications was

[1] Lord Lytton was guided in this, as in many other matters, by Colley's opinion: "Personally my hobby is the Kuram. . . . I had long ago come to the conclusion that the possession of the

recognized by the Government of India, and preparations were therefore made for the spring campaign of 1880 along the three lines of advance on Kabul familiar in the preceding campaign.

The necessity for a concentration at Kabul depended partly upon the general conditions in Afghanistan, and partly upon apprehensions of an attempt upon Kabul by Abdul Rahman, a cousin of Shere Ali, whose father had been ruler of Kabul for a year before his death in 1867, and who had been himself dispossessed by Shere Ali. He had been living at Tashkend under Russian protection and restraint. When the abdication of Yakub Khan and his deportation to India by the British Government were announced, Abdul Rahman was released by the Russians, and given some assistance in arms, animals, and money. It seemed at first not improbable that Abdul Rahman, as the ally of Russia, might make a dash at Kabul as soon as the Bamian and other passes over the Hindu Kush were open in the spring. The wise policy of Lord Lytton prevented any such catastrophe, for he entered into the negotiations with Abdul Rahman which ultimately brought about the solution of the Afghan problem; but communications between the future Amir and the British Government did not commence until March, and meanwhile the plans for the spring had to be decided upon.

Peiwar held the most commanding military position, short of Kabul, in Afghanistan. . . . The Kuram Valley is mainly fairly open and inhabited by a peaceable agricultural population, so that our communictions there will never be troublesome or uncertain."—Colley to Sir Luther Vaughan, January 1879: *My Service in the Indian Army—and After,* by Sir Luther Vaughan, p. 180.

The lesson of the attack upon Sherpur was not lost upon General Roberts, and the Commander-in-Chief hoped that it would not be lost upon the Government of India.

> "There is a limit," he wrote, "to the numbers we ought to call upon our troops to meet. Of course, our superior weapons give us control over greatly superior numbers, but we cannot go on reckoning on this superiority as a constant quantity. The Afghans already have some 5000 Snider rifles, which with a large amount of ammunition were given to Shere Ali out of our own arsenals. The same with Enfields; 25,000 of these were given; and Shere Ali certainly had artificers capable of converting them into Sniders. He could turn out Snider ammunition too, for much of this class of native manufacture was found in the Bala Hissar."

Sir Frederick Haines thus describes his proposals to meet the danger of a great tribal combination in the spring—

> "The Bombay Presidency to relieve the Bengal troops at Kandahar, setting the latter, under Sir Donald Stewart, free to operate towards Ghuzni and Kabul. General Bright to reinforce Sir Frederick Roberts at Kabul, thus placing troops at his disposal for operations towards Bamian. A moveable column from Kuram to cross the Shuturgardan and to work either towards Kabul or Ghuzni as circumstances may dictate." [1]

By these means it was hoped to acquire complete military ascendency in Afghanistan by Kandahar to Ghuzni and on to Kabul.

[1] Sir F. Haines to the Duke of Cambridge, 13th January 1880.

The scheme of the Commander-in-Chief was accepted by the Government of India, but it was not destined to be completely carried out. Operations towards Bamian proved to be unnecessary, as the negotiations with Abdul Rahman progressed; and the Kuram project was soon recognized to be impracticable. This, of course, was no surprise to Sir Frederick Haines, whose acquiescence in operations by the Kuram had always been against the grain, although, as the troops were there, he made every effort to make use of them.

> "Kuram is our weak point,"[1] he wrote, while preparations were still in their initial stages; "it eats up a large number of men, and, as I have always anticipated, we can only send forward by this route a small body of men, and that in the shape of a flying column. In fact, the operation which was resorted to in October last, when the Shuturgardan garrison and others were sent forward to Kabul, would have to be again repeated, Sir F. Roberts giving a hand as far as Shuturgardan, if not to Ali Kheyl."

General John Watson, who was now in command of the Kuram, definitely reported that with his existing force he could not advance farther than Ali Kheyl, and the Viceroy acquiesced in Sir Frederick's proposal that no reinforcements should be sent, and that the communications with Kabul via the Kuram should be reopened by a detached force sent by Roberts or Stewart. No such force ever was detached, and the Kuram remained, as Haines had described it, a cul-de-sac. General Watson and his small force held

[1] Sir F. Haines to the Duke of Cambridge, 4th February 1880.

it till the following October, when its evacuation was ordered.

> "As a line of military communications," wrote Haines, "experience has condemned it, and I abandon it as such without the slightest regret";

his view was shared by General Roberts, who described it as a by-road. It will be unnecessary again to refer to the Kuram; but it must not be forgotten how far Colley's unfortunate "hobby" hampered military operations in Afghanistan from 1878 to 1880.

Preparations for the advance by the Khyber and by Kandahar were made rapidly and without much friction between the Commander-in-Chief and the Viceroy. General Roberts was reinforced at Kabul; and in the end of April his force amounted to nearly 14,000 men (besides followers) and 38 guns. The Kabul force was divided into two Divisions; one under the immediate command of Sir Frederick Roberts and the other under General Ross, who had been in command of the Reserve Division at Peshawar. General Bright was placed in charge of communications on the Khyber line, his force consisting of 15,000 men and 30 guns. General Stewart, who had also received reinforcements, left Kandahar on the 30th March. He was succeeded at Kandahar by General J. M. Primrose, who commanded the Poona Division. He had seen some active service at the Cape in his youth, but the greater portion of his career had been passed in Staff employ. Primrose had been nominated by the Bombay Government for the post, Kandahar being now garrisoned by Bombay troops. General Phayre

was in charge of the line of communications with Kandahar.

The increase in the number of troops in the field led Sir Frederick Haines to suggest that he should proceed to Kabul in person to take chief command of the three army corps now being formed. The Governor-General in Council considered that he was precluded from assenting to the proposal on the ground of the inconvenience which the Government felt in having their constitutional adviser and executive at so great a distance from India and possibly cut off from communication with it. If so high an official as the Commander-in-Chief were to be isolated at Kabul, the effect upon the war and upon India generally would be disastrous; and his presence in Kabul would give rise to the impression that the annexation of Afghanistan was contemplated. Further, from Kabul, it would be almost impossible for him to exercise effective control over operations in Kandahar and Western Afghanistan. Circumstances might arise which would not only justify but even require the presence of the Commander-in-Chief in Afghanistan, but these circumstances had not arisen. Lord Lytton suggested that

> "much advantage would be derived from His Excellency's assuming more direct control of the whole operations from some central point on the base; whence, while in secure and easy communication with the Government of India, he could direct the Kandahar and Kabul operations alike."

This step the Viceroy pressed upon the Chief and told him that in the event of his concurrence,

"it will only remain for His Excellency to suggest

> such arrangements as may be necessary, and of which the confirmation by the Government may be required for giving effect to the measures."

It was therefore arranged that Sir Frederick Haines should meanwhile move his headquarters to Peshawar; he attached no special importance to the locality, feeling that, if he was to be at the end of a telegraph line, he might as well be at one place as another, but he welcomed the Viceroy's invitation "to assume more direct control of the whole operations."

There were, however, unexpected difficulties in sanctioning the general and departmental staff, and the correspondence on this subject led to the abandonment of the project and to strained relations between Lord Lytton and Sir Frederick Haines. The Viceroy, in the communication in which the new arrangement was suggested, had strongly insisted that

> "there will occur many difficult and delicate political questions essentially connected with the military operations, upon which the military commandants, who are entrusted with political as well as military powers beyond the frontier, must necessarily be in constant communication with, and receipt of orders from the Government of India in that [the Foreign] Department."

In spite of this, General Greaves, who had succeeded Sir Peter Lumsden as Adjutant-General, wrote, without the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief, a private letter to the Viceroy's Private Secretary, in which he stated his view that the Commander-in-Chief must be in absolute command and responsible to the Government for everything, and that even

political correspondence connected with the troops should pass through him. Any other view, he added, was obviously incorrect. This letter must have surprised Colonel Brackenbury[1] (Colley's successor as Private Secretary to Lord Lytton), for the Governor-General in Council had stated an opposite view very clearly. He showed the letter to Lord Lytton, who was much alarmed, and decided to cancel the Peshawar movement. This, in itself, did not much matter to Sir Frederick Haines, though he regretted the letter as "an unfortunate incident in the career of my most intimate Staff officer." But Lord Lytton was further alarmed by a phrase which occurred in a letter written by Sir Frederick himself. The Viceroy had said that "much advantage would be derived from His Excellency's assuming more direct control of the whole operations." The Commander-in-Chief spoke of assuming "personal command of the troops in the field." In these words Lord Lytton discovered a reason for abandoning his original attitude, and adopting that of General Greaves, by whose arguments he expressed himself convinced. It would, therefore, he said, be unwise to attempt to separate the political from the military control or to assume that the Commander-in-Chief could, under the suggested arrangement, have abstained from direct and personal interference with the conduct of military operations in the field. Consequently he proposed that Sir Frederick Haines should have no more intimate relations with the generals commanding in Afghanistan than an English Commander-in-Chief towards any general com-

[1] Now General Sir Henry Brackenbury.

manding in field operations out of England: his control should be limited to matters concerning discipline and efficiency.

To the letter in which Lord Lytton stated these views, Sir Frederick Haines replied that he had himself refused to accept the contention of his Adjutant-General, and that he had written no word evincing a desire to assume political influence or authority of any kind. His position towards the troops in the field was, he argued, in no way analogous to that of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army towards a general commanding a force dispatched from England on a foreign war.

> "Here the lines of communication run into our old established cantonments. Not a day passes without communication with Jamrud from Peshawar, but Jamrud itself and the whole road up to Lundi Kotal is India now. The same in Kuram: India proper extends to within five miles of the Shuturgardan. A day never passes without some direct military contact with the forces in the field requiring immediate orders from me. . . . Your Lordship seems to imagine that it is impossible for me to exercise personal supervision over every communication which passes out of my office to Generals in the field. This, however, is done, as every report received from the front by the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General, is brought to my office every day at 10.30. a.m., discussed, and the course to be taken decided upon."

Lord Lytton, on receiving Sir Frederick's protest against the limitation of his supervision to the discipline and efficiency of the troops, had asked him to draft a minute defining the position so as to combine

the possession by Generals Stewart and Roberts of the power of organizing their own troops, and making their own strategical and tactical dispositions, with an obligation to report through the Commander-in-Chief on matters respecting organization, disposition of forces, and conduct of military operations. Sir Frederick Haines preferred to leave the drafting to Lord Lytton, and satisfied himself with stating the principles upon which he had consistently acted—

> "My principle of command has throughout been one of non-interference with General officers commanding in the field, who have been left entirely free to make their own strategical and tactical arrangements. I find it difficult to forge fetters for myself at this point heavier than those my will imposes. For I admit that officers holding independent commands are entirely responsible to Government for the organization of the forces under their command, for the disposition of these forces, and for the conduct of military operations; and that they are to be given the utmost freedom in working out all details connected with the above; subject only to the general scheme submitted to Government by the Commander-in-Chief and approved, or to any changes which may be made in that scheme under the authority of Government. All reports referring to the organization of these forces, their disposition, and the conduct of military operations, must, as hitherto, be rendered to the Commander-in-Chief for the information and orders of the Government of India. This last is essential, for I still venture to consider myself Your Lordship's chief and most confidential military adviser."

Lord Lytton's Minute was almost in the words of the Commander-in-Chief—

MINUTE

1. It having been decided that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will not assume the direct and personal command of the troops in Afghanistan, the present Minute defining the relations of Lieutenant-General Roberts, and Lieutenant-General Stewart, to the Government of India, and to the Commander-in-Chief, has been drawn up by me in consultation with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

2. Each of these officers is to be considered as a General officer holding an independent command in the field, and will be directly responsible to the Government of India for the organization of the forces under his command, for the disposition of those forces, and for the conduct of military operations, subject only to the general scheme submitted by the Commander-in-Chief and approved by Government, or to any changes which may be made in that scheme under the authority of Government.

3. All reports referring to the organization of these forces, their disposition, and the conduct of military operations, will, as hitherto, be rendered to the Commander-in-Chief for the information and orders of the Government of India.

4. In the event of a concentration of the forces now respectively under Lieutenant-General Stewart and Lieutenant-General Roberts, Lieutenant-General Stewart, as senior officer, will assume the command.

It was a diplomatic victory for Sir Frederick Haines, for, without altering in any respect the principles upon which he had acted, he had succeeded in defeating an

attempt by Lord Lytton to place him in a position in which self-respect would have compelled him to resign his high office. But it was impossible that, after this incident, his relations with the Viceroy could remain unaltered, and there was an unpleasant feature of the correspondence which increased the difficulty of the situation. Lord Lytton had put hypothetically some cases in which the orders of the Commander-in-Chief on purely military matters might be deemed by General Roberts to be so unsuitable that he "would be almost compelled to appeal to higher authority for permission to adhere to his own dispositions." Sir Frederick Haines could not regard such a correspondence as a product of Lord Lytton's imagination. "The only points of interference I remember," he told the Viceroy, "seem to me to correspond pretty closely with those Your Excellency puts hypothetically." It was impossible to resist the conclusion that the Viceroy was in private communication, on tactical questions, with General Roberts, but Sir Frederick contented himself with remarking on the coincidence. He explained that he had caused inquiry to be made regarding the defences of Kabul, in view of the fact that, during the crisis of the preceding December, no information existed at headquarters as to the defensive works at Sherpur, the position of the guns, or the water supply.

> "I have made some remarks regarding the defences, but have left the whole question exactly as your Lordship would have it, in the hands of General Roberts."

The tension of the relations between Haines and

Lytton passed away after the former's cordial acceptance of the Viceroy's Minute. Other anxieties, both public and private, were weighing on his mind. A few days after the close of the incident, he received the news of the sudden death of Lady Haines. She had been in England for the last two years, from time to time in bad health, but there was no reason to apprehend that her end was near, and the restrained letter in which he thanks the Duke of Cambridge for "the sympathetic words in which you allude to my terrible loss," shows how cruelly the blow fell on him. Almost contemporaneously with his personal sorrow came the news of the defeat of Lord Beaconsfield's Government at the General Election of 1880, and of the accession to power of a ministry which was not likely to support the Afghan policy favoured by Sir Frederick Haines. The Conservative defeat was immediately followed by the resignation of Lord Lytton. He remained in office until the arrival of his successor, the Marquis of Ripon, in June, and was able to make some progress in the negotiations with Abdul Rahman. His final letter to the Commander-in-Chief maintained the cordial tone of their personal communications ("though I have had a cropper over the last fence, I rejoice to think that you at least will be in at the death and secure of the brush"), and he described himself as "your affectionate friend and colleague."

The "cropper" to which Lord Lytton referred was, of course, the gigantic error in the Financial Department by which a miscalculation of some thirteen millions was made in the estimate of the cost of the war. The error originated in the Military Department of the

Government of India, and Sir Edwin Johnson at once, and perhaps with unnecessary generosity, accepted the whole responsibility. Sir Frederick Haines was indignant at the suggestion, made for controversial purposes, that the misstatement was no mere blunder but an intentional attempt to deceive the British public in view of a General Election; the very magnitude of the mistake ought, he considered, to free the Government of India from the suspicion of organizing a plot which must inevitably cover them with confusion in a few weeks. The accounts and expenditure of the war were in no way connected with the office of the Commander-in-Chief, and he was only concerned in the matter as affecting the work and the credit of his colleagues.[1]

Meanwhile, the spring campaign was progressing satisfactorily enough, in spite of disturbances in all three lines of communication. Sir Donald Stewart entered Kabul on the 2nd May, having fought successful actions at Ahmed Khel and Ursu. Sir Frederick Haines would have preferred that he had left some troops to hold Ghazni as a temporary measure—

> "It has been such a focus of intrigue, and such a centre for hostile gatherings, that a short course

[1] Lord Lytton complained to Lord Cranbrook that "the powers of military darkness, against whom I have been maintaining single-handed for four years such a fatiguing, and till now not unsuccessful struggle, have in the last hours of my administration contrived to give me a *croc aux jambes* which no vigilance on my part could have prevented and which no explanations on their part or on mine can now solve."—*Indian Administration*, p. 501. The explanation is given in another portion of the same letter. Lord Lytton and Sir John Strachey assumed that Sir Edwin Johnson's estimates, having been accepted by the Financial Department, were not likely to be exceeded.

of discipline and orderly government would have been beneficial. But this was put out of question by the order of Government."

At Kabul, Sir Donald Stewart found himself in command of the Northern Afghanistan Field Force, numbering in all about 36,000 men. Sir Frederick Roberts remained in command of the First and Second Divisions at Kabul, and General Bright of the Fourth Division, on the Khyber line. The Third Division, under General Hills, was known as the Ghazni Field Force. When Lord Ripon arrived at Simla on the 8th June, the British negotiations with Abdul Rahman were not yet concluded; but an agreement was soon made, and on the 22nd July he was proclaimed Amir of Kabul. The question whether Kandahar should be restored to Afghanistan, or retained by the Government of India remained for settlement.

The close of the war was marked by a great British disaster at Maiwand and the relief of Kandahar. The Sirdar Wali Shere Ali Khan had been given in the autumn of 1879 the temporary appointment of Governor of Kandahar, and in April 1880 the Government of India had appointed him its hereditary ruler, promising him military support, and assuring him that Kandahar was to be permanently detached from Kabul. He was known to have no confidence in himself and little in the native troops which he had collected, and his presence was of very doubtful value to General Primrose. The Commander-in-Chief had always felt considerable anxiety about the danger of an attack on Kandahar by Ayub Khan, who had a large force at Herat. The Political Officer at Kan-

dahar, Colonel St. John, reported from time to time rumours of an advance from Herat, but the evidence was conflicting, and there were many rumours of disagreements between Ayub Khan's Kabuli and Herati regiments, and of desertions from his standard.

On the 26th May, Sir Frederick Haines drew attention, not for the first time, to the political intelligence from Kandahar that Ayub Khan contemplated an advance from Herat—

> "If such a move is made, it will have a disturbing effect, not only in the neighbourhood of Kandahar, but also on the Panazai and Kakars on the line of communication, and, therefore, the Bombay Reserve Division should be mobilized as soon as possible after it is known for a certainty that Ayub contemplates a move on Kandahar, or any other direction eastward."

When this recommendation was sent in, Lord Lytton was on the point of leaving India; the news from Kandahar seemed reassuring, and no steps were deemed necessary to be taken. On the 18th of June Lord Ripon for the first time discussed Kandahar affairs with his Council. The Commander-in-Chief returned to his frequent theme of the weakness of Kandahar, pointing out that Ayub had now shown indications of an intention to move on Kandahar, and that in these circumstances the garrison was not strong enough. The Foreign Department, however, retained their conviction that there was no danger, and its Secretary, Mr. (now Sir Alfred) Lyall, in answering the Chief, took the view that Ayub need not be feared. He considered him a man without military skill or personal courage;

he had no authority either over his troops or the inhabitants of Herat; and he would never come. There was considerable justification for this view in the reports that had reached the Government, and the Viceroy was satisfied with the reply, remarking, "Ayub has cried wolf, wolf, so often, he will never come." Sir Frederick Haines walked back from the Council with Sir Andrew Clarke. "Lord Ripon," he said, "has misquoted the fable. Ayub is the wolf; we are the heedless shepherds. You are going home, but don't forget what has occurred to-day, for Ayub will come, we shall have a disaster, and I shall be hanged for it." So much was Sir Frederick impressed by the discussion that he asked Sir Andrew Clarke to make a memorandum of it, "for discussions in Council become intangible things even immediately after they have taken place."[1]

Before long, events were to prove that the instinct of the Commander-in-Chief supplied a wiser guidance than the rumours which had been duly reported. While they were talking, Ayub Khan was already marching upon Furrah.

In the end of May, Colonel St. John had suggested that a Brigade should be detached from

[1] The statement in the text is derived from a letter written to Sir Andrew Clarke by Sir Frederick Haines on the 23rd November 1880, to remind him of the incident. The letter was not intended for publication of any kind, and the Commander-in-Chief, in the face of a considerable amount of abuse, consistently refrained from any public reference to the disregard of his warnings before the disaster of Maiwand. This was characteristic, for he strongly disliked the introduction of a personal element into any controversy; but his biographer does not feel a similar reticence incumbent upon him.

Kandahar to Girishk, on the Helmund River, whither the Wali Shere Ali proceeded on the 1st June. This suggestion was made at the request of the Wali, and it was declined by Sir Frederick, who informed the Government that Kandahar was not strong enough to detach a Brigade. "It is evident," he added, "that very little reliance could be placed on the Wali's troops." Colonel St. John telegraphed on the 21st June that the Wali had reason to anticipate a serious movement on the part of Ayub Khan, and had again asked for the advance of a Brigade from Kandahar to Girishk, which he was holding; and the Political Agent thought that a Brigade might be sent to Maiwand, the Wali being instructed not to advance beyond Girishk. The Government was not yet satisfied, and telegraphed on the 22nd to the British Minister at Teheran, who, on the 26th, confirmed the report of Ayub's advance. On the 27th, General Primrose asked permission for a Brigade with a battery of horse artillery, and a regiment of native cavalry to move on Girishk; Kandahar to be reinforced from Quetta and from Khelat-i-Ghilzai. The Viceroy and his Council came unanimously to the conclusion that "Ayub Khan's advance should be met by a demonstration towards the Helmund," as Colonel St. John and General Primrose desired; but before sanctioning the movement, they telegraphed for the permission of the Secretary of State for India. Lord Hartington's approval was received on the 1st July. In the interval the Commander-in-Chief had pointed out to the Government that General Primrose's proposals were quite inadequate to meet the

situation. To detach a brigade would leave Kandahar dangerously weak, and to withdraw any troops from Khelat-i-Ghilzai would be, he thought, to court disaster. He therefore urged the necessity for at once moving up troops from Bombay to take the place of the force which was to march from Quetta to Kandahar. General Primrose had considered one regiment of Native Infantry sufficient for this purpose: but the Chief insisted upon a brigade, consisting of one British and two Native Infantry regiments, with a battery of artillery and a regiment of Native Cavalry. His recommendations were approved, and orders were given to move up the troops from the rear.[1]

On the 1st July General Primrose was told that a Brigade might advance on Girishk, but was on no account to cross the Helmund. He was informed that the Commander-in-Chief considered the force which it was proposed to leave at Kandahar weak in all arms, and that the promptest measures should be taken to reinforce Kandahar without weakening Khelat-i-Ghilzai, the necessary troops from the reserve being pushed forward at once, and the garrisons on the line of communications moved up when relieved. Burrows, therefore, marched to the Hel-

[1] Communications between the Military Department and the Government of Bombay about the mobilization of the Reserve Division had taken place in consequence of the Commander-in-Chief's recommendation in the end of May, but the Division had not been mobilized, for the Military Department had informed the Bombay authorities on the 27th May that "no steps need be taken immediately nor until something more decided is heard of the truth of the report. Ayub Khan will probably find it very difficult to leave Herat, and, if defeated in front, he would find it still more difficult to get back there."

mund, which he reached on the 11th July. His position was opposite the Wali's camp on the other side of the river. General Primrose felt so confident of his strength that he applied on the 13th for discretionary powers for a move across the Helmund in the event of any emergency which might render it expedient, and the Chief replied that he was opposed to such a move in view of the distance from supports. On the 14th the Wali's troops mutinied, and General Burrows promptly crossed the river, which at that time of year was easily fordable, disarmed the mutineers, captured their guns and recrossed the same day. Of this vigorous and decisive action the Chief highly approved: the situation had been changed by the desertion of the Wali's men, and General Burrows had remained loyal to the spirit of his instructions by at once returning to the left bank of Helmund. A day or two later he retired to Kushk-i-Nakhud. The Chief was uneasy about Burrows's position, and telegraphed to General Primrose to inquire about it. General Primrose replied—

> "Kushk-i-Nakhud is an important position covering roads leading from the Helmund to Kandahar. Whilst remaining on the Helmund, forage and grain could hardly be obtained: whereas they are plentiful at Kushk-i-Nakhud. Between the latter place and Girishk, there is a desert 25 miles broad: General Burrows at Kushk-i-Nakhud is within fair supportable distance from Kandahar. The presence of a force there has the effect of keeping the people quiet."

While Burrows was at Kushk-i-Nakhud, Lord

Ripon became anxious about the movements of Ayub Khan, and on the 21st July he informed Sir Frederick Haines that if Ayub were to escape and make his appearance in the neighbourhood of Ghazni, it would have an unfortunate political effect, suggesting that, if possible, Ayub should be attacked and his army dispersed. The Commander-in-Chief had always believed that Ayub's objective was Kandahar, and that the defence of Kandahar was the first interest of the Government of India. He had unwillingly acquiesced in the advance on the Helmund in view of the strongly expressed opinion of General Primrose and Colonel St. John: but he had never approved of the movement. He liked it still less now, for a series of floods had caused breaks on the railway between Jacobabad and Sibi and had seriously delayed the reinforcements which were being pushed up to Kandahar. A detachment of a Native Infantry regiment had reached Kandahar on the 13th July, and further reinforcements were now being sent up; but Kandahar was still dangerously weak. In his reply to Lord Ripon's communication, the Commander-in-Chief pointed out that, if Ayub Khan wished to attack Ghazni, he could do so by moving along the north bank of the Helmund, without the possibility of our interfering with him. The persistent belief that Ayub would not advance from Herat had prevented the adoption of timely measures to meet him.

> "The Helmund," wrote the Chief, "is 75 miles from Kandahar. The force under General Burrows is weak to attack so large a force as that of Ayub at such a distance from support."

If Sir Frederick Haines had adopted the course which seemed to himself the least objectionable, he would have insisted upon the return of General Burrows to Kandahar, and events would have justified the decision. But there were strong political considerations connected with the situation at Kabul and the negotiations with Abdul Rahman, which rendered it extremely undesirable that Ayub Khan should be permitted to move on Ghazni. General Primrose telegraphed from Kandahar that travellers who had passed Ayub's camp reported disaffection in it and the probability of "a split before they reach the Helmund." On the other hand, General Burrows, he said, was ready to meet the enemy: his troops were healthy and in good spirits, and he was utilizing the Wali's guns. The Chief, therefore, with the sanction of the Government, sent, on the 22nd July, his final orders to General Primrose—

> "You will understand that you have full liberty to attack Ayub if you consider you are strong enough to do so. Government consider it of the greatest political importance that his force should be dispersed and prevented by all possible means from passing on to Ghazni."

On the 27th July, General Burrows fought the disastrous battle of Maiwand. The error which led to the defeat was, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, a fresh development of the consistent refusal to appreciate the danger from Ayub Khan. General Burrows' information was defective; if he had been aware that Ayub would present himself in such force, his plain duty would have been to retire towards Kandahar, keeping a close touch on the

enemy with his cavalry. He was vastly overmatched as to numbers, and the action commenced precipitately on ground not deliberately chosen by the British general, and with an enemy entirely unreconnoitred; the native infantry gave way from the left and threw the line into confusion; the cavalry failed to charge, and a rout became inevitable. The artillery maintained their military formation and their *moral* during the retreat: the cavalry kept together, but no use was made of them, and the army never halted to regain its formation. The retreat was continued without a break to Kandahar, notwithstanding that the pursuit, never vigorous, was not pressed beyond the third or fourth mile from the field.[1]

Next morning the first fugitives reached Kandahar, and reported the complete annihilation of the brigade under General Burrows. Alarmed by the tale of disaster, General Primrose (precipitately in the

[1] These sentences are taken almost *verbatim* from Sir Frederick Haines' review of the action, dated 25th September 1880. Mr. G. W. Forrest contributed to *The Times of India* of 23rd March 1883, an account of the battle drawn from the narratives of survivors:—"The action commenced with an artillery duel which lasted two hours. During this time our cavalry and infantry were exposed to wholesale slaughter, and when a party of Ghazis came up an unguarded ravine, the native infantry gave way, and the 66th were broken by the rush of Sepoys upon them. The cavalry had been so demoralized and crippled by the artillery fire that they could not be got to charge, and a disastrous rout began. The splendid 66th upheld their country's honour. One hundred officers and men made a desperate stand in a garden. They were surrounded by the whole Afghan army, and fought until only eleven men were left. The survivors charged out of the garden, and died with their faces to the foe, fighting to the death. Young Honeywood, holding a colour high above his head, shouting, 'Men, what shall we do to save this?' will be a beacon to soldiers so long as heroic virtue is reverenced."

opinion of the Commander-in-Chief) abandoned his cantonments, and took refuge in the citadel of Kandahar, telegraphing, not only to Simla, but also to Bombay, the annihilation of the brigade. The message was at once cabled from Bombay to London, and Lord Hartington startled the House of Commons by reading it that evening. In point of fact, the brigade had not been annihilated,[1] and, grave as the situation was, this serious exaggeration of the character of the reverse caused unnecessary alarm in England and throughout India. The Home Government at once dispatched reinforcements to India, and the senior naval officer at Rangoon offered the services of a Naval Brigade. Neither step was necessary. Kandahar was seriously menaced by Ayub Khan and must be relieved: but the resources of the Government of India sufficed for the purpose.

The best-known account of the decision to relieve Kandahar from Kabul is that given by the hero of the episode in his *Forty-one Years in India*—

> "The lamentable story [of Maiwand] imparted to me by [Sir Donald] Stewart almost took my breath away, and we eagerly discussed the situation as we rode back together to Sherpur. It was impossible to predict how the news would affect the recent arrangements entered into with Abdur Rahman, or what the attitude of the tribesmen would be; but we agreed that, whatever might happen in our immediate neighbourhood, the only means of affording speedy relief

[1] Of 2,476 men engaged, 934 were killed and 175 wounded and missing; the rest reached Kandahar in safety. General Burrows, who showed great personal gallantry, was among the last to arrive.

> to the Kandahar garrison was by sending a force from Kabul. It soon, however, became apparent, by telegrams received from Simla, that the Government were in doubt as to the best course to pursue, and looked to Quetta rather than Kabul as the place from which Kandahar could be most conveniently and rapidly succoured."

Lord Roberts cannot have known what was passing at Simla, for he does less than justice to the Commander-in-Chief, who first suggested the march from Kabul, and whose view received the support of the Viceroy. Any hesitation as to the wisdom of the measure is to be found not at Simla, but in messages dispatched from Kabul by Sir Donald Stewart. The news of Maiwand reached Simla on the morning of the 28th July. Five days previously, Sir Frederick Haines had warned Lord Ripon that it might be necessary to march a force from Kabul on Kandahar. At a conference with the Viceroy held at noon on the 28th, he suggested that troops should at once be sent from Kabul, "always supposing that no political objection existed" there. Reinforcements by Quetta were now ready in considerable numbers, and General Phayre should also march on Kandahar. A telegram was dispatched on the 28th to Kabul to discover General Stewart's views as to the possibility of relieving Kandahar from Kabul.

There was some hesitation at Kabul. On the morning of the 29th July, a telegram arrived from Sir Donald Stewart in which he said that the news from Kandahar might arouse active opposition at Kabul and that Abdul Rahman might possibly declare

against the British, though there was no reason to suppose he would do so.

> "A force," he added, "can easily be organized here, but as some delay must take place in bringing back ammunition and other stores, the earliest notice should be given to me. The march of a force by Ghazni will stir up the country, but everything must give way to the military necessities of the case, which are of course not known to me accurately."

This telegram gave the impression that Stewart was not averse to the project upon which the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief were agreed. But in the course of the afternoon, a further telegram arrived in which Stewart expressed doubt as to the best course to pursue—

> "In my opinion the moving of troops from Kabul is not sound in strategy or policy, and it is only the impossibility[1] of sending a sufficient reinforcement from India by Scinde route that will justify it. No move can be made from here before the 8th August at earliest, so Government can judge whether move from this will meet the requirements of the case."

On the 30th the Council met, and a further communication was received from General Stewart. He

[1] There was no impossibility of sending a sufficient reinforcement from India by the Scinde route. General Phayre was almost ready to start, and it was possible that his Quetta force might reach Kandahar before the troops from Kabul could do so. But this march did not meet the possible contingency of an advance by Ayub Khan upon Ghazni, and although Sir Frederick retained his opinion that Ayub had always aimed at Kandahar, he agreed that it was necessary to take other precautions, and decided that a march from Kabul was desirable whether Ayub should be on the way to Ghazni or not.

had been informed of the means which were available for the relief of Kandahar by Scinde and Quetta, and he now replied—

> "The arrangements for reinforcing Kandahar seem sufficient, but is it certain that the troops detailed can all be pushed forward at once? The force here is now ready to start when the few stores from the rear arrive, and its movements will be certain. It can reach Kandahar in from thirty to thirty-two days from start."

Haines had remained unshaken in his belief in his Kabul-Kandahar project, and his Memorandum on the discussion in the Council of the 30th, records with satisfaction that the latest telegram was understood by Lord Ripon and his colleagues as an indication that Stewart "was beginning to look with favour on the proposal to send troops from Kabul to Ghazni and Kandahar." On the evening of the same day (July 30) Sir Frederick Roberts, with Stewart's knowledge, sent the Chief a telegram which confirmed this view of his attitude. He strongly recommended, on his own account, the dispatch of a force, and mentioned that Stewart had already organized a very complete one.

> "He proposes sending me in command. . . . You need have no fears about my division. It can take care of itself, and will reach Kandahar under the month."[1]

After the meeting of Council on the 30th the Viceroy prepared a Minute, which was printed and circulated on the 1st August.

[1] *Forty-one Years in India*, Vol. II, p. 337.

"After Your Excellency's Minute, which came to me in circulation to-day,[1] I no longer doubt that a force will be dispatched from Kabul to Kandahar. I am also aware that if a force is to go, it will be under the command of Lt.-Gen. Sir F. Roberts; than this, no better arrangement could be made."

On the 3rd August Lord Ripon wrote to Sir Frederick informing him that he had definitely decided on the movement recommended by the Chief on the 28th July—

"If you agree with me in thinking that we must now dispatch a force from Kabul, I think the concurrence of our colleagues may be so far anticipated as that you may issue the necessary orders at once. As you have already suggested, the Division should be commanded by Sir F. Roberts."

The orders were given and the march commenced on the 9th August; supplies were plentiful and the rapidity of the march gave no time for organizing serious opposition. On the 23rd August General Roberts reached Kelat-i-Ghilzai unopposed, and his arrival there compelled Ayub Khan to raise the siege of Kandahar. It had lasted only eighteen days, for the enemy did not fully invest the citadel until the 6th August, and Roberts broke up the investment on the 24th. The garrison was able to protect itself, though its confidence was lessened by an unsuccessful sortie on the 16th. On the 31st August Sir Frederick Roberts entered Kandahar, and on the 1st September

[1] Sir F. P. Haines to Lord Ripon, 1st August 1880.

he attacked and defeated Ayub in the battle of Kandahar.

> "The admirable energy and skill which had brought Sir Frederick Roberts' force from Ghazni to Kandahar in sixteen days will be acknowledged as constituting a military feat of first-rate importance," wrote the Commander-in-Chief to the Duke of Cambridge; "the endurance of the men as evidenced by the small number of casualties shows the high qualities of the troops, and the success of the movement generally, those of their leaders. The bold military adventure has certainly been brought to a successful conclusion."

With the battle of Kandahar, military operations in Afghanistan came to an end. It was desirable to leave Abdul Rahman a free hand in Kabul, and Sir Donald Stewart commenced the evacuation immediately after dispatching General Roberts on his adventurous march. It was necessary to retain a garrison at Kandahar until a final settlement should be made of the question of its retention. The health of General Roberts did not permit of his remaining in command, and he returned to Simla in October *en route* for England—

> "Sir Frederick Roberts' visit to Simla must have been as pleasant and satisfactory to himself as it certainly has been to all his old friends. . . . He is a charming fellow, and one of the pleasantest travelling companions I ever met; he falls off at sea, in fact there he collapses."[1]

The remaining months of Sir Frederick Haines' term of command in India were chiefly occupied,

[1] Sir Frederick Haines to the Duke of Cambridge.

apart from questions of military operations, with discussions on the retention of Kandahar, and on the Report of the Military Commission. With Sir Frederick Roberts and Lord Napier of Magdala he advocated strongly our remaining in the province. "The retention of Kandahar," he said, in his Minute for the Viceroy's Council, "is in my opinion necessary on political, military and commercial grounds." His attitude on the Central Asian question mainly determined his view of the problem—

> "The value of Kandahar cannot be fully understood until we come to consider the significance of its possession by us, in connection with the advance of Russia in Central Asia. Kandahar is an important strategic point on the line by which alone a serious attack on India can be delivered by Russia. It is the only line by which an organized Russian Army could reach Kabul. It is also the direct route to India."

These views, expressed in more detail in numerous communications with Lord Lytton, were the result of a long study of the possibilities of a Russian invasion of India. They were not accepted by the British Government, which restored Kandahar to the Amir early in 1881; but to the end of his life Sir Frederick Haines never doubted the wisdom of the course he had urged upon Lord Ripon and Lord Hartington. The development of Anglo-Russian difficulties in the early 'eighties seemed to him to confirm the attitude he had consistently adopted; and, although, at the close of his life, the danger had ceased to be present to the public mind, he believed that the

Central Asian question remains for settlement. No subject interested him so much in his later years; on no other did he amass so large a quantity of material; the last Parliamentary debate which he followed with close attention was that initiated by Mr. Balfour's speech on the defences of India in 1905.

The Army Commission was appointed in July 1879. The heavy loss to the revenues of India caused by the fall in the rate of exchange rendered necessary reductions in public expenditure, and the work of the Commission was to advise the Government "what share of this unavoidable reduction can be borne by the military charges without injury to the general efficiency of the army, and in what manner such savings can best be effected." The Chairman was Sir Ashley Eden, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and the other members were Mr. C. E. Barnard, General Sir Peter Lumsden, General Sir Frederick Roberts, General Phayre, General H. H. O'Connell, General H. T. Macpherson, Colonel T. D. Baker, Colonel C. M. McGregor, and Major O. R. Newmarch. The Secretary was Captain (now Sir Edwin) Collen. From the first the Commander-in-Chief had disliked the appointment of a Commission. He objected to it on general grounds; the spirit of compromise which generally governs the proceedings of such a body was, he thought, likely to bring about a result of which no one would fully approve. The discussion of certain subjects included in the Commissioners' instructions would, he considered, tend to disturb the minds of considerable bodies of native soldiers. Above all, he objected to the reduction of expenditure; he recognized, and he

tried to remedy, many defects in the Indian Army; but he held that a Commission, compelled by its constitution to recommend economy, was much more likely to create defects than to cure them.[1] When, in September 1879, four of the military members were sent to commands in Afghanistan, he urged that the proceedings of the Commission should be postponed; but Lord Lytton appointed General Napier Campbell to take the places of General Roberts, General Phayre, Colonel Baker and Colonel McGregor, and the report was printed before the end of the year. The anxiety of the campaign in Afghanistan prevented the Commander-in-Chief from stating his views as he would have wished to do, and although he expressed his opinions very definitely on the main points of inquiry, he was compelled to leave untouched a considerable portion of the field. His memorandum on the report of the Commission is too long for quotation here, and much of it relates to minor points which have now very little interest; and his general views are best expressed in letters written to the Duke of Cambridge in February and March 1881, when the subject was discussed by Lord Ripon and his Council—

> "The Army Commission Report has been under consideration for the last fortnight, and a Dispatch goes home by this mail on the following points: Whether the Commander-in-Chief of the Minor Presidencies shall be retained or abolished;

[1] He considered that inordinate expenditure did exist in the Army; but not in the directions indicated in the instructions to the Commissioners. Like Sir Neville Chamberlain, he attributed unnecessary expense to the introduction of the Staff Corps system in 1861.

whether the Commander-in-Chief in India shall or shall not retain his seat in Council, and thirdly, the division of the Bengal Army into two armies.

"It has been decided that the Commanders-in-Chief should cease to exist as such, Lt.-Generals being appointed to command the Madras and Bombay Armies under the direct command of the Commander-in-Chief in India, these armies being directly dissociated from the local Governments. I have opposed this root and branch, because I know that with the Commander-in-Chief will go all our manufacturing establishments, all our separate sources of supply of warlike stores, and eventually the separate governments themselves. At this stage of the proceedings it will be argued that this does not follow as a matter of course. Further, that with some additions our military factories at Calcutta, Cawnpore and Futtehghur can supply all demands. This has been argued before, and Your Royal Highness will remember how often I have had to write in defence of such establishments as the gun carriage factory at Madras, the Remount Depôt at Oossoor, &c., &c. A more vigorous attack than ever will now be made upon them. The doing away with the Commander-in-Chief is the first step towards the abolition of those Governments themselves, and the substitution of Lt.-Governors after the pattern of those of Bengal, the North-West Provinces and the Punjab. We shall thenceforth have one centralized base from which to operate in case of internal disturbances, instead of three separate and distinct sources of military power and civil Government combined, from which to act. This is a question which reaches far beyond that of mere military organization, though the purely

military part of it is grave enough. I alone dissent from the Despatch.

"The Commander-in-Chief in India is to retain his seat in Council, and in this of course I concur most heartily. He should ever be in the closest possible contact with the Government of India, and to bring about this in its most intimate form I would do away with the military Member of Council, transacting the business, as in Madras, without the intervention of such a functionary.

"The next point is the separation of the Bengal Army into two, under the command of Lieut.-Generals reporting to the Commander-in-Chief in India. I oppose this generally as being part and parcel of a vicious system about to be introduced, but, as a matter of fact, whenever it has been determined to place Madras and Bombay under the Commander-in-Chief in India, through the direct command of Lieut.-Generals, the same system must be applied to the Bengal Army, and the Commander-in-Chief relieved of his direct command. The question of the segregation of the Punjabi and Sikh elements from the Hindustani here crops up, and to that I am bitterly opposed."

Sir Frederick Haines felt very strongly indeed about the proposal to abolish the commands at Madras and Bombay, and his answer to the question put to him by the Commissioners may conclude this summary of his attitude towards their recommendations—

"In this question I am asked to set aside historical sentiment. How far this can be done depends upon the idiosyncrasy of the individual; but in any case we cannot put aside historical facts or the impressions they create. The armies

of India have grown with the growth of our Empire. That of Bengal had the larger growth. It has been impelled by force of circumstances to leave the cradle of its birth, and to advance step by step northward, until it now stands in the Khyber, on the crests of the Shutar Gardan and of the Khojuck. There has never been a question of an army for the Province of Bengal, and I do not see how it can arise. As long as it could, the Bengal Army provided for the wants of that Province. It is now mainly, and I think fitly, held by Madras troops. The population, seething though it be as to numbers, is singularly unwarlike. The communications with our great military centres are so good, that all possible demands can easily be met. I think therefore that the question as put has no very practical bearing on military efficiency. Bengal, the North-West and the Punjab are modern expressions as Local Governments, the establishment of which, we may hope, will turn out a comparatively perfect system of civil administration. They are the outcome of peace, with war they have no concern. The Madras and Bombay Armies have had no small share in creating the Empire of British India, and, like that of Bengal, have spread over immense tracts of country. The magnitude of their military charge is not to be measured by the square mileage of their own provinces, by the density of their population, or by the amount of revenue collected. That of Madras, for instance, has within its military area, though excluded from that of its civil administration, Mysore, the territories of the Nizam and the Central Provinces. It is assumed that the population of Madras is essentially peaceful, but this is not the case even within its own provinces.

The Polygars of the south are not to be implicitly relied on, the Moplas of Malabar are extremely dangerous, constantly giving rise to coercive measures; that the Northern Sircars require troops and are beyond police control we have present evidence. The Ceded Districts also have elements of trouble within them. The Mysore Territory has its turbulent population, especially in Nuggur: in this province arose the disturbances which ended in the assumption by the British of the administration of the country. Mysore is about to be restored to Native rule—an experiment which requires to be watched. Coorg also has an armed population. But the sorest spot within the limit of Madras military government is Hyderabad in the Deccan. This is notoriously the resort of outlaws and desperadoes of all sorts. In addition to this semi-criminal class there is a large body of partially organized troops and irregular bands of Arabs, Rohillas and Sikhs in the pay both of the Nizam and of his nobles. This is a hot-bed of mischief; however we may despise even the best organized of these armed men, they require a large force to watch them. The military demands from the Central Provinces are not excessive.

"The scope of action of the Madras Army does not march with the civil administration, and therefore the force necessary to be maintained and its *raison d'être* cannot in reason be referred to the population, revenue, or extent of the provinces of Madras Proper. But it is clear to my mind that these extraneous matters are better dealt with by that army, which has in the course of time grown up in their midst, than by any other means. The Madras Administrators who have advocated reduction have always excluded from their calcula-

tions these foreign demands, giving the discussion an unpractical turn, for the Madras military liability ranges from Cape Comorin to Cuttack on the east coast, to North Canara on the west, and skirting the Bombay boundary to Nagpore to the north. This under ordinary circumstances: for many years Saugor has been added to its liabilities.

"It must be remembered that we hold the Berars, and have in old days received other territories as payment for the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force and for the Contingent; that we receive a subsidy from Mysore for the maintenance of the troops in that Province, and I believe some slight payment from the Maharaja of Travancore for the regiment at Quilon, so that the military burdens imposed upon us by those States are by no means so heavy as a calculation of the cost of so many regiments and batteries would imply; but no credits on account of these transactions appear in the military budgets.

"I am altogether in favour of retaining the armies of Madras and Bombay on their present footing; they have stood the test of time, and have been found equal to every strain. No doubt the existence of these separate Governments having under them armies separate and distinct from that of Bengal as to race, religion, customs, and interests has proved the strongest element of safety to the Empire, and may do so again. I am specially opposed to the formation of a localized and a locally-recruited army-corps for the Punjab, which I infer No. 4 army-corps would be. It would be an impolitic arrangement to have the Punjab element predominant in the north. Then again it would tend to localize the

Hindustani element too much in its own home districts; it would lessen the general range of relief—an objection in a sanitary as well as in a political point of view. I trust no step will be taken toward forming two army-corps out of the Bengal Army.

"It has been customary to declare that the Madras Army is composed of men physically inferior to those of the Bengal Army, and if stature alone be taken into consideration that is true. It is also said that by the force of circumstances the martial feeling and the characteristics necessary to the real soldier are no longer to be found in its ranks. I feel bound to regret the above assertions and others which ascribe comparative inefficiency to the Madras troops. It is true that in recent years they have seen but little service, for, with the exception of the sappers, they have been especially excluded from all participation in work in the field. I cannot admit for one moment that anything has occurred to disclose the fact that the Madras sepoy is inferior as a fighting man. The facts of history warrant us in assuming the contrary. In drill, training and discipline the Madras sepoy is inferior to none, while in point of health, as exhibited by returns, he compares favourably with his neighbours. This has been manifested by the sappers and their followers in the Khyber, and the sappers are of the same race as the sepoys. I have no doubt all I have said for Madras may be urged equally justly for Bombay. I therefore have no hesitation in saying that the Madras and Bombay Armies form the safest and most efficient reserve for the army of Upper India."

Although no other member of Lord Ripon's Council

agreed with Sir Frederick Haines on this question,[1] his view was strongly held both by Sir Neville Chamberlain and by Sir Richard Temple, then Governor of Bombay. The question was a difficult one, and its final decision was postponed for fourteen years. The Presidential Army system continued to exist till 1895, when the Madras and Bombay Armies Act of 1893 came into operation. It is too early to decide whether Sir Frederick Haines was wrong and the successive Viceroys and Commanders-in-Chief who, from 1879 to 1893, supported the change, were right. The new system has not yet been tested by war or revolt. The abolition of the Military Member of Council, to which Sir Frederick made an incidental reference in the letter from which we have quoted, was carried out in 1905.

In April 1881 the term of office of Sir Frederick Haines as Commander-in-Chief in India came to an end. In his last official letter to the Duke of Cambridge, he said—

"I resign my command in the full assurance

[1] Sir Frederick himself never regretted his attitude. "However glaringly I may have failed in my attempt," he wrote in 1885, "nothing in the whole course of my command gives me greater satisfaction than the reflection that what I could do I did to stem the tide of destructive theoretical reorganization which the Army Commission set a-flowing." About the same time he had the pleasure of reading in the *Madras Mail:* "We hope the members of the Commission now see that it was fortunate for India that their recommendations were only partially adopted. . . . The stirring events of the last three months have proved that Sir Frederick Haines was far more long-sighted than the Viceroy, the Finance Minister, and the members of the Reorganization Committee."—*Madras Mail,* 6th June, 1885.

that it falls into good hands, and that it will be ably executed by Sir Donald Stewart, and I shall present myself to Your Royal Highness, whenever it may be your pleasure to receive me, in the full consciousness that, many as my shortcomings may have been, I have most earnestly striven to do my duty in the very difficult post you were good enough to hand over to my safe keeping five years ago—and when you think of the shortcomings, I am certain you will admit that, from the very first, my path was beset by unusual difficulties and that these have surrounded me pretty well throughout my term of command."

From first to last, in his private letters as in his public references, Sir Frederick Haines showed no jealousy of the distinguished soldiers who gained in the Afghan war a reputation which his high office prevented the Commander-in-Chief from acquiring.

"You must not expect to see my name often in connexion with the war in Afghanistan," he told his wife in October 1879. "I only sit at my table and do the best I can to organize the means by which others gain their victories. These are quiet, unobtrusive works, which have their value and which are duly acknowledged in the end . . . but of course, as things work themselves out, those who are on active service in the field are the Heroes of the day, and rightly so, for theirs are the toil and the danger."

For General Stewart he had a deep regard and admiration, and when General Roberts was being attacked in England, he more than once, in his communications with the Duke of Cambridge, took the opportunity of contradicting statements made in the

Press or in Parliament to the detriment of that general. Throughout the campaign he had entire confidence in the military capacity of each of these generals, and he rejoiced in their rewards and in their prospects of further service to the State. The references in his correspondence to Lord Lytton are invariably generous, and he was indignant at the attacks made on him in Parliament in 1881.

> "His Afghan policy, especially in its earliest stages, was perfectly sound, just, and straight," he told the Duke of Cambridge in March 1881; "I am confident that nothing would tend more to Lord Lytton's glorification than a complete *exposé* of the whole case as he holds it. I am in fear, lest acting strictly on the defensive, he should in some measure spoil his excellent position."

It was the remark of a generous soldier, for his controversies with Lord Lytton had left wounds: but his was not the nature that loves to keep wounds open, or to reveal their existence. He adopted and maintained an attitude of complete self-restraint, not only in public discussion, but also in private correspondence.

With Lord Ripon, his relations were much more happy. More than once in his letters he pays a tribute to his method of transacting business, and when, in November 1880, the Viceroy was seriously ill and there were rumours of his resigning his office, he wrote[1]—

[1] Sir F. P. Haines to the Duke of Cambridge, 15th December 1880.

> "Anything which would take Lord Ripon away from India just now would be a national disaster, for he has certainly started well, and has acquired immense popularity amongst all classes. Everything he has said or done has tended to create trust and confidence."

Sir Frederick's own services in the second phase of the Afghan war were acknowledged by the thanks of both Houses of Parliament "for the ability and judgment with which he directed the recent operations from September 1879 to September 1880 in Afghanistan."[1] Just before he left India, Lord Ripon informed him that the Queen had been graciously pleased to approve of the offer of a baronetcy being made to him. "It is," he said, "my duty to accept gratefully whatever honour Her Majesty may see fit to bestow upon me, but there are circumstances which induce me to hesitate in accepting this." Family considerations, and especially the death of Lady Haines, explain his final decision to decline the honour; but if—as most certainly ought to have been done—the distinction had been offered him a few weeks earlier, when two baronetcies were conferred for the Afghan war, his answer might have been different.

"I hope," he wrote to Lord Ripon, "you will not think me jealous or contentious, for, believe me, I was perfectly content when expecting nothing. I am most grateful to all concerned in procuring for me this offer of hereditary honours, and most of all to

[1] The resolution was carried in both Houses on the 5th May 1881.

Your Excellency for your invariable kindness and consideration."

In the debate[1] on the Parliamentary votes of thanks to the Army, Lord Hartington made no reference to the delay which had destroyed the gracefulness of the honour, and intimated that, as rewards for the conduct of operations, baronetcies had been offered to Sir Frederick Haines, Sir Donald Stewart, and Sir Frederick Roberts, and had been accepted by the two latter generals. He referred to the importance of the services rendered by Sir Frederick Haines and to the success with which his five years' administration of the Indian army had stood the test of actual warfare. "All these military movements," he said, "had been entirely under his direction, and the uniform success which has attended them is due to the ability with which they have been planned as well as the fidelity with which they have been executed." In the House of Lords, Lord Cranbrook praised the "unselfish generosity" with which the Commander-in-Chief gave to another officer the supreme command in the field, while he himself saw "that there were troops in sufficient numbers and that they were sufficiently supplied." Lord Lytton, who took part in the discussion, explained why Sir Frederick had not gone to the front. He said that he was—

> "in a position from long and intimate relations with the gallant Commander-in-Chief to bear testimony to his vigilance in all that concerned the Army of India, and his serenity of mind amid

[1] *The Times*, 6th May 1881.

very trying circumstances. After mature consideration, it was the unanimous opinion of the members of the Council of India that it would be a serious inconvenience to the Government to be deprived of the presence of the Commander-in-Chief. That opinion was stated to Sir Frederick Haines, and though it was a sacrifice to remain away from the army, he made that sacrifice cheerfully in the interest of the public service. But though he was not present personally with the army, he was with it in mind, and he was constantly seeing that the orders he gave in respect of it were faithfully carried out."

Most gratifying to the Commander-in-Chief was the speech of Earl Granville, the Leader of the House. He paid a tribute to Sir Frederick's long and distinguished service as a soldier, and closed with a simple record of fact: "During the war, in no instance has failure been attributed to arrangements made by him." No stronger eulogy could be passed upon the work of a commander who, though not himself in the field, had directed the great military machine which had attained the objects of British policy in Afghanistan.

CHAPTER X

CLOSING YEARS, 1881–1909

WHEN Sir Frederick Haines returned to England in the spring of 1881, after sixteen years' almost continuous residence in India, he settled down to Club life in London. After the death of his wife, he gave up his intention of beginning housekeeping under new conditions, and the years that had passed since he left England in 1865 had made many gaps in his circle of kindred and friends. His mother had died in 1869 at the age of ninety-two; Lord Gough, in the same year, at the age of ninety; his brothers Gregory and Edward were also dead. Of the Indian circle of forty years before, there remained Sir Patrick Grant, then a Field-Marshal and Governor of Chelsea Hospital, Lady Grant, and her sister Mrs. Gregory Haines. With them, and with a younger generation, he had many years of pleasant association before him, and as time went on, he made new friends in London. None of his three sons was permanently settled in England, and Sir Frederick decided upon living in chambers in, or near, Pall Mall, where he had his headquarters at the United Service Club, of which he had been a member since 1855. In 1884, he leased a convenient flat in 123, Pall Mall, but the Club was his home for over a quarter of a century.[1]

[1] His portrait, painted by the Hon. John Collier, now hangs on the walls of the United Service Club.

His first years of London life were varied by some pleasant experiences. In 1882, he was sent to represent the British Army at the Russian Manœuvres. Two letters describing his Russian visit have been preserved; they are so characteristic of the writer, and they contain so many indications of the interests of his later years, that we quote them almost in full—

"*Krasnoe Selo*
"*2nd August (and following days)*

". . . I have nothing but good to say of my new friends, for they are treating me most superbly. I am astonished to find so many of them know me by name and repute. Their politeness and their hospitality know no bounds.

"My party consists of Col. Liddell, 10th Hussars, a very nice fellow and quite as keen to take care of me as Hugh Gough could have been. Captain Johnson, R.A., is younger, but a very useful fellow. He is the taker of notes of the party and is responsible for the material for the Report. He takes careful notes of everything we see, and brings them to me every evening. They are both excellent travelling companions, and like pictures as much as I do, which is fortunate, otherwise I should bore them extremely. . . . We met at the Victoria station at 7.50 p.m. on the 25th. . . . Our first halt was Cologne where we got a little food at 11.20 a.m., starting at 12 for Berlin. Towards evening it cleared and there was a good sunset effect, darkening exactly to the tone of one of my favourite pictures in the Academy [of 1882]—

"'Hence, thou lingerer, light,
Eve darkens into night.'

"We arrived at night and went to the Hotel d'Angleterre, quiet, comfortable and clean, also

admirably situated for the sights. We went to the Gallery in the Musée [the Gemälde Gallerie]. I was not much impressed by my recollections of the Berlin Gallery, but find it a much more important collection than I had expected. I should have liked to have three or four days in it, there are many pictures requiring more study than could be given on such a hurried visit as we paid. I shall only mention one, which is by a master of whom I never had heard before, or, having heard of, had forgotten. The subject is Abraham casting out Hagar and Ishmael into the wilderness, the population of which Hagar would increase apparently immediately on arrival. The artist is Govert Flink. The hands are wonderfully drawn and painted, particularly Abraham's right hand and wrist. The colouring throughout is admirable, but nothing can be finer than the green of Hagar's robe in juxtaposition with the red of Ishmael's. Abraham's figure is fine too, but what a wretch to have thrust out Hagar and at such a moment too. I have never so fully sympathized with her as I did when looking at that picture. I hope to see more of Flink's pictures before I return, but I saw no other in Berlin. . . .

"Our journey forward was uneventful. We got an excellent compartment for ourselves with washing apparatus, so we were quite comfortable as far as the frontier. Just before we reached that, we came across the only pretty woman we had met since entering Germany, there were none in Berlin. This young person, supposed to be a bride starting on her honeymoon, was extremely bright and graceful, just the sort of person who, once seen, I should remember for ever. We have come across one or two bridal parties. At

the frontier, Wirballen, the moment they knew we were going to the manœuvres at Krasnoe Selo, there was no question of search of Baggage by the Custom house officials, our things were passed at once. We are the guests of the Emperor of Russia for all the time we may be in attendance on the Manœuvres, whether we be at Krasnoe Selo or in St. Petersburg. We are all put up at the Hotel de l'Europe, lodged in the most princely manner, with carriages at our disposal at every minute of the day. The officer specially charged with the care of the English Deputation is Prince Orbeliani, Captain in the Caucasian Hussars of the Guard. He is most attentive and shows us everything. We are in every sense the guests of the Emperor, by whom the Hotel de l'Europe is taken for our accommodation. The Prince speaks French and English perfectly, so there is no difficulty about communicating.

"On Sunday (July 30th) we paid all our official visits, to the Minister of War, Chief of the Staff, the Commandant of St. Petersburg and many others. We also visited the Kazan and St. Isaac Cathedral, going up to the top of the latter to get a good view of the city and the Neva—a splendid view, but I hate going up places, especially in spurs. We live immensely in spurs here. . . . At night we drove through the town and were much struck by the beauty of the Neva under the moonlight. As we admired this, suddenly the moon caught the very slender spire of the Cathedral of Sts. Peter and Paul, causing it to appear as if illuminated. It was the reflection from the gold with which the spire is encased. It looked like an enormous lance head of flame.

"We visited the Hermitage palace in which

is the splendid Gallery of pictures.[1] It is useless to see pictures in the way we had to hurry through this. I should like to spend as many months in it as I have been able to spend hours. It is full of real treasures of art, and of historical reminiscence, Peter the Great being the chief figure in the scene. It is quite hopeless to attempt to master this superb gallery of pictures, one comes away with a general sense of the beauty and value of the collection, especially of Murillos, but the Italian and Dutch Schools are also fully represented. In the evening of Sunday we went down the Neva in a steam launch. It was beautifully fresh on the river, and St. Petersburg looks its best from the river. I was sitting near a Swedish officer, when the first gleam of the moon shone on the spire of St. Peter and St. Paul, but it was evanescent, and he did not quite understand my enthusiasm. When I showed it to him a little later, in all its glory, he became even more enthusiastic than I was. The blade of a fine rapier is the form of it, and that standing high in the heavens apparently in flames.

"We received notice in the course of the day that the Grand Duke Vladimir, who commands the troops at Krasnoe Selo, would receive all the

[1] In some notes of his visit, Sir Frederick writes: "An annoying fact is that this Gallery contains the Walpole collection purchased out of England in 1779 for the ridiculously small sum of £35,000. It consists of 89 Italian pictures, 75 German (Dutch, Flemish, etc.), 7 Spanish and 5 English. These pictures are scattered about the gallery, but in the catalogue each picture which formed part of this collection is marked with the letter W, a sign which must often provoke the utterance of a great big D by English tongues. Had this Walpole collection been secured to the nation and added to the National Gallery, our collection would have formed the finest picture-gallery in the world."

Foreign Officers in camp at 12 noon on Monday, so we had to be off in the morning. In the Hotel we all had our meals in our own rooms, but at Krasnoe Selo we dine together, occupying rather crowded huts as dwellings. I gave up my somewhat large room in order to be with Col. Liddell and Captain Johnson, this being a great convenience in many ways. All the nations of Europe are represented; as yet we have seen very little of the French, they are going on a line of their own, and apparently do not intend to join the camp until the Emperor arrives, which will be to-morrow the 6th August. He makes his public entrée at 5 p.m. I am on the best possible terms with all, but am most friendly with the Austrian, Swedish and Danish deputations. General von Ramberg, the Austrian, is a most charming man, perfectly companionable, and full of interesting talk.

"The Grand Duke Vladimir received me most graciously. Of course, he (as all do) asked me if I had not made the Afghan campaign. To which I could only reply, 'Yes, but from afar, not actually with the troops. To Sir Sam Browne, Sir D. Stewart, and Sir F. Roberts belong the honors of the campaign.' A little mortifying, but true, and therefore it is as well to be out with it frankly. The same occurred with the Grand Duke Michael, and with each deputation of Foreign Officers. This greatly lessens the interest they would otherwise have taken in me. On the 1st we had our first parade. I have a charming horse, fresh, active, never makes a mistake and is fully up to my weight. He is a real handsome charger, and I am as much at home on him as if he were Inkerman or Charlie. Ball practice by four Batteries

of Artillery was the first parade. They fired very well, especially the Battery manned by the cadets (Woolwich boys of St. Petersburg). They join in all field exercises and reviews, and always do remarkably well. The Grand Duke always speaks to me on arriving on the ground. I am the senior of all the Foreign Officers present. We generally have two Manœuvres to attend each day except Thursday and Saturday, which are holidays. The first manœuvre begins at 9 a.m. The horses are sent off to the place of assembly, we are driven in a wild career across country or over the worst of roads to where our horses are posted, and there await the arrival of the Grand Duke or many of them.

"On Wednesday last we had a very long day. There was the usual morning manœuvre, and in the evening two forces acting one against the other. It was a most interesting business, but very long, not finishing much before 8 o'clock, and after this we had to drive 7 miles to dine with the Grand Duke Nicholas' son, commanding two squadrons of the Caucasian Hussars of the Guard. This was a wildish drive in a brichka, that is, three horses abreast. We soon discovered that we had both a shaky wheel and a wild driver to deal with, but he got us home again at about 2 a.m., after many dangers in which champagne and other Russian hospitalities played a conspicuous part. The worst of it was our invitation did not distinctly ask us to dinner, so we dined before we went, and on arrival found we had to dine again, which we did without a wink. This is Orbeliani's Regiment. The Grand Duke is quite a young fellow, standing about 6 ft 4 in height. He is a wildish youngster, but nothing could be nicer than his reception of me. The men sang

their national songs, danced, and were prepared to hoist any one who would drink to the Regiment shoulder high and toss them up into the air in a standing position. It was a wild sight. Both Liddell and Johnson had to undergo this operation, I escaped.

"Hotel d'Europe, St. Petersburg,
"20th August 1882

"I thought we should have finished with the camp and St. Petersburg in about a week, but instead of that it has taken us three weeks to see us through it. We have come to an end at last, our last day of manœuvres was yesterday. Such lovely weather as we have had. Ever since the day of the Emperor's arrival in camp, which was detestable, it has been simply charming, if anything, too hot. On some of my long mornings, I would gladly have had Helmet and Puggree instead of the wretched little forage cap without a cover. It is quite impossible that anything can ever happen to me again which will be half so delightful as this trip has been.

"You say 'of course I shone out among the others.' Not a bit of it. There are many most distinguished officers amongst them. The Austrian Ramberg is a first class soldier and my especial friend amongst all. How he and I have spooned together at the Picnic luncheons in the field, and never in the least in each other's way! There is no question of outshining anyone, but I am conscious that I have had a certain amount of success. They all like me and have made a great deal more of me than there was any reason to do. I have assumed nothing, have trodden on no one's toes, and everybody has treated me with the highest consideration. This applies to the Russians as well as to the Officers of the Foreign

Deputations. From the Emperor and Empress and the Grand Dukes down, all have been kindness itself. Yesterday it fell to me to drink the health of the Emperor and Empress and to thank the officers who had had charge of the different Deputations. Imagine me, no orator in my own English, having to perform this duty in the face of the representatives of all the Armies of Europe, and in French too. However I said a few words really from my heart—and scored—for all the members of the Deputations crowded round me to thank me for having exactly expressed what they would wish to have said on their own behalf. The Russians thanked me for what I had said of the Emperor, the Empress, of Russia and her future, and of themselves. The French General was extremely complimentary. For myself, I thought I had said a few commonplace things in very halting language, but they think otherwise.

"This is all very nice, but the Empress will always stand out distinctly as the central figure of this *tamasha*. She is simply charming. I have had lots of opportunities of talking to her, and have so far had my wits about me as to utilize them fully. I have never once had to say to myself 'I wish I had said so-and-so.' Her charming manner puts one completely at one's ease. She has been out at all the manœuvres of the last week, and there has always been an al fresco luncheon, at which she was present with the ladies of the court.

"They think I can ride a little. For the Grand Tournee of the camp, my horse fell to the Danish General; the flies bothered him to such an extent that the Dane had to dismount, and the horse was cast as unfit for the Staff, but I bothered the equerries about him so much that at last I per-

suaded them to give him to me again, and for the last ten days I have been riding him, a little fidgetty sometimes, but no one has been in danger from his heels for a moment. He is a grand horse and has never made a mistake with me in the worst of ground.

"Colonel Liddell and Captain Johnson left me this afternoon, they return at once to England, right through, with the letters. To-night I go to Moscow, stay there two or three days, and then to Warsaw and Dresden. I don't attempt to give you my opinions of Krasnoe Selo in detail, but we have really seen Russia and the Russian Army in a way that few foreigners have seen them. Kronstadt too we have seen. They shewed us the interior of two of the Principal Forts on the eastern side, which is much more than I expected to see. The place is enormously strong. Then we have seen the fête of the Préobrajensky Regiment of the Guards, a wonderful sight, after which we sat down 300 to dinner in the Grand Pavilion at Krasnoe Selo. I occupied the third seat from the left of the Empress, sitting between the Grand Duchess Constantine and the Princess Eugenie of Oldenbourg. I had not been introduced to either, but each said 'I must present myself' in such a charming way that I was at my ease at once and chatted away all dinner time. It was a magnificent function, all the officers of this splendid Regiment being present. The Empress spoke to me for a long time after dinner, after which I was introduced to the Queen of Greece, the Grand Duchess Catherine of Oldenbourg, but not to that vision of beauty, the Grand Duchess Heritiere of Mecklenbourg Strelitz, Anastasie Michaelovna. She is just Marion Terry over again, the least thing stouter, not much, that would

spoil her. Much of the Terry grace of movement but with a more severely regular nose. I doubt this being an improvement. I intended buying a Photo of her, but she comes out quite plain in a Photo so I prefered to trust to my memory, which is strong in the matter of beauty. Her eyes are lovely, but she is short sighted. She is a daughter of the Grand Duke Michael.

"I feel rather lonely in launching myself into the interior of Russia without a companion. The French and Italian Missions go to Moscow by the same train as I go, but they do not go to Nidgni. I cease to be a guest of the Emperor of Russia after dinner to-day. Three weeks of free quarters is a wonderful thing to happen to me, and such free quarters too. I shall never forget the hospitality and genial kindness of everyone I have met in Russia."

On his return from St. Petersburg Sir Frederick received, from the Commandant of the Military Household of the Emperor, portraits of their Majesties, with their autographs, and of the Grand Dukes Nicholas (the present Emperor) and George.

In the spring of 1883 Sir Frederick applied for leave of absence for one year to be spent in Tasmania and the Australian Colonies. The main object of the tour was to visit his eldest and youngest sons, but with his artistic temperament, there was much in his wanderings to interest him. He returned in time to represent the British Army at the German manœuvres in September 1884. He was accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. Bowdler Bell, of the Intelligence Branch of the Q.M.G.'s office, and by Colonel Sir Howard Elphinstone, R.E., for both of whom he soon

came to entertain a warm regard. He found some things to criticize in the manœuvres, but they left upon him a deep impression of German military power—

> "The march past of a German Army Corps is a superb military spectacle, and I have nothing to offer save unqualified praise of the parade movements of the VII and VIII corps when inspected by the Emperor. . . . The Infantry is superb, the men are young and in all line Battalions there are some small men, but all are robust for their inches, and there is not a man under 20 years of age in the ranks. I may say that the class of weakling which fills our hospitals under the strain of service in hot climates does not exist in the German Army. . . . We must accept the German army as the most powerful military machine in the world. It is so complete in every branch, its ranks are so full of men of powerful physique, the supply so ample and apparently so inexhaustible. . . . Imposing, even fatiguing to the eye as a march past of a German army corps undoubtedly is, its full significance is not grasped until the mind has realized the fact that there are eighteen others almost identical in numbers, training and equipment, all on the peace establishment to-day, but capable of being placed on a war footing to-morrow."

Sir Frederick had pleasant meetings with the Crown Prince and Princess (the Emperor and Empress Frederick), and some memorable conversations with Von Moltke, for whom he, as a soldier, had a great admiration. His impressions are given in a personal letter to the Duke of Cambridge—

"It has been an unmixed pleasure to me to have had the honour of being presented to Field Marshal Von Moltke, who always enters into conversation with me when we meet, and that in the most cordial manner. I am under the impression that he is aware that Sir Frederick Roberts' march on Kandahar was made on my responsibility, and that I was the man who would have been hung, not Roberts, if anything had gone wrong with him. In any case, he treats me with the utmost kindness. I regret to say that the Emperor [William I] appears to be very feeble indeed. He looked well on the occasion of the inspection, and remained on horseback throughout. He also looked remarkably well at the dinner which followed, but I hear that when dressing yesterday morning he had a fall, was much shaken, and went to bed again for half an hour, he then got up and came to the field, remaining in his carriage throughout the day, looking very ill and feeble. What wonderful pluck he has, for at the end he sent for us and spoke to us generally, after which he entered into a full criticism on the day's work, and those who heard it say it was an excellent one, completely to the point, showing that he had followed all the details of the work with the greatest precision."

His attendance at the German manœuvres of 1884 was the last public service performed by Sir Frederick Haines; for the remaining twenty-five years of his life he lived quietly in London, making occasional visits to the Continent. A series of small note-books, written in pencil and almost illegible, contain his numerous descriptions of scenery and of pictures. Mr. Kenneth Barnes, who accompanied him in 1896, 1898, 1902, and 1903, writes of their travels—

"The main objective was always Dresden. He used to approach her from various directions —from the Rhine, from Berlin, Nurenberg—but Dresden was the mark by which his journeys were orientated. As a home of opera and of the old masters, Dresden combined what Sir Frederick most enjoyed in the realm of art. Besides, he loved the Elbe as he saw it from the terrace of the Hotel Bellevue, its huge strong current taking the curve under the massive bridge. He watched the rafts, skilfully threading their way on the swirling torrent. He would describe the river as he had seen it once in flood, all traffic suspended. The craft on the river, its loading and unloading, its departure and destination, were of constant interest to his observant mind. A visit to the China Factory at Meissen was a delightful episode, because he knew each stage of the process by which the finished article was turned out. It was characteristic of him that, whatever interested him in Nature or Art, he acquired a real knowledge of, and enjoyed imparting his knowledge. But Pictures were the chief attraction for him: and the picture gallery was practically his headquarters in any town, for he scarcely ever stayed anywhere where there were no pictures. In this connexion it must be noted that, looking broadly at his appreciation of pictorial art, he had a decided preference for the Dutch and Flemish Schools over the Italian School. I never heard him compare them, for he had too much reverence, and did not allow the shadow of comparison to disturb his admiration; but in going through collections with him, it was obvious that he got more pleasure from the genre painting and broad landscapes of the Dutch and Flemish schools, than from the idealists of the

Italian school. He showed that he had an insight into technique by occasionally giving reasons why he doubted the authenticity of a particular work, but he never allowed such considerations to spoil the pleasure he took in its beauty. In whatever town he was, he knew and visited any private collections as well as the big galleries. The last journey he took abroad was in 1903, and he took me specially to Rothenberg, Nurenberg, Prague, Hildesheim, in order to give me an impression of mediæval cities. Wherever he went and had been before, he was received with most courteous civility by anyone who had to attend him, from the Manager of the Hotel, to the woman who took his great coat at the opera. Everyone remembered him and was glad to see him again, and he remembered them. When one travelled with him it was as if an invisible courier were on in front preparing the way, so exceptional was the deferential yet unostentatious manner in which he was received. His habits were absolutely regular and without fuss, he adapted himself to his environment with the acumen of a practised traveller among men whose customs were different from his own."

In London Sir Frederick's favourite and regular amusement was the theatre. He was a well-known "first-nighter," and he had a wide acquaintance and some intimate friends in the dramatic profession. He watched with constant observation and sympathetic criticism the rise to fame on the stage of some of his friends whom he had known from their childhood. Among living actresses he most admired the art of Miss Marion Terry and Miss Irene Vanbrugh. I am

again indebted to Mr. Barnes for the following account of his interest in the drama—

> "He was one of those for whom good acting could compensate for a bad play. He recognized the niceties of stage-technique and delighted in 'polish.' Any art with even an appearance of being unfinished he did not care about, whether the unfinished state was intentional on the part of the artist or not. Consequently his appreciation of Comedy was more evident than that of Tragedy. His judgment about acting was thoroughly sane, he disliked mannerisms or any effect that did not seem easy. His knowledge of the art of acting gave him an appreciation of effect."

One of his friends in the dramatic profession, Sir Squire Bancroft, sends a reminiscence unconnected with the stage—

> "Sir Frederick Haines was in the daily habit, for a long while, after breakfasting at the United Service Club, of taking some food to a jackdaw in St. James's Park. After eating it, the bird would accompany his kind friend in his morning walk, hopping from tree to tree until he chirped a farewell from the last branch he could reach near the Duke of York's steps. The time came when the Field Marshal sought the little creature in vain, and after repeated visits, had to give him up as gone. With great regret for the loss of his companion, Sir Frederick related this little incident with deep feeling."

During the first few years after his return to England Sir Frederick Haines was occasionally consulted by the War Office and the India Office, and he was

always able to place his views before the Duke of Cambridge. The Egyptian question was much in his thoughts in 1881 and 1882. He was anxious to see the Egyptian question, and the Eastern question generally, settled before Germany should possess a great fleet—

> "Germany's time," he wrote in a memorandum dated October 1881, "has not yet come, as yet her Fleets have not grown out of the review period; but wait a bit, she is using every effort to develop her naval resources. Give her time, and she will be a naval factor in the solution of the Eastern question, of enormous power. For we must admit that, in providing means to an end clearly foreseen, she is unrivalled. She has that organizing and productive power which enables her to provide enormous and efficient naval as well as military resources at comparatively small cost to the country."

Of the policy which led to the bombardment of Alexandria he thoroughly disapproved, believing that it would "throw Italy and Turkey into the arms of Germany." When the relations between Great Britain and Russia were again causing grave anxiety, Sir Frederick found that his attitude on the retention of Kandahar was widely regarded as justified by events. "You took a correct forecast of the situation," Sir Edward Hamley wrote to him in 1885, "and it is a great pity that you and others who desired the retention of Kandahar did not prevail." The Central Asian question remained his chief political interest to the end of his life, and he continued to follow foreign policy very closely. His love of art was not permitted to interfere

with his study of this subject, and he read *The Times* regularly on the Continent as well as in London.

On the 21st May 1890, Sir Frederick attained the much-coveted distinction of a Field-Marshal's[1] bâton, and the same year brought him the great pleasure of a new link with the 21st Foot. In 1874 he had become Colonel of the Royal Munster Fusiliers, and he now exchanged this Colonelcy for that of the Royal Scots Fusiliers. He had long wished to hold this appointment, and had expressed his wish to the Duke of Cambridge, who took the first opportunity of gratifying it. The Regiment received their new Colonel with enthusiasm, and almost every birthday brought him congratulations from his old corps. He closely followed its fortunes in South Africa, and though his health did not permit of his greeting its members in person on their return from the war, he sent a gracious and inspiring message of welcome and congratulation.

"He was always a friend of the rank and file," said a newspaper writer after his death, and his personal correspondence attests the interest he took in veterans of the 21st. To one of his efforts on behalf of an old Fusilier a special interest attaches. On the 11th September 1898, a frightful hurricane swept over the island of St. Vincent, devastating the island. Among the sufferers was an old Scots Fusilier, William Jackson, who had served through the Crimea in the 21st, had been transferred to a West Indian regiment, and had closed his active career as Sergeant-Major of Police in St. Vincent. The hurricane recalled to him the great November storm in the Crimea, and the date

[1] He had become a general in 1877.

was close upon the anniversary of the battle of the Alma. He wrote to Sir Frederick Haines to ask if he could obtain for him from the War Office an advance of a year's pension or in some other way assist him "to put up a shelter to cover my old head." The application brought to Sir Frederick's recollection an incident of the battle of the Alma which we relate in Sergeant-Major Jackson's own words—

> "On the morning of the 20th September 1854, a young officer called me and asked if I had any water. I said 'Yes, you can have some.' He told me that Lord West offered to give any person a sovereign for a drink. I gave him one out of a tin pan, he offered me a sovereign. I told him to keep it as both him and me might lose our heads before the day was finished. He told me if I ever wanted it to ask him, and he would give it me with pleasure. I saw Captain Haines looking very hard. I also gave him a drink, he told me as Lord West told me. Everything was forgotten till the late Sir F. P. Haines sent me 16 guineas."

Lord West had long been dead and there were few Crimean Officers of the regiment alive, but Sir Frederick obtained further assistance from the Officers of the Scots Fusiliers of 1898.

In the last months of Sir Frederick's life a public presentation was made in Ayr (the depot of the Scots Fusiliers) to five Crimean veterans belonging to the regiment, and the message he sent formed, not inappropriately, his last words on any public occasion—

> "I feel I cannot allow this occasion to pass without sending my hearty congratulations to my

old comrades of the North British Fusiliers, to whom honour is done so deservedly to-day. I regret extremely that I am quite unable to be present and shake their hands, but it is impossible at my great age—I am in my ninetieth year—and must therefore content myself by wishing them every prosperity and by sending them personally my most sincere congratulations."

A letter from any soldier, whatever his rank, invariably received Sir Frederick's consideration. Numberless applications reached him from officers who had served with him or under him, and for each he did his best. He was not unmindful of the other regiments to which he had belonged, and he was much interested in the great memorial erected at Liverpool to the members of the King's Liverpool Regiment who fell in Afghanistan, Burma, and South Africa.

Sir Frederick had a strong constitution, though he suffered in India from occasional attacks of fever, and his general health continued good up to the end of his life, in spite of an ailment which caused him frequent inconvenience. "The easy fortitude," writes one of his friends, "with which he went through his life as an old man, living alone, and recurrently troubled by a most serious weakness in his physical organs, without in the least giving way to any hypochondriacal tendency was wonderful. I remember the subject of hypochondria once coming into the conversation, and his saying 'Thank God, I've avoided that.'" For more than ten years before his death he was unable to endure the fatigue of riding, and this incapacity prevented him from taking his place as a Field-Marshal

in the Queen's procession, on the occasion of her Diamond Jubilee. His last public appearance was in March 1904, when he stood in Westminster Abbey by the coffin of his old friend the Duke of Cambridge. He had intended following it to the grave, but the King called him to him and suggested his going home after the service in the Abbey. The consideration which prompted the suggestion was not King Edward's only thought for the senior Field-Marshal of the British Army, for on Sir Frederick's last birthday he received His Majesty's congratulations and good wishes.

Though he approached the extreme limits of human life, Sir Frederick's eyesight and his hearing continued strong to the end, his intellect unclouded, and his memory perfect. He had to diminish his activities, but he never curtailed his interests, nor did he ever lose the pleasure of living. His last two or three summers did not see him at Lord's, and in the closing months of his life he was unable to go to a theatre; but his interest in cricket and in the drama continued unabated. After the summer of 1904 he never left London, where he was surrounded by friends and had the frequent companionship and the devoted care of his son, Lieutenant-Colonel Gregory Haines, who was stationed at Aldershot. He enjoyed his Club life, and especially the society of the late Colonel Horace Montagu, who shared his knowledge of pictures, and with whom he dined regularly for many years at the table which members of the United Service Club must associate with his distinguished presence. Early in 1909 he was severely shaken by a fall, but he seemed

to recover almost immediately from its effects, and he thoroughly enjoyed the sixtieth anniversary of the battle of Gujerat (21st February), when, with his son, Colonel Montagu, and a younger friend of his last years, he dined at his Club, and walked up the long dining-room to look at Sir Francis Grant's portrait of Lord Gough. His familiar figure could be seen as usual in Pall Mall until the beginning of a cold June, when he was attacked by a severe illness. He died on the 11th, in his ninetieth year. On the 16th June he was buried, with full military honours, in the Brompton Cemetery, close to his old friends and leaders General Pennefather and Sir Patrick Grant. He had outlived nearly all the comrades of his bivouac, and the Field-Marshals who followed him to the grave belonged to a younger generation. One of the wreaths sent in remembrance bore the inscription: "From the Bugler who gave you a drink of water on the field of the Alma and whom you did not forget when he was in trouble forty-four years later."

As the Last Post sounded over the open grave his daughter-in-law dropped one white rose upon the coffin. The symbol of purity and loyalty was his by right, who had never cherished an ungenerous thought, whose courage had no taint of self-seeking, and whose devotion was as his courage.

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